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THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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FEBRUARY, 1936

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COVER

Fleet Marine Force Activities

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★The November number of
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THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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No. 1

TRANSITION OF THE FLEET MARINE FORCE



Major General
John H. Russell

■ The initial task of building up a distinctive, adequate and flexible striking force, to deal with such emergencies as the Navy Department may direct, has been accomplished by the United States Marine Corps with the active cooperation of the Navy.

It was no easy job to form a sizeable and suitable fighting force of Marines which would become an integral part of the United States Fleet, but after

two years of research, planning and experimenting by officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, the program has reached a highly satisfactory stage.

Thus, with the formation of the "FLEET MARINE FORCE" the death-knell of the old expeditionary forces had been sounded, and an organization much quicker-moving and more efficient has taken its place.

The new force is aptly described in the annual report of Major General John H. Russell, Commandant, for the fiscal year 1935:

"The Marine Corps has increased the efficiency and readiness for action of the Fleet Marine Force, and placed its recruiting services, garrisons of navy yards and stations, and its reserves on a footing which, in the event of national emergency, will make the maximum number of trained officers and men available in the shortest possible time.

"This has been accomplished by the loyalty, cooperation and united efforts of all ranks."

According to officials, the movement has resulted in closer relations between the Fleet and Fleet Marine Force; it has facilitated the regular and continuous training of the force in conjunction with fleet operations, and assures prompt readiness and movement of the Fleet Marine Force when the Fleet or its detachments start operations requiring the use of such a force.

They point out that it is a marked contrast with the previous occasional contact between the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and the commanding officer of an ex-

peditionary force, the irregular and uncertain training of the force personnel, and only the problematical readiness of an adequate force to move promptly when called upon for such service.

The term of "Fleet Marine Force" was suggested by General Russell. Among those afloat who played an important part in adoption of the new plan was Admiral D. F. Sellers, then Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, who heartily approved the plan and gave his full cooperation with the Commanding General when the Force became attached to the Fleet.

In September, 1933, the plan was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Marine Corps was asked to submit a plan of instructions for the establishment of the new force. This was done in October, 1933, and approved by the Navy Department.

One of the first steps taken—and one that received the whole-hearted approval of the Corps at large, was the revival of the famous war-time Fifth and Sixth Marines.

Throughout the United States hundreds of former Marines who served with the two regiments were prompt in expressing their approval of this splendid move.

From the old Seventh Regiment, which was later disbanded, personnel was drawn for the revived regiments. There was no man in the Fifth or Sixth Marines who was not more than proud to wear the fourragere denoting the decorated colors of the regiment.

Thus the Fleet Marine Force was made a single unit organization, with the Fifth Marines constituting the nucleus on the East Coast and the Sixth Marines on the West Coast.

The important task of rearing this new outfit through its initial period of organization was placed on the shoulders of Brigadier General Charles H. Lyman,

U.S.M.C., who was assigned to his new command in December, 1933. His work in this connection is another outstanding achievement in his service career.

Within a short time after he assumed command, Marine Corps Headquarters submitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet an outline of plans covering the strength and organization of the Force in



Admiral
D. F. Sellers



Brigadier General
Charles H. Lyman

cluding stabilized units of the Fleet Marine Corps available for continuous training and immediate service and the total forces available in an emergency counting personnel drawn from other kindred units.

One of the most important of the changes gradually affected in the making of the new Fleet Marine Force was in its aviation components.

When the first tables of organization were made up, it was noted that certain aviation units could not be included until released by naval aircraft carriers. The training which these units had obtained aboard carriers stood them in good stead when the new units for work in cooperation with the Force began to take form.

At present Aircraft One is stationed on the East Coast at Quantico, Va., and Aircraft Two on the West Coast at San Diego. The seat of primary training for Marine aviation units remains at the Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida, so it can be said that the two aircraft units attached to the Force have been trained under uniform conditions.

In summarizing the brief period of joint service of the air contingents of the Force and the Fleet, experts of both the Navy and the Marine Corps have expressed themselves as highly pleased with the results. In their opinion the new organization brings about a far closer cooperation, not only between Naval and Marine Corps aviation, but also within Marine aviation itself. It is regarded by them as a joint training plan with definite objectives carefully worked out and met as they arise, contrasted with the old system which was impulsive and transitory.

FLEET PARTICIPATION—1934

The plans of the Navy for the Fleet Problem for May, 1934, involved the definite task of seizing an advanced base site. First word to Marine Corps Headquarters of the result of the new experiment—one awaited as the proof of the success or failure of the new force—arrived in code at the Navy Department. It cryptically said: "Landing Force operations successful."

That was all that Navy and Marine Corps officials wanted to know, so from the Major General Commandant's office went the radio, equally terse: "Congratulations." The Marines, following the Fleet, had landed successfully. Their mission had been accomplished. All the expense of planning and training was justified.

FLEET PARTICIPATION IN 1935

The Fleet Problem in 1935 in the Pacific dealt with the Hawaii-Puget Sound-Alaska triangle, and was equally successful and beneficial. It constituted the training test for the west coast units of the Fleet Marine Force.

FLEET PARTICIPATION IN 1936

The Fleet Marine Force got off to a flying start with the New Year when the entire First Brigade embarked from Quantico, Va., to take part in the Naval

Landing Operation Exercises, which began at Culebra in early January, 1936.

The training tests took a period of about five weeks. The latter part of February, 1936, the Brigade returned to their base at Quantico.

The exercises involved the task of assisting in the seizing of an advanced shore base and included firing from small boats on targets placed on shore. In this maneuver, trench mortars were used, as well as 37 mm guns, machine guns and .50 calibre machine guns.

Another exercise called for just the reverse of the above, the Fleet Force using the beach as a base of operations and firing on the invading boats. The boats used in the operation were 40-footers, in addition to some steel boats, each carrying a platoon of men.

The entire personnel of Aircraft One, consisting of about 60 planes of various types, accompanied the brigade. They played an important part in flying at various heights, towing a "sleeve" target. These targets were the objectives of infantry rifle fire from land.

The exercises, as well as those in 1934 and 1935 were termed "highly successful and satisfactory" by the various commanding officers.

As training progressed, some necessary changes were made. Notable among these was the obviously necessary change from the original plan of keeping the high command of the Force on the East Coast while the Fleet was on the West Coast.

It was ever borne in mind that the very crux of the being of the Force was availability and speed, and when called for duty the character of its services rested wholly with the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

With the Fleet stationed on the West Coast in conformity with the Administration's present policy, it became more and more apparent that while the majority of the personnel would have to remain on the East Coast for a time because the barracks facilities were inadequate on the West Coast, the commanders of the fleet should maintain closer liaison.

General Lyman was elevated to the rank of Major General and placed in command at Quantico. This promotion caused several changes in commissioned personnel. To succeed General Lyman Brigadier General D. C. McDougal, commanding the Marine Corps Base at San Diego, was selected. Colonel E. P. Moses was chosen as Chief of Staff.

The First Brigade remained at Quantico and included the Fifth Regiment, augmented by certain special troops. The Second Brigade, at present only regimental strength, bases at San Diego, and includes the Sixth Regiment. In command of the First Brigade is Colonel J. J. Meade, while the Sixth Regiment is in command of Colonel P. H. Torrey, Aircraft One and Two are in command of Colonel R. S. Geiger.

The Fleet Marine Force continues to look forward with one idea in mind, ". . . to assist in the capture and defense of a fleet base." —ED.

FLEET MARINE FORCE LANDING BOATS

LIEUTENANT MELVIN M. JOHNSON, JR., U. S. M. C. R.

■ Before entering into a discussion of this subject I wish to direct the reader's attention to the admirable progress being made by a board of officers under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel C. D. Barrett, U.S.M.C., in the division of Operations and Training. These officers are working in coöperation with the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and when the problem of designing the ideal landing force boat is solved, it will be the direct result of their labors. I wish further to pay tribute to the work of the late Colonel Cutts, the well-known inventor of many devices, including a special form of landing boat.

Lieutenant Colonel Barrett and his assistants have had many obstacles to overcome, aside from the task of actual design and selection of material. I hope that this paper will at least stimulate the reader's appreciation of their work.

I. NECESSITY FOR SPECIAL LANDING BOATS

Within the past three years, the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE has published articles at some length on landing force problems, on the organization of the Fleet Marine Force, on the importance of bases as an equivalent of ships, and on several landing operations.

Without mentioning all the sources of authority it may be at once concluded that the navy is of paramount importance to the national defense, that the United States has very few bases, that bases are of tremendous importance to the navy, that the primary mission of the United States Marine Corps is to take over and hold bases for the navy, finally, that the Marine Corps will be called upon to go ashore under adverse conditions and take over positions along shores and coasts which, because of their strategic importance to the enemy are adequately defended, yet which, because of their strategic importance to our navy must be seized.

It is quite apparent to the most casual observer that "Marine Corps" is synonymous with "Landing Force." Much time has been spent on landing problems. Landings have been already worked out in minute detail, with one glaring exception. *What about landing force boats?* If we were ordered to land under fire at any time this year with the available equipment, the fellow who once figured out U.S.M.C. to mean "Useless Sons Made Comfortable," would quickly change to "Useless Sons' Mortal Catastrophe."

In fact, it is reported that a high ranking officer, after observing a landing demonstration, stated that men should land at a dock like gentlemen if the beach were not defended, but should never try to land if it were.

The writer has discussed this subject with quite a number of officers, all of whom are by no means in accord, but are certainly far greater authorities than the writer. One of these officers remarked that after I had talked

to one hundred officers on this subject I would have as many different views.

An attempt will be made here to analyze the factors which are involved in this problem.

First, the question is raised whether there is any use in developing a boat for landing men against opposition. It is submitted that inevitably we must seize bases which are defended. If the shore is not defended it is not a base. If it is not a base it has comparatively no strategic value. Consequently a seizure will gain us nothing. But if it is valuable we must try to seize it. Therefore we will undoubtedly land against opposition quite unlike that encountered in the "comic opera" and "banana wars."

Assuming, then, that the island or coast we land on is a strategic point and reasonably defended, we must choose some beach which has the weakest defense. Probably the enemy will determine which beaches can most easily be "landed." These they will fortify.¹ The portions of the shore which would be most difficult to land on will be defended the least. Thus we face the predicament that we must seize a base which is defended along all of the available landing beaches. Old Mother Nature prohibits us on the one hand, hostile fortifications on the other. But the base must be taken. Too late to beg shortsighted diplomats for more islands for the navy which we might in turn have fortified.² It is submitted that a war-time landing force will encounter material opposition from the shore, yet will be forced to land notwithstanding. These matters are viewed in a different light in war-time. "Men," it is said, "are the cheapest thing we have." Yet *men on the beach* are required to seize bases. They must be landed, at least. If the Marine Corps will not be able to land against opposition, in performing its primary mission as a landing force, we shall not be carrying on our traditions and maintaining our records of past performance.

But it seems quite clear that with the present equipment the Marines will never get near the beach. Rifle and machine gun fire will complete the work of artillery fire. What may happen to the men after they "hit the beach" will remain theoretical. Surely we must be equipped to transport the bulk of our landing force to the shore. The present equipment is not only completely vulnerable to shrapnel, but no difficult target for high explosive and bombs, not to mention "boat-strafing." Colonel Cutts demonstrated the terrific effect of shrapnel conclusively on one occasion by firing two 75 mm guns over the area which had been covered by boats in a landing demonstration. In case the reader is not familiar with the 75 mm, which serves as an illustrative weapon in this connection, it may be said that this gun has an accurate range of over 6,000 yards, conservatively. The ordinary shrapnel burst is extremely effective within two hundred yards. The burst is ordinarily three mils off the water. Water is flat. There are no hills, except the waves. The battery commander can easily observe every shot. Let us assume that one motor-sailer full of men, moving at ten knots, is "X" yards from one 75 mm gun. Without making any calculations as to range whatever, the battery commander could put a burst directly over the boat, firing not more than six rounds in less than one-half minute. This would be a simple problem even by mere guesswork. The battery

¹See "Heavy Mobile Artillery In Base Defense," by First Lieutenant F. A. Stephenson, U.S.M.C., Marine Corps Gazette, November, 1934, page 53, paragraph 9.

²See "Bases Mean Ships," by Captain Dudley Knox, U.S.N., Marine Corps Gazette, 1934.

commander merely estimates the deflection for the first round, and guesses the range. A round is fired, bursting over and to the right. The next round, fired after a change in range and deflection is short and to the left of the boat. The boat is now bracketed. With the next round the range is increased by half the difference between the "surely over" and "surely short;" likewise the deflection. The third round is over. The range is decreased by half again and the fourth round is short. The deflection is now corrected, the range increased by half, and the fifth round is just over. With a decrease of one-half the sixth round is just short, the boat now being bracketed within one or two forks. If round five was one hundred yards over and round six one hundred yards short, both rounds would have easily scored in the boat. During thirty seconds a ten-knot boat moves about two hundred yards, which is certainly not enough to puzzle the artilleryman. Bracketing the target is the artillery method of "sighting in." Although "four forks" is the customary bracket, a larger bracket is often used. The object is to get one round surely over and one round surely short, then narrow down. A ten-knot boat presents no problem to the war-time guns, far less with improved post-war equipment. The writer apologizes for digressing into the subject of field artillery. However, some of the readers may not be especially familiar with the French seventy-five. Incidentally, an efficient battery could easily hit a slow boat with a high explosive shell up to two or three thousand yards.

Almost everyone has fired a rifle at targets in the water. A group of army officers once tried out the bracketing system with service rifles, firing at five-gallon oil cans placed at unknown ranges (from three to six hundred yards) on the water. The average was not more than three overs and three shorts, the lateral deviation being corrected simultaneously with the range. No one knew the actual range, and a strong breeze affected the targets materially. Semi-automatics would have been even more deadly. It is quite unnecessary to discuss the machine gun in this connection.

The writer has been discussing "primary school" matters; yet as a late President once said:

"People need not so much to be told as to be reminded." We must not underestimate the hazards, yet the best experts have been known to do so, a graphic and notable illustration of which may be found in former Premier Lloyd George's recently published "Memoirs."

So far, then, we have sought to conclude that we must land against a defense, that our equipment is inadequate, and that average modern weapons ordinarily obtainable will wipe out our boats.

II. BRIEF ANALYSIS OF A LANDING BOAT

How can men be transported ashore? The answer is, on the water, under the water, or in the air. Well, without much argument the ultimate answer is, "on the water."

Why is a small army tank of the improved type so difficult to hit with artillery? Because it is extremely mobile, and especially because it is fast, exceeding speeds of forty miles per hour. Why are the new tanks so difficult to stop with small arms fire? Because they are armor-plated.

What is the chief requirement of a small boat designed to carry men in heavy seas and surf? It must be extremely seaworthy. Furthermore, it must be strong

enough to withstand the pounding of heavy seas, rocks, and surf-pounded shores.

Perhaps the reader will not agree that the "ideal boat" as conceived by the writer is ideal. Nevertheless, it is submitted that an ideal landing-force boat should be capable of a speed in excess of thirty knots fully loaded; that this boat should be extremely seaworthy under all conditions; that the boat must be armor-plated to protect the men from small arms fire, shrapnel, and "strafing;" that the boat must not draw so much water that it cannot be landed, bow up, on any beach otherwise suited for a landing; that the boat should be capable with safety of turning sharply at high speed, and stopping quickly; that it must be mounted with machine guns to support the landing, and also to defend against hostile aviation; that such a boat must be capable of high speeds in heavy seas without sustaining any leaks or breakage; that the boat, in short, must be almost invulnerable except against a direct hit with H. E. or a bomb, yet a difficult target for either.

These, it is submitted, are the vital factors. Our mission is to land the men. There are many other factors to be considered. They will be taken up later. The only question now is whether such a boat can be built; whether such a boat is a practical possibility.

The writer is able to assert that boats have been and can be constructed from metal, without exceeding practical weight limits when armored, which have stood and can stand any seas in which the wildest landing party would ever embark under any circumstances, and those boats have maintained speeds up to thirty-five miles per hour. They would have exceeded forty if sufficient horsepower had been furnished. It is not relevant to say more here. It can be done; it has been done. The reader's indulgence is requested to accept this as a fact. Further, that the boats in particular were and can be made practically non-capsizable, non-sinkable, and rugged enough to withstand a pounding on any beach.

There is another factor which must be discussed, but the writer is aware that this question, comparatively, is more nearly settled. How large shall the boats be, and how many men will be carried? There seem to be different views on this. I have heard of problems worked out with squad boats used for the leading sub-waves. I have heard of twelve-man boats with a crew of four, of platoon boats, and so on. I have heard of a two-squad or section boat from several authoritative sources.

On the other hand, the older system contemplated at least one hundred men in a boat. The "motor-sailers" hold one hundred and fifty. There is an old adage: "Never put all your eggs in one basket." Consider the artillery problem. A small fast boat is hard to hit. If it is hit only a squad or a section is gone. I have heard old duck hunters say they prefer to have a few ducks fly over the blind at a time than to have a whole flock come over at once.

The same proposition is applicable here. Do not have too many men in one boat, and have more boats.

The reader will find that if a "speed boat" of a certain size will hold two squads, a boat half that size can not accommodate one squad. The writer believes that a boat capable of high speed, about twenty-eight to thirty feet in length, with about a nine to eleven foot beam, is the ideal size for most requirements. Such a boat will hold two squads, one or two officers, and a crew of two or three men. A boat not less than twenty-three

(Continued on page 60)

Mobile Machine Gun Nests

■ Out in Indiana is a concern that has been "tinkerin' with tanks" ever since the World War. They were smart when they fell heir to the famous Marmon motor. They were sharp when they directed their efforts toward a non-turret combat tank and proceeded to interest the Marine Corps in their product. Before a board of officers at Quantico last fall Mr. Herrington put his light combat tank through such a variety of essential and interesting stunts that the board whispered, "The Force could use a few of these without any trouble." With the help of Congress our Headquarters paved the way so that today we find ourselves in possession of five of these overland cruisers.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

The accompanying cut gives the pictorial answer of the job as a unit; also some of the interesting points are listed. Quite different it is from the war-time rough riding, slow, hot tanks. Basically kindred to Europe's present Krupp, Skoda and Vickers—minus the turret. Can be craned out from the deck of a transport and laid on a motor sailer, barged to a water depth of about four feet, run down a ramp ashore under its own power. Reserve buoyancy is sufficient, with the aid of about a dozen standard gasoline drums, to permit it to be propelled to four feet of water before casting off its drums, ready to move ashore. Currents, winds, and probable traffic interference appear to make barging it ashore more desirable.

Its peculiar construction and design of track mechanism permit its easy negotiation of tropical stubbles and underbrush without retarding its speed. Loose sand banks, spongy or marshy beaches are not hindrances. Beachline embankments and serious crags are not obstacles. Wire entanglements are rolled over and back without appreciable delay. Land mines, even if they capsize it, are not fatal. The fact that its center of gravity is so low operates to keep it righted against most of these hazards. Should it capsize, it is quickly righted, as there are special side attachments handy. Its cross country test of 250 miles with accompanying trailer and

truck covered a non-stop test at an average speed of over 30 miles per hour and proved satisfactory.

Its crew is two men, driver and gunner. Semi-streamline, quarter inch armor per U. S. Army Ordnance specifications is its protection.

One, two or three .30 calibre machine guns, or a combination of .50 calibre machine guns or 37mm guns compose the armament.

The success of this type of tank is traceable to use of the continuous band cable type track belt. Its loading and unloading on and off the trailer is a simple, speedy process, accomplished by manipulation of a detachable rear axle of the trailer. The sound military belief that it is essential in the operation of tanks to conserve the tank track mileage for vital military movements was constantly borne in mind during the development of this tank. That is, the principle that the tank should arrive at its jump-off point in the best of mechanical condition and set for instant service is the company's creed. The unit consists of a truck, trailer and tank. The truck serves as a tender carrying extra stores and ammunition for the tank. This combination can be moved as high as 50 miles per hour from one point to another. The trailer is designed so that its rear wheels can be removed easily and its rear end lowered to the ground, thus making a ramp for unloading and reloading the tank under its own power. A two-way radio telephone equipment outfit is present which is capable of reaching other tanks, planes and fixed mobile command posts under combat conditions.

On the next trip to the Caribbean area the *Force* will have a new interest, and these tanks will receive a test which will undoubtedly disclose useful data. The development of the amphibious characteristic of this tank will be especially interesting.

SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS

The breakdown of the general characteristics just recited is blocked for easy information.

Name:

Marmon-Herrington, Two-man Combat Tank—
(Continued on page 64)



Marmon-Herrington Tank Unit

THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF YOUNG OFFICERS

COLONEL C. J. MILLER, U.S.M.C.

■ The following reflections and deductions are prompted by the excellent article that appeared in the last Anniversary Number of THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, entitled "Military It." In this article the writer, First Lieutenant Alfred R. Pefley, U.S.M.C., stressed the importance of Initiative, Originality and Knowledge in the development of leadership. It is believed that these qualities can be practically acquired and developed, if careful consideration is given to the military education and training of young officers from the time they enter the Corps.

In dealing with so broad a subject as military education and training, it is not proposed to present a well-defined course of studies or a program of training to be pursued in establishing a high degree of professional attainment, but rather to emphasize some of the measures that may assist in qualifying young officers for command. The noting of these measures, and the reasons for their basis, follow no orderly arrangement.

To observe the daily actions of young officers, one is agreeably impressed with their unbounded enthusiasm and eagerness to perfect themselves professionally. At the same time it would not be strange to find that they also possess that inherent quality of youth, that irks at too much repression or shackles the practical expression of their ideas. However, this is not a censurable characteristic, for otherwise it would be replaced by one of discouragement. After all, when in battle, so much must be left to chance and opportunity, it does seem inconsistent in peace time to lay down rules that must be inexorably followed. It must be appreciated also, that all wars are fought by young men, and this is true only of the rank and file, but also of the great majority of commanders. These young commanders possess the mental alertness, courage and physical stamina that makes for victory in battle.

Probably the outstanding characteristic of leadership, is initiative, or the ability for original conception and independent action. In peace time young officers must be allowed and encouraged to develop their initiative, otherwise they will be incapable of independent action under the stress of battle, when clear thinking and quick decision are paramount to success. If we constantly impose restrictions, we will suppress individuality and originality, and fail to inculcate a spirit of confidence in those who must carry out our intentions. It should be the heritage of every young officer to foster his intelligence and imagination, and increase his tactical knowledge. Only in this way can he lay the foundation of his future career.

In speaking of military knowledge, one of the essentials to leadership, we should not gain the impression that it is obtained solely from books. Such an understanding would leave us steeped in theory from which there would be no egress to sound practice. It is hard experience, training and reflection that add immeasurably to military training. Before we can command, we must know our trade, for in action we can only apply what we have learned. In order to command, there must be a

preparation, and to meet the demands of modern warfare this preparation must be long, arduous and progressive. The introduction of new weapons and the application of modern science to warfare adds innumerable complexities to the solution of battlefield problems. History clearly demonstrates that the role of the commander is never an easy one and that a life time is not too long to prepare ourselves for it. As the profession of arms does not permit of its daily application to the realities of war, there can be no opportunity in peace time to learn by actual experience. Furthermore, we do not possess the intuition and genius that make Gustavus Aldolphus, Ghenghis Khan, Caeser, Alexander, Napoleon and Lee, the great captains of all time. Therefore, hard work, study and reflection are all the more indispensable in developing our natural gifts for command.

The most important function of the commander is to make decisions, and then convey his intentions unequivocally to his subordinates and see that they are carried out in accordance with his designs. In the execution of this role, which is pre-eminently one of action, knowledge is not sufficient, but nevertheless it is indispensable. Broad military culture and tactical understanding are necessary and naturally assume greater proportions as we ascend in command.

Leadership acknowledges the willing acceptance of responsibility. Regardless of our position in the military hierarchy, we must be ready to accept and share responsibility. Responsibility and command are twin brothers, and if we fail to assume responsibility there can be no leaders. If we are imbued with a sense of responsibility, we will not hesitate to be resolute in making decisions. However, we should remember that responsibility implies the granting of latitude and the delegation of authority to subordinates on the part of the higher commander.

The foregoing discussion has been made to point out the importance of initiative, responsibility and knowledge in the education and training of young officers. Naturally there are other requisites to leadership, such as character and physical fitness. For example, it is manifest that good health and a strong constitution are invaluable assets to the young officer. A clear and vigorous mind is not generally found in a sick, weak body. Physical well-being inspires confidence and begets courage.

An examination of our most probable missions or tasks discloses that we must train our young officers to be capable and aggressive leaders. They must have unwavering faith in their ability and urged to develop those traits of character that make for leadership.

Today the training and education of young officers revolve around the two major tasks of the Marine Corps, namely: landing operations and small wars. Other than duty at sea, there are certain duties such as service at navy yards, ammunition depots, recruiting stations and small posts, which contribute little to the war training of officers, and if proper measures are not adopted may act as a detriment to their training. Again conditions at large posts may impose a large amount of purely routine duties on young officers, whose activities may be largely confined to interior guard duty, close and extended order drills and administration.

It cannot be admitted that adherence to Marine Corps

Order No. 41 meets the training needs of young officers, though it may satisfy the requirements of drills and the technical use of infantry weapons. This basic training is too mechanical to stimulate initiative or act as an incentive to tactical understanding.

No attempt will be made in this short space to discuss the tactical features of the landing attack and the defense of advanced bases, other than to point out some of the difficulties inherent to and the necessity for training young officers in this class of operations.

We reiterate the extreme hazard attendant to landing on hostile shores and endeavor to overcome the disadvantages by providing special means and measures. But this may not be sufficient under actual conditions, for the greater the difficulties of any problem, the more flexible must be our minds and the more indoctrinated we must become in the employment of the means placed at our disposal for carrying out the general plan of the commander. Flexibility of mind depends on intelligence and knowledge, while indoctrination is a matter of training in accepted and well tried methods of combat.

Already in our training for the landing attack, there is a grave tendency to regulate everything down to the smallest detail and leave nothing to the initiative and judgment of the subordinate. Unfortunately, when we insist on regulating every detail by order and prescription, and our well-laid plans go awry, our subordinate is at a loss to know what to do. In this connection we know that war invariably produces the unforeseen and contingencies never anticipated occur with startling rapidity. This will be only too true in the landing attack.

Viewed in its broader aspects the landing attack presents some unusual features. If the commander is to take advantage of his initiative and superior mobility, the landing attack will begin with many of the characteristics of dispersion, which may even extend down to the lower units. The situation may be such as to force the commander to probe out the weakness of the defender by several thrusts ashore before committing his general reserve. This in turn may entail landing on widely separated fronts. All of this must lead to the decentralization of command and the necessity for competent leadership on the part of subordinate commanders.

In spite of the precautions taken to orient the landing waves on their designated beaches, there are such elements as fog, mist, darkness, smoke, currents and hostile opposition that may intervene to land smaller units outside of their designated zones of action. In this case the subordinate commander will find himself thrown on his own resources, without support and the probability of being forced to resort to strong outflanking action in order to gain contact with friendly units. Paucity of information of hostile defenses, the lack of accurate maps or aerial photographs, the inability to conduct preliminary reconnaissances ashore may make a situation already uncertain extremely vague for the subordinate, and at a time when there is an impelling urge to get inland.

The above is only cited in order to indicate a few of the obstacles that the subordinate commander must surmount when landing on strange and hostile shores, and where the enemy enjoys so many advantages of the defense. Certainly the success of the landing attack will reside in the courage and initiative of the subordinate, and his ability to take advantage of fleeting opportunities.

In the defense of advanced bases, where large areas are to be defended and there exist numerous landing places, the difficulties of control will be greatly augmented. Under these circumstances the higher commanders cannot spread

their attention in all directions. They must be ready to share unreservedly command and responsibility with their subordinates.

Small wars training assumes particular importance for our young officers. The longer our government refrains from intervention, the greater will be the chance that the knowledge of our occupational duties will become lost to the Corps. Older officers with this knowledge will have become separated from the Corps, and it cannot be definitely predicted that we may never again be forced into an intervention.

The Marine Corps Schools are attempting to conserve our small war experiences and are now collecting and recording past operations in the form of a manual or text. Studies and researches in small wars disclose that we have not assiduously studied these operations or profited universally by past experiences. Expeditions have included a large number of young and inexperienced officers, who have had to assume responsibilities beyond their capacity and judgment.

In the future our problems in this class of peace time operations, which call for so much diplomacy and good judgment and are so open to criticism, will become more onerous and perplexing in their solution. Only recently we have had an example of the increasing dangers of guerrilla warfare. Failure to train and instruct young officers in small war operations and the ramifications of military occupations may react unfavorably to the future prestige of the Corps.

From past interventions we are aware that small wars give rise to unusual dispersion of forces, either because of the vast areas involved or because the force has been found inadequate for the mission. Decentralization of command naturally follows and more than often results in placing young officers in positions of responsibility. They are given command of areas, detached posts or patrols on dangerous missions; all for the purpose of restoring order and tranquility within a region where the people may have little faith in the good intentions of the occupying forces. Surely this requires tact, initiative and good judgment on the part of young commanders.

An examination of our missions would seem to infer conclusively that higher commanders must be ready to train young officers in initiative and responsibility. This will demand patience and self denial. In this connection, the writer heard a general officer of the Corps say on several occasions, that loyalty starts from the top and goes down. He was speaking of loyalty in its broadest sense, and meant that the duty devolves on older officers to direct the energies of young officers into intelligent channels in order to fit them for command.

If it were possible in theory to measure initiative it might be stated in the given quantities of any situation or problem. However, in actual practice the commander is forced to take the character of the subordinate under advisement when determining the amount of initiative to be granted. In this determination the commander has recourse to two methods, either by giving orders more or less in detail or by assigning tasks commensurate with the capacity of the subordinate. However, it is a deception to believe that the lack of initiative in a subordinate can be compensated by an excess of detail in orders or instructions. When in orders an attempt is made to regulate every action and the unforeseen does occur, the subordinate may not have an opportunity to make a suitable decision, since

he is acting in conformity with a plan he has not conceived and perhaps not even understood. Frequently when young officers ask what should I do in such an emergency, we have this satisfying answer to make: "Do what your commander would do, if he were in your place." Just as though the subordinate could read the soul of his commander and foresee his natural reflexes under the stress of the moment. Such elements of uncertainty are enough to confuse any subordinate.

It is the duty of every commander to assist his subordinates in developing their initiative. With an inexperienced subordinate it is always easier to do a thing oneself. We must guide the subordinate, but not substitute ourselves for him. It is true that in pursuing this course our patience may be sorely tried and time lost in the beginning, yet in the end we will have rendered service to the command as a whole and contributed immeasurably to team work.

The whole art of command lies in an exact balance between what we should do ourselves or prescribe, and what we should leave to the initiative of the subordinate. In any command this requires tact and forebearance, and cannot be reduced to any rule.

We should not form the habit of prescribing details that are within the province of the subordinate, otherwise we will diffuse our activities everywhere and lose sight of our own perspective. We must restrain ourselves from fixing in an order both an objective to be attained and the dispositions to be taken in gaining the objective. This is especially true, if the commander is not in a position to personally intervene at the time an unexpected emergency arises during the execution of his plan.

It must not be assumed that the commander has reduced himself to a state of impotency, when he leaves a large share of initiative to his subordinates. Important orders issued by his subordinates will be communicated to him, and he will usually find it expedient to take cognizance of them before execution. Moreover, the active commander frequently visits his subordinates, holds counsel with and takes them into his confidence. He explains his intentions to them and tells them why he adopted one course of action rather than another. He discusses the different eventualities that may occur and the probable measures that can be taken to cope with new situations. In this manner the commander paves the way for the action of his subordinates and at the same time keeps a grasp on the situation.

Finally we should never discourage attempts at initiative on the part of subordinates. We should not anticipate that all these efforts will be successful. There are certainly to be some embarrassing moments. In most cases they can be overlooked and even if they are exceptional they can be corrected without acrimony.

A consideration of the above factors will permit limiting the prescription of orders to what is strictly necessary. The commander can retain for himself and delegate to each subordinate a proper share of initiative and responsibility. In following this procedure young officers will become resourceful, dependable and will loyally and intelligently carry out the intentions of their chief.

It is not intended to prescribe here a course in tactics for young officers, but only to lay stress on certain features of tactical instruction.

As in all other branches of human endeavor military tactics is subject to the laws of evolution. The diffi-

culty in teaching tactics exists, that in peace time, our conceptions cannot be put to the real test of war. History proves that at the beginning of a new war, the belligerents experience disagreeable surprises, because in studying past wars, they were unable to create tactical doctrines adapted to the conditions of the moment. Therefore, we must learn by reflection and logic and the close observation of the military and naval operations of other nations at war.

Care should be taken to avoid teaching thumb rules and principles. The mere learning of principles will have the pernicious effect of converting young officers into military pedants. In the study of tactics young officers should be instructed in accepted and well established methods of combat. Principles have little significance if their application is not illustrated by sound tactical doctrines.

In teaching methods of combat, it should be borne in mind that methods are never basic or fundamental. They may vary with each new situation. They also change with the development of weapons and with the addition of new ones. For example, the chemical weapon has imposed new methods of combat both on the defense and offense. Therefore, young officers should be made to realize that they must keep their methods of combat up to date.

Before beginning a comprehensive study of tactics, let us not forget that it is essential to have a practical knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of our own weapons and supporting arms. Young officers of the Corps should first be trained in the use of all infantry weapons before being permitted to specialize in other arms and services. While specialization enters more and more into our daily training, long and continued specialization in one arm or service to the exclusion of all others, will never develop capable leaders for higher command.

In the last analysis, young officers should not be taught to be general officers, before they master their jobs as company officers. They must know how to command their men and provide for their needs and understand their human limitations. This they should know thoroughly before they are asked to comprehend the grand combinations on which tactics and strategy are based.

In conclusion, the whole military training and education of our young officers lies in an equitable distribution of duty with troops, at sea, on the staff of smaller units, and regular attendance at schools. In each case they should be granted sufficient latitude to exercise their own initiative and intelligence.

General's Daughter Christens U.S.S. PORTER

■ As one of the latest pieces of war machinery slid into the Delaware River on December 13, 1935, a bottle of champagne was crashed over its bow to wish it a long and successful sea-going life. The hand that held the neck of the bottle was one that represented a long line of Navy ancestry. The name of Porter can be found on the Navy officer rolls for nearly two centuries, and so with profound and distinct pride the U.S.S. *Porter* was christened by Miss Carlile Patterson Porter, the daughter of Brigadier-General David Dixon Porter, The Adjutant and Inspector, U. S. Marine Corps. With such a debut and such a name, the Corps will follow the history of the latest Navy greyhound with keen interest.

ED.

THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MACHINE GUN

CAPT. R. R. DEESE, USMC.

■ Assume that the Fleet Marine Force has seized and is defending an advance base. The enemy is known to be in the vicinity and an attack from the air can be expected at any time. Our defense against his bombers consists of batteries of director controlled three-inch anti-aircraft guns firing fuzed high explosive and having an effective horizontal range of six thousand yards at seventeen thousand feet altitude. These batteries will be subject to attack against the personnel by fast low flying planes armed with machine guns and light bombs.

Aviation units form a part of our defense. They operate from emergency fields within our base. Their personnel and such planes as are on the ground are peculiarly vulnerable to the same type of attack from fast low flying planes.

Assume that we receive a night bombing attack. We have sound locators and searchlights to enable our three-inch batteries to fire on the enemy bombers. As each searchlight is illuminated it will be literally pounced upon by one or more of the fast planes.

We have outlined above three situations in which we have units performing essential defense missions which are endangered by the activities of what the Army terms "attack aviation." Other likely targets for attack planes are numerous among command, administrative, and supply activities.

In order to combat attack aviation we must have a weapon capable of instant action and with hitting power sufficient to bring down a plane. Various automatic weapons have been designed for this purpose with more or less success. The only one of these which has reached the stage of adoption as standard equipment is the cal. .50 Browning machine gun. Except for the increased caliber necessary in order to obtain the required hitting power this gun is essentially the same as the familiar cal. .30 Browning machine gun. For anti-aircraft use it is mounted on a high tripod which permits free elevating and traversing. Its rate of fire is variable between four hundred and fifty and six hundred rounds per minute.

A number of experimental sights and fire control systems have been designed for this gun, but at present none of them have been adopted as replacing the use of tracer control. Normal practice is to make every fifth round a tracer and leave fire adjustment in the hands of the gunner. A greater proportion of tracers would be desirable from the standpoint of fire adjustment, but it is obvious that each tracer replaces a ball cartridge and the tracer bullet, being hollow, can do little damage to the target. Effective fire against a rapidly moving aerial target is very difficult to obtain. This is due in a large measure to the inability of the gunner to determine the point where the tracer has reached the range of the target. An inexperienced gunner will line up the target with the tangent to the trajectory as he sees it, with the result that all his bullets fall below the target. There usually being no reference point or perspective to guide him he must fall back on his ability to see stereoscopically. Every effort is made to find and develop this ability in prospective gunners.

A further check on the ability of the gunner is obtained through firing the cal. .30 machine gun at free


balloons. This firing has the advantage that the gunner sees instantly when he has hit the balloon and can remember how he was pointing the gun. It has the disadvantage that a very limited number of courses are possible, none of them simulating those of the enemy. Hence the final step in training the gunners consists of firing target practices against towed sleeves. Normally the four guns of a platoon fire simultaneously, a check being obtained on the individual gunners by using different colors on the bullets. The fire must be continuous in order to secure an adjustment. On each course the gunner fires about one hundred rounds. If three of them hit the target he is doing excellent shooting. However, he has no way of determining which three of his bullets made the hits. It is suggested that the invention of a towed target which will give instantly visible evidence of being hit would be a distinct advance.

Various devices have been designed for having an observer other than the gunner adjust the fire onto the target. It seems unlikely that any of them will be fast enough in practice to be used as a primary method. A convenient rule of thumb for estimating aircraft speed is that miles per hour divided by two equal yards per second. From this it follows that a hedge hopping attack plane flying at two hundred miles per hour can come over a ridge one thousand yards away and be directly overhead in ten seconds. The gunner can be warned of the approach of the plane by a lookout stationed on the ridge, but no active fire control measures can be taken until the plane is visible from the gun. Instant action is in order and the gunner is the only man qualified to go into action without delay.

The gunner must be thoroughly drilled in identifying aircraft so that he can tell at a glance whether a given plane is friend or enemy. His own air force must keep him well advised through his unit commander of friendly air operations or sad mistakes will be inevitable. His impulse will be to shoot first and ask questions later.

The anti-aircraft machine gun battery consists of three platoons of four guns each. The platoon usually

(Continued on page 39)



Browning Machine Gun (.50 Cal.)

Garde d'Haiti

Its Progress and Future Plans*

BY COLONEL D. P. CALIXTE
Commandant Garde d'Haiti

■ A force of about 3,000 men, well trained, commanded by 215 officers of the regular service, distributed throughout the Republic of Haiti, in five military departments, performing simultaneously the duties of police force and national army,—such was the Garde of Haiti, August first, 1934, the date on which Colonel Vogel, of the United States Marine Corps, turned over his duties to the senior Haitian officer of the organization.

Since then it is acknowledged that the efficient military instruction, the strict discipline, the precision of action, and the perfect administration, left by the very competent American instructors, have been maintained and even improved during the last eighteen months of the independent life of the Corps, thanks to the energy, spirit of initiative, and firmness of the general staff and the officers in charge of the different administrative branches, aided effectively by the assistance and constant cooperation of the Government of His Excellency, Mr. Stenio Vincent, President of the Republic.


We hope that with such spirit and such favorable existing circumstances the Garde of Haiti will advance, and that the accomplishment of the plans of the Commandant of the Garde during the new year will be a great step of the Haitian army towards progress and military perfection, objects of all armies of the world, because they are the foundation and guaranty of internal peace and foreign respect.

* * *

The Garde of Haiti, created by the American Occupation, has profited by all the advantages of an American organization adapted to the particular conditions of Haitian life.

At the time of the transfer of this corps into native hands the principal objective of the American staff was to leave an efficient force, capable of bringing about a state of peace to the liberated Republic. To this end many steps had been taken and carried out progressively, and many plans had been made for the future.

* Translated by Lillian C. O'Malley.



Fort Liberte

The Haitian General Staff, distinctly conscious of its responsibilities and its duties, devoted itself to guarding the basic organization of the force, to strengthening it, and to bringing it to more definite and permanent form; also, to stabilizing, as much as the financial condition of the country would permit, all the plans for the future that the American régime had not had the time to carry out.

Such was the course followed by the Garde at the end of the fiscal year 1933-1934, and which, during the two months of August and September, developed rapidly and favorably.

The year 1934-1935 was rather marked by its own peculiar enterprises for the new management of the Corps, tending to complete the task, to make the Garde more and more adequate for the new conditions of the surroundings, and above all to improve it and make a real Army of this well organized force, so that the additional duties and increased power would not reduce technique or modern efficiency.

This period of development of the "new Army" has scarcely begun and already, following this plan, many accomplishments have proved the ability of the Chiefs and personnel, and warrant the prediction, since the financial scheme alone presents difficulties, that, in the very near future, the proposed ideal will be attained.

* * *

END OF THE FISCAL YEAR 1933-1934

At the time of the complete Haitianization of the Garde of Haiti the Military Academy had successfully completed the instruction of fifty cadets. This increase in the commissioned personnel should have been accompanied by an increase of 800 enlisted men, which unfortunately the American régime had been unable to bring about as it had hoped to do.

Notwithstanding an addition of 266 men in August, the proportion of officers still exceeded that of the enlisted men, even though a surplus of eleven cadets from the last graduating class was not commissioned. However, since that date these have been recalled for temporary duty as probationary officers.

Even under these conditions the discipline of the Corps was improved and strengthened and obtained, in carrying out its daily duties, the maximum of efficiency and perfection.

With the elimination of the Haitian-American Treaty a link was missing in the legal connection which joined the Garde of Haiti with the general statutes of the Republic. It was during this short period that the first laws of stabilization and reorganization were voted upon, tending towards a more satisfactory settlement of the officers' pay, regulation of their promotion, and conditions of their retirement.

The general military condition of the Corps was also improved.

Some buildings were maintained in the best condition; others improved upon.

In addition, regular inspections showed some remarkable progress in the accomplishment of the general duties, particularly in the purely military education, this last phase having been energetically followed by the Commandants of the organization.

While this year ended most satisfactorily, some plans for the future were made, including:

- (1) organization of the Medical Department;
- (2) creation of an intermediate grade of warrant officer, for the benefit of worthy noncommissioned officers;
- (3) adding a Dental Corps to the Medical Department;
- (4) organization of an aviation section;

- (5) introduction of accompanying weapons into the Infantry for regular use;
- (6) creation of a light artillery unit;
- (7) regulations regarding retirement and military pensions;
- (8) increase of the general duties and enlargement of the group of noncommissioned officers;
- (9) creation of expeditionary companies and a reserve corps;
- (10) effective organization of a coast guard service and purchase of two oil burning vessels;
- (11) creation of a model prison farm in the interior of the country;
- (12) creation of new outposts and the erection of barracks and prisons in various parts of the Republic.

* * *

FISCAL YEAR 1934-1935

An excellent start was made this year.

By its discipline, esprit de corps, and determination, the Garde of Haiti clearly proved its worth and its intention of being the faithful guardian of order and peace. Its prestige increased and the situation was very favorable to the realization of numerous projects, of American initiative as well as of those purely Haitian.

On the first of October, 1934, some slight modifications, caused by the topography of the Republic, the new political régime, and economic conditions, were effected in the military force of the country. The five military departments were maintained, but to the Department of Port-au-Prince, which became the Department of the West, was added a section of the District of Petit-Goave, which was formerly in the Department of the South.

In the latter a new district was created, that of Nippes, including all the other posts of the former district of Petit-Goave, up to the Bridge of Miragoane, which in itself became the dividing line between the new departments of the west and the south.

The former military department of the West became the military department of the Artibonite and northwest, with the same boundary lines.

While the usual training of the troops was followed, including closed and open order drill, ceremonies, inspections, range practice and bayonet exercises, sports and athletic games, and practice marches were arranged for the battalions stationed at Port-au-Prince, Cape Haitien, and Hinche.

A complete company was instructed and specialized in the handling of automatic firearms and ultra-modern accompanying weapons.

The commissioned personnel familiarized itself especially with the use of the automatic pistol, caliber .45.

A unit was organized for the operation of a battery of trench mortars and 37 mm guns, which the Garde eventually acquired.

The law authorizing the grade of warrant officer having failed to pass, fifteen superior noncommissioned officers were admitted, with the rank of second lieutenants, by special permission, to follow a graduate course in the Military Academy.

Under the plan for quarters, four sites were acquired, in different parts of the country, with a view to providing more room and comfort for the troops.

Some improvements, such as electrical installations, paving, repair of foundations, etc., were effected in various barracks. The National Penitentiary was entirely repaired, enlarged and restored. The Dessalines Barracks, occupied by the enlisted men of the National Palace District, under-

went important changes and improvements. An outpost was constructed at L'Anse-Rouge. Barracks were erected at La Gonâve, Hinche, and Fort Liberty; the last two, with second stories, are fine buildings.

The Military Hospital and the Military Academy have been moved to the Aviation Field of Pont-Rouge, where the buildings are fitted up for this purpose. Additions have been made there, especially a modern operating room.

Under the social plan, two military moving picture houses have been opened and are running at Hinche and Port-au-Prince.

An enlisted men's club has been organized at Cape Haitien. Two officers' clubs have been formed and are getting along very well at Les Cayes and Port-au-Prince. The one in the Capital has already commenced constructing an enormous club house costing about \$20,000, which will be finished in four months.

Under the educational plan, the combined schools for the police and instruction of noncommissioned officers have continued to function. Schools for the instruction of illiterate enlisted men have been conducted. The Corps has been improved in a general way by the enlistment of young men possessing a diploma of primary education.

A school for automatic and accompanying weapons for officers and noncommissioned officers is in progress in Port-au-Prince.

Under the legislative plan, great progress has been made, including laws:

- (a) to provide the grade of warrant officer, which permits the proportion of officers to conform to that of the enlisted personnel;
- (b) to give a regular status to the eleven probationary officers of the last class of the Military Academy;
- (c) to add dental surgeons to the Medical Department and some engineers to the line, with the rank of officers of the engineer corps, these latter forming the nucleus of an engineer corps, an important branch of every army;
- (d) to authorize retirement and military pensions, which will be put into effect immediately, thanks to a pension fund obtained by some taxes on the salaries of the personnel of the Garde of Haiti, and which is of no expense to the government.

In addition, the military regulations are actually undergoing modification in view of the new status of the Corps.

Therefore, of the twelve projects for the year 1933-1934, four have been entirely fulfilled and another, in part, despite the difficult financial situation.

As for the plans now at a standstill, the staff has not lost sight of them and is doing everything possible to carry them out. The Coast Guard Service has also commenced

(Continued on page 63)



Hinche

OFFICER PROCUREMENT

■ Many pages in the GAZETTE have been devoted to the training methods urged for our young officers. Some of these methods appear to overlook the fact that our younger officers already possess some of the qualities so vital to the composition of a desirable officer. We must agree it is easy to produce a good lieutenant from individuals who come to us from a group of young men who have been undergoing stiff competition for four or more years at selected colleges or universities. Sight is not lost, however, of the fact that these young men need certain finishing touches put upon their basic qualifications, but too much time should not be spent on recovering rudiments of such qualifications. Otherwise, most of our young officers will be attending schools the majority of the time destined for them to be in the junior grades, thus depriving them of certain troop duty experience from which some young men retain more knowledge than they do from the theoretical lessons.

Mix troop experience with school days and the result will produce a better young officer.

Again, some of our older officers might not know the formula employed in selecting our lieutenants from civil life. So a summary of it is explained.

Experience has taught that it is more desirable to have our officers come from every State in the Union, thus giving our Corps an index, so to speak, of the youth of our country. This eliminates narrowness, sectional bigotry and limited interest. To meet this thought the office of the Commandant has settled upon a procurement plan which contains this idea. The plan allows every State in the Union and the District of Columbia, at least one vacancy for a second lieutenant. The functioning of the present personnel laws create even more than forty-nine vacancies annually.

Also, commissions are offered to around five enlisted men with meritorious records, and six or seven of the honor graduates of the platoon leaders' class, and the same number of aviation cadets, and five of the Marine Corps Reserve officers, after competitive examination, twenty-five graduates of the Naval Academy, and the remainder of the vacancies go to honor graduates of selected colleges and universities.

This plan of procurement has been worked out with the War Department and the Navy Department, and represents an example of fine cooperation. There are five universities that have both Army ROTC and Navy ROTC units. The colleges and universities selected all have a detail of ROTC officers of the U. S. Army. Letters of instructions are sent direct to the president of each university and college. These letters explain our requirements and needs, and invite the cooperation of the president and the senior ROTC officer in procuring the best officer material. The principal is the college's first choice, and the alternate is the college's second choice. It will be noted that the cadets so recommended are accepted by Headquarters and commissioned, provided they pass our physical requirements, and that they receive their college degrees. The benefits of this plan are reciprocal. It finds employment for college men—a credit to the college; and gives the Corps the pick of the college cadets of the country. The Army cannot offer second lieutenants' commissions in their regular

service to these honor graduates, as the West Point graduates take care of the Army's needs in this respect.

This procedure gives us hand picked young men who have devoted four years of their life to military business, and have done it because they elected to do so. The presidents of the various colleges and universities, seventy-two in all this year, are careful not to have their institution represented by any one not only proven material, but the best they can produce. It can be noted that the ROTC officers at these various institutions are most helpful and serious in their interest and assistance in making these selections.

The choices of each institution are ordered to report at the nearest medical boards of naval officers, who examine them. Should a principal fail physically, his alternate is given a chance; and should he fail, the vacancy is held open and passed on to some other college whose alternate is specially desirable and who can pass physically.

After these naval medical boards complete their reports, a chart is compiled in the Personnel Section at Headquarters and the final selections are made and candidates so notified.

Should there be fewer than 49 vacancies only the required number is selected from the list of eligibles. Those selected are notified via the presidents of their respective colleges and upon graduation they are given a letter of instructions and orders to report at the Basic School, for duty and schooling. It can be noted that the first expense to the Corps in every case is the mileage paid the selectees from their homes to Philadelphia.

This procedure gives each candidate ample time to make up his mind as to whether or not he desires to cast his lot with our Corps. Incidentally it costs these candidates an appreciable amount to proceed to the location of the medical boards, especially the candidates in western and central western colleges.

Those of us who have been fortunate enough to see the members of our present Basic School Classes cannot but admit that our present system of officer procurement is not only economical, but a vast improvement over former ones, and one which operates to supply the Corps with a splendid index of our American youth, representing all sections of our country.

—EDITOR.



Scene from Our Virgin Island Aviation Base

ARTILLERY AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC MAPPING

CAPTAIN JOHN KALUF, U.S.M.C.

■ It is a strange commentary upon our progress in most fields of endeavor that the demand for progress usually comes from the bottom. Unquestionably, the automobile would not have reached its present state of perfection if left entirely to the automotive engineers. It was because the public demanded certain features that they were incorporated in the present day car. Over and above all the exhaustive tests given cars at the factory, automotive engineers realize that the final and conclusive test rests with the consumer and always await with apprehension the popular reaction to any new device or development.

This is a situation that exists in the military services, but a situation we do not fully realize. This is not meant to be a criticism of those "higher ups" or boards or bureaus charged with the improvement of our materiel and methods of training, but rather a criticism of ourselves, the users, who too often complacently accept what is handed down to us and say "This is it. This is what they give us and this is what we use." It stands to reason that if we never make any suggestions or complaints about the things we use, those in authority have every reason to believe the methods and materiel provided us as the tools of our trade must be O. K.

With so much as the prelude to this opus let us get on with the subject at hand. Those of you who have an abhorrence of technical subjects please proceed without misgivings. This is not technical but rather apostolical. The technicians have done and are doing their part in relation to aerial photography in general and photographic mapping in particular, and now all they need is some salesmen to push their product. Paradoxically, the popular idea of aerial photography is not that it is worthless but that it can accomplish too much. To every new idea there are two reactions: (1) that it is no good; the old way is better and (2) that it will replace everything gone before. One is as detrimental to progress as the other. Usually, between these two extremes we arrive at the truth.

First of all, let us assume the following "rebuttable presumptions":

- a. Wherever we go we are going to need maps.
- b. We are not going to be able to stop at the nearest filling station and pick up a map of a hostile country. (Witness the experience of the British at Gallipoli.)

"The only available map showed the road south from Suvla as a defile between the Sari Bair ridge and the sea. This map was subsequently found to be inaccurate. Before the war there was no road along the coast here."

"Available maps showed the southern end of the peninsula as a gentle slope—it was not fully realized until after the landing that the country was in reality

deeply scarred by numerous water courses and offered many natural advantages to the defense."

"The existing map gave no indication of the extreme importance of this feature. It was an immense ravine, with deep and confusing tributary gullies running into it, and with rugged banks in some places nearly 50 feet high."

"A visit to X Beach discloses the fact that the view from the cliffs above the beach is extraordinarily valuable. But with previous reconnaissance out of the question, and only an inaccurate map available, this happy circumstance was not realized before the landing."

"At Y Beach the available map showed a stream running generally parallel to the beach at a distance of about 500 yards, but the available maps were so inaccurate and information so incomplete, that nothing was as yet known at headquarters regarding the nature of this rugged and tortuous ravine, whose banks were in places over 100 feet high. The 'stream' was shown on the map by a straight blue line."

"Not the least important advantage gained by the Australians on the 19th (of May. They landed on the 25th of April) was the capture of several more sheets of a Turkish map of the peninsula—. Up to this date the maps of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force had been very inaccurate and misleading, but, with the help of these sheets it was soon possible to issue an excellent map to all units." * *

c. The Marine Corps has no special agency such as the Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army charged with the particular duty of mapping. We have a very fine reproduction department capable of turning out copies in quantity and quality desired, but maps are not made on the draftsman's table.

d. The Hydrographic chart is useless for any extensive operation inland from the beach. Charts are principally concerned with the shoreline features about as far inland as the hydrographer can see from the beach.

e. Even with a competent mapping agency, ground methods of mapping will be out of the question if we are contemplating landing on a hostile beach.

So what? So we will employ the only method left open to us, namely, the aerial photograph. At this point it is hoped the reader will not become obscene in his hilarity and shout, "That's nothing new. Hell, that's perfectly obvious to anyone who isn't an utter nit-wit." But wait! If that was all there was to it, this article would never have been written. It is to disabuse the minds of those who have such fantastical ideas of the all-sufficiency of aerial photos and mosaics as well as to attempt to set forth just what can be accomplished that this is being written. Aerial photography is useful for two general purposes: (a) intelligence (b) mapping. It is with mapping that we are concerned here. Aerial photos in themselves are not maps nor is an uncontrolled mosaic that has been pasted together by mere matching of photographic detail in adjoining prints sufficiently accurate for fire control purposes. Perhaps that statement needs to be qualified by saying that under certain conditions it may be. What those conditions are will be discussed in detail.

At this point it is necessary to discuss briefly the advantages and limitations of the aerial photo as compared with a map. To get a clear understanding of this

**Official History of the War, Military Operations—Gallipoli. (British.)

it is necessary to point out the inherent errors of the photographic print. The aerial photo gives a true picture of the ground—that is, all details in their proper relation to one another only when the following conditions are satisfied.

1. The camera is held perfectly plumb, i. e., the plate parallel to the plane of the earth's surface.
2. The ground is perfectly flat and level, i. e., no relief.
3. The film is perfectly flat against the plate.
4. There is no distortion in the film or print paper.

Conditions 3 and 4 are being gradually attained by perfection in manufacture; condition 1 depends on the operator and pilot; condition 2 practically never obtains. By referring to the figures it will be seen just how these errors come about. Figure 1 shows the photograph being taken under ideal conditions. The scale or Representative Fraction of this photo will be f/H where f is the distance (in feet) from the lens to the plate and H is the distance of the camera above the ground in feet. Thus in a camera having a focal length (f) of 12", or 1 foot, as in the K-type camera, the height in feet above the ground is the denominator of the RF of the photo. Note this is the height above the ground, not the barometric reading of height above sea level.

Figures 2 and 3 show the effect of relief. Figure 2 shows how scale variations are introduced due to the fact that the top of the hill was closer to the camera than the bottom. This effect has probably been noted by everyone who has seen aerial photos of large cities containing very tall buildings. The tops of the buildings appear larger than their bases.




Fig. 1




Figure 3 shows displacement on the print due to relief. This displacement occurs along the radial lines from the center of the print. It is a function of the height of the camera (H), the depth or height of the object above the datum plane, and the distance from the center. Note that the greater the value of H , the less the displacement, which is an argument in favor of high altitude photography.

Figure 4 represents the effect of tilt. For practical purposes when the tilt is not in excess of 3 degrees it can be corrected for graphically. Photos obtained with the camera tilted out of its vertical position are called "obliques" as distinguished from "verticals." (Actually there are three centers to be considered in an "oblique;" as determined by the vertical axis, the optical axis and a point midway between). For purposes of clarity in drawing only one center is shown. For practical purposes when the amount of tilt does not exceed 3 degrees they may be considered as coincident.

One more figure is shown, figure 5, to show the effect of relief on direction. Fortunately all displacements due to the above cause are along radial lines. These errors may be cumulative or compensating.

If a single vertical only is to be used, and taken at a height of not more than 10,000 feet for moderate relief the errors of displacement will be well within the allow-

able limits of military sketching. If the area involved is not greater than that covered by a single good vertical it may be used as a combat map by small units of infantry. This will hardly be the case for artillery. A single print of 7" x 9" at 10,000 feet covers about 1,900 yards by 2,500 yards. At 20,000 feet these linear dimensions will be twice as great and at 30,000 feet 3 times. In most cases, especially in the case of the 155 mm gun, it will be necessary to utilize a number of adjacent prints. These prints may be fitted together in the form of a mosaic. Mosaics may be either "controlled" or "uncontrolled." In uncontrolled mosaics the prints are merely fitted together by matching topographic details. Such serious errors are introduced in this type of mosaic as to render it unsuitable for artillery purposes. In the controlled mosaics, the prints or parts of prints are adjusted by one of several methods so that the distances between objects represent more nearly the correct distances in the ground. The methods of accomplishing this need not be discussed here. In general it may be said that all mosaics are makeshift maps and are not satisfactory. They make pretty pictures and show a great deal of detail which the map does not disclose but the great drawback is that too much dependence is placed upon the individual's ability to interpret the details. What may be a trail to one may be a stream to another; what may be a pond to one may be plowed ground to another, etc. Another drawback is that places, roads, hills and so on are not identified by name or number. There are also difficulties in the matter of reproducing sufficient numbers of copies in the quantity required.

By far the most satisfactory solution is the map made from aerial photographs. Maps thus made are in all respects equal to if not actually superior to maps made by ground methods. In point of time consumed in making they represent a tremendous saving—representing hours where ground methods represent days. In rugged mountainous country—covered with jungle growth with its attendant annoyance of insects and heat, to say nothing of hostile natives it may be well the only solu-




Fig. 3
Showing displacement due to relief. "A" will appear to be at A' and "B" at B'.




Fig. 4
Showing radial displacement due to tilt.

tion. Recently the island of Luzon was mapped by Army engineers using a combination of ground control and aerial photography. Ground surveys were used for the principal triangulation and topographic details were filled in by means of photographs and the stereoscope. It is safe to say that without a doubt a truer picture of ground forms was obtained in this manner than would have been possible with the plane table in that particular locality. So it is not a makeshift method that is being offered under the press of circumstances but a method which will undoubtedly be in time the principal method used by mapping agencies throughout the world. Military maps to be of any value not only for artillery but for all other arms must portray ground forms. In fact this is the one feature that distinguishes a military map from all others. The topography, i. e., the relief—is all important. Here is where the aerial mapper uses the principle of the old-fashioned parlor stereoscope. Two adjacent photographs can be made to overlap by timing the intervals between successive exposure as the plane flies along its course. Now if two adjacent prints are placed under the stereoscope in their proper position so that one eye sees the area from the same relative position as the camera at first position and the other eye views the same area from a different position, the ground, buildings, etc., will stand forth as when actually viewed from the air. This effect may be exaggerated or minimized, depending upon the amount of overlap and the height of the camera. Reference should be made to a map or chart which shows the actual eleva-

tion of a few critical points in order to get the proper picture of the true relief of the ground. It is the stereoscopic principle which is employed in the various types of machines used for drawing in the contour lines. Most of them depend upon a certain amount of ground control points, i. e., elevation of certain critical points determined by some sort of ground survey, but this dependency is gradually diminishing with the perfection of instruments. In fact, and this is important, in a recent mapping operation by the U. S. Army no ground control whatsoever was used and the average horizontal error was less than the probable error of a 155 mm gun and the vertical error was almost negligible. It is presumed, however, that in order to obtain such excellent results flying and photographing conditions will have to be pretty near ideal and that the area to be mapped is not extensive. Under wartime conditions good prints and in sufficient numbers may be difficult to obtain. The Hydrographic Chart here may be very useful in furnishing the necessary horizontal and vertical control. Points on the shore line are usually shown on the charts with sufficient accuracy as to location and usually the elevations of a number of principal points are shown that can be used to determine the relief. It is not unreasonable to assume that we may have to land in some unmapped area and may have to employ similar methods.

Now as to equipment—what will we need and what have we got? First of all, we need a photographic plane, i. e., a plane fitted out to house the latest type multiple lens camera; and fitted with oxygen tanks for pilot and photographer. (Good photographs can be made of the ground at a height of 30,000 feet when under certain conditions the plane can neither be heard nor seen). Instruments will be needed for obtaining the altitude to a far greater degree of accuracy than the altimeter of the plane is capable of recording. This is necessary in case of mapping country in which there are no known distances in order to establish the exact scale of each print. We have none of the above.

We should have the latest type of multiple-lens T-

type mapping camera—the kind with one horizontal central lens and four peripheral lenses tilted at about 35 degrees. The result of a single exposure with this type of camera is one vertical and four obliques. For the obliques it is necessary to have a rectifying camera in order to transform them photographically to the plane of the center photograph. This type of camera may not be altogether essential to our use but it is very useful for mapping deep into enemy territory, covers large amount of terrain in a single exposure, and is valuable for determining the range and position of artillery targets. At present we have a T-type multiple lens camera with three peripheral lens but no plane equipped to mount it.

With this much equipment we can, assuming we have the necessary trained personnel, turn out good planimetric maps. Such maps will disclose roads, streams, trails, buildings; in fact, everything except the all-important ground forms or relief. Such a map would have its value, of course, if nothing better were available but would still fall far short of being a suitable map for artillery purposes or in fact almost any military purpose.

In order to portray the relief we need some sort of stereoscope mapping instrument, and skilled operators trained in their use. There are a number of these in existence of various types, but all employing the stereoscopic principle discussed above. It is not possible within the scope of this discussion to give any adequate description of the various types in existence. Suffice it to say that these instruments are of considerable size and complexity and require skilled personnel to operate. In the United States we have not fully realized their possibilities. In fact, to quote from a lecture recently delivered by an Army officer at the annual meeting of the Society of American Engineers on May 13, 1934: "It is only within the last three or four years that serious consideration has been given to stereoscopic plotting instruments in the United States. At the present time there are three aerocartographs, one stereoplaniograph, and one multiplex aero-projector in this country. The purchase of two additional multiplex aero-projectors in the immediate future is contemplated. The United States is at the bottom of the list in the matter of modernization of mapping methods and the time has come when something should be done to rectify this discrepancy. We still send plane table parties into the field as we did thirty or forty years ago."

He thus went on to recommend that a certain number of men from engineer districts should be sent to Wright field in order to become trained in the operation of stereoscopic plotting instruments and that the multiplex aero-projector in use at Wright field was sufficiently simple for high caliber enlisted men to operate. Opportunity was granted different officers to reply to his recommendations and one officer, an authority in the subject of mapping, replied in effect that undoubtedly the possibilities of aerial mapping were excellent but that progress in this would have to be a matter of gradual development rather than sudden change; that if they, the Army, went to war tomorrow they would have to use principally the methods that are now in existence. With us in the Marine Corps that argument does not apply since we have no mapping agency of any kind in actual existence. We might as well take up the latest, the most expeditious and possibly the only method left available to us.

(Continued on page 39)




Fig. 5

Showing the effect of relief on direction in adjacent photos.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

CAPTAIN ARTHUR T. MASON, U.S.M.C.

PART I

THE GENERAL SITUATION

■ At the beginning of 1915, England, France, Russia, Belgium and Serbia were at war with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Italy, disregarding her alliance with the Central Powers, was neutral, waiting to pick the winner. Bulgaria, inclined toward Germany, and Rumania, favoring the Allies, were both neutral, as was also Greece. Turkey had just entered the war on the side of Germany.

On the Western Front, the Battle of the Marne, the out-flanking attempts which extended the lines to the Channel, and the First Battle of Ypres, had resulted in the establishment of a trench barrier from Switzerland to the sea. The power of modern defense had triumphed over the attack and the war in this theater was at stalemate. The leaders were reluctant to accept this situation. In February and March, the French lost 50,000 men in gaining 500 yards in the German defenses in Champagne, and in April, 64,000 in a futile attack in the St. Mihiel area. There were heavy British losses at Neuve Chappelle, and the French lost 100,000 in their offensive effort between Lens and Arras.

On the Eastern Front, the same condition, to a lesser extent, had evolved. In this theater, such chances as there were of breaking through favored the Germans.

The importance of Turkey as a factor in the war was due mainly to her geographical position rather than to military activity. An attempt to strike at the Russians in the Caucasus ended in the disaster of Sarakamish and the reduction of an army from 90,000 to 12,000 men. An expedition against the Suez Canal failed and in Mesopotamia the Turks were slowly retreating before the British.

The main effects of Turkey's entrance into the war were to give to Germany the opportunity to gain a through route to the East, to close the important line of communication through the Dardanelles between Russia and her allies, and to distract the military strength of Great Britain and Russia.

While the armies were deadlocked in France, and Joffre, Foch, and French, supported by others in the triumph of their faith over reason, were lavishly throwing away men and munitions in vain frontal attacks against fortifications, certain British groups were devising other solutions. One, tactical in nature, was the development of the tank. The other, strategical, was to go around the trench barrier. Viewing the enemy alliance as a whole, it was maintained that modern developments had so changed conceptions of distance and powers of mobility that a blow in some other theater of war would correspond to the historic attack on the enemy's strategic flank.

In October, 1914, while the war was still in a mobile state, Lord Fisher had proposed landing on the German coast. In January, Kitchener suggested severing Turkey's line of communications to the east by a landing in the Gulf of Alexandretta, while there were others who favored landing at Salonika. The solution finally adopted—and if "adopted" conveys the impression of

an uncared-for orphan it is the proper term—was to force the Dardanelles.

The political results of successful accomplishment of this project would be to free Russia from isolation; it would influence Italy and the Balkans in favor of the Allies; and it would keep the Near East and India quiet by liquidating German influence in these areas.

Its military advantages were that it was a flank rather than a frontal attack; that it would cut Turkey out of the war; that it would be striking at a weak point rather than where the enemy was strong; that it would give Russia the direct support of the Allies by the supply of munitions and assist the Allies by gaining access to Russian wheat; that it would tighten the blockade of the Central Powers; that it would utilize the advantage of England's command of the sea; and, finally, that it would, in all probability, materially hasten the end of the war.

THE DECISION

We are mainly concerned with the operations of the landing forces, so that it is intended to outline the initiation of the expedition by civilian and military leaders only sufficiently to give a picture of the situation at the beginning of the main effort and to indicate that the seeds of failure were sown before a single man was embarked.

Churchill, to whom must go the main credit for the most promising idea of attacking the Dardanelles and for translating the idea into action, and the chief blame for its faulty execution, was First Lord of the Admiralty and a member of the War Council which was composed of himself, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the War Minister (Field Marshal Kitchener), the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for India, and the Lord Chancellor. In November, 1914, Churchill had advocated a naval attack on Constantinople but the project was not approved. Both naval and military opinion condemned unsupported naval attack on guns and forts ashore, an opinion which is still sound today, but the brilliant Churchill, "blithely willing to accept responsibility in matters of which he was ignorant, impatient of detailed analysis or plan," confident that the small knowledge he had of military and naval affairs was superior to that of his technical advisers, would not believe.

When Russia in January, 1915, requested the British to make a demonstration against Turkey in order to relieve the pressure on the Russian army in the Caucasus, Churchill seized the opportunity to revive the idea of a naval attack on the Dardanelles. Lord Fisher, First Sea Lord, and Sir Arthur Wilson, Admiral of the Fleet, technical advisers to Churchill, and Sir James Wolfe Murray, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, all opposed the proposition. By a little misrepresentation in both directions, Churchill convinced the admiral commanding the British Fleet in the Mediterranean that Lord Fisher approved the idea. On this understanding, the admiral submitted a plan of attack which Churchill used to silence Lord Fisher's objections by asserting that the "man on the spot" believed the scheme practical. He then convinced Kitchener that the experience of the past meant nothing and that modern ships' guns could destroy forts. Kitchener cared

little for any sort of advice, still less for military advice, so that the position of Murray, his technical adviser, was largely ornamental. When the War Council met to pass on the proposition, Churchill, supported by Kitchener, proceeded to sell his idea. The technical advisers, military experts, were present but believed that out of loyalty to their chiefs they could not publicly oppose them. On the other hand, the civilian members of the Council believed that the presence and silence of the experts indicated their approval. So, on the 13th of January, the Council decided that: "The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective." Write your own remark on sending ships to "take" a fortified land area 45 miles long by as much as 12 miles wide.

Thus the political mind, disregarding the lessons of history, as well as various studies which had been made of this particular problem, including one which had been made some years previously by the Admiralty and War Office, stepped outside its proper sphere by dictating to the naval and military leaders not only what to do but how to do it. No further details of the activities of the War Council will be presented, but let us remember that its decisions, arrived at by a continuation of similar methods, exerted a continuous and generally adverse effect on the operations.

THE NAVAL ATTACKS

A naval force was assembled for the attacks which had been directed and began its operations against the defenses of the Dardanelles on February 19. The difficulty in silencing the obsolete and inadequate forts at the entrance was discouraging, but by the first part of March, the fleet was able to commence to attack the important defenses at the Narrows. The main effort was made on March 18 by sixteen battleships and a number of smaller vessels. Of the battleships, three were sunk and another put out of action by mines, and three more disabled by gunfire. The naval attack was abandoned and it was decided that land forces were necessary to deal with the defenses of the channel and that the fleet should revert to the role of auxiliary to such forces.

These naval attacks were not without result, but the effect which they had was beneficial to the other side. One of the arguments at the time of their initiation had been that if the first attempts were not successful, they could be abandoned and the impression created that only a demonstration had been intended anyway, but by March 18 they had been carried so far that to withdraw would be to admit defeat; the Allies were definitely committed to the operation. Furthermore, all hope of surprise had been lost; the fleet had suffered its casualties in order to deliver a message to Constantinople which said, in effect, "We are going to attack you here and you had better get ready." They did.

THE MILITARY FORCE ASSEMBLES

While the naval operations were in progress, the military force which was to make the campaign was gradually drifting together, haphazardly assembled with no conception as to its function which had any relation to the true condition of affairs.

The garrison in Egypt had been increased to meet the threat of attack on the Suez Canal. This garrison consisted mostly of Indian and Territorial troops, and the equivalent of nearly two divisions from Australia and New Zealand. In London, the War Council came

to realize that after the fleet had forced the Dardanelles (if it did), a military force would be required to assist in the later stages of the program by completing the destruction of the forts and by occupying the ground on each side of the straits. The Council concluded on February 16, three days before the naval attacks were begun, that a military force should be prepared. Troops in Egypt were warned to move and the 29th Division was to be dispatched to Lemnos, these troops to be used "if required." There was no hurry about it, for the fleet operations were estimated to require a month and there was no realization that the operation should be amphibious from the start.

Here appeared another factor which seriously influenced the campaign throughout. The generals in France and those who believed in their murderous frontal attacks continuously opposed the detachment or diversion of any forces or supplies from the western theater for any other purpose. On this account, the 29th Division could not be immediately withdrawn from France and it was almost a month later before it could be ordered to embark. In the meantime, the French decided to cooperate in the employment of land forces as they had in the naval campaign and improvised a division made up mostly of colonial troops from Africa.

Toward the end of February, General Birdwood, the Anzac commander in Egypt, was ordered to report on the situation at the Dardanelles, and at the same time one Australian brigade was moved to Lemnos. Birdwood's report expressed doubt that the fleet could force the straits unaided, so on March 10, the 29th Division was ordered to embark and Sir Ian Hamilton was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the military forces.

The tenor of Hamilton's orders was to the effect that his task was to assist by minor enterprises in support of the ships, but after witnessing the naval attack on the 18th, he cabled home that his share must be a "deliberate and progressive military operation carried out in force to make good the passage of the Navy."

The original scheme of a naval attack had completely failed and no provision had been made in time to meet the new situation. Quick action was important but Hamilton was in no condition to make an immediate effort. Part of his force was already at Lemnos and on the water in transports, the remainder ready to embark from Egypt on short notice, but the units he was to command had been shipped from distant ports, those in charge of the embarkation had been uncertain what was expected of the army and at the time the transports were loaded not even Hamilton himself knew what his task was to be. So ill-conceived and chaotic had been the original loading that battalions were separated from their transportation, wagons from their horses, guns from their ammunition, and even shells from their fuzes.

It was therefore necessary to return the transports which had arrived at Lemnos, and to direct others en route, to Alexandria, there to unload and reload for the attack. The reorganization of troops and reassignment to transports required almost a month, so that it was the 20th of April before the forces were again assembled at Lemnos in readiness for the landing. During this time, their opponents had undisturbed leisure to prepare for the attack which they saw was impending.

To appreciate how welcome was this delay to the Germans motivating the Turkish war machine—or ox-cart—one must realize the Turkish lethargy and indifference, for until the end of February there was only

one division on the Peninsula and it was not until the end of March that improvements in the defenses of the straits approached completion. This weakness was in part due to the Turkish belief that it was futile to oppose any serious attempt to force a passage. The Turkish Staff History says, "Up till the 25th of February it would have been possible to effect a landing successfully at any point on the peninsula and the capture of the straits by land troops would have been comparatively easy." It may be noted that on February 26th, a few marines went ashore on the tip of the peninsula to blow up the forts. Two months later, thousands of men died effecting a landing at the same spot where this small party had walked around without opposition.

The Turks were amply warned of the projected land attack by the cessation of the naval attacks, by the movements of transports, and by public reviews of troops in Alexandria and Cairo, faithfully reported in the Egyptian newspapers. At least one British staff officer was receiving official letters in the open mail addressed to the "Constantinople Field Force." Not even the Turks could ignore such warning, and on March 25th they formed a separate army with a strength of six divisions to defend the Peninsula. Its commander exclaimed, "If the British will only leave me alone for eight days." They gave him four weeks.

Thus, finally, Hamilton's 75,000 men were to make their attack against 84,000 Turks. The weakness of the Allied force was due to lack of foresight and planning and to disregard by the leaders of the implications of the undertaking. Many in London realized the difficulties but they were over-ruled by Churchill's arguments and Kitchener's bludgeoning. Kitchener was probably most to blame, for he underestimated the Turkish fighting ability, even going so far as to say that "if one submarine pops up opposite the town of Gallipoli and waves a Union Jack three times, the whole Turkish garrison on the Peninsula will take to their heels." Churchill said that he got his idea of the Turks from an incident that had happened in December. A landing party from a British light cruiser tore up the railway north of Alexandretta without opposition and demanded that the locomotives in the place be blown up. The Turks agreed to do so if the British would lend them some explosives. When a British lieutenant went ashore the next day with the gun-cotton, a new difficulty arose, for Turkish dignity forbade the British to have anything to do with the destruction, and they would not do it themselves. After a conference of some hours, the situation was solved by the Turks, who formally rated the British lieutenant a Turkish naval officer for the rest of the day and let him blow up the engines.

But the campaign turned out to be no comic opera for Hamilton, for no heed was paid to his immediate and potential needs in men, guns, ammunition, and supplies, and the expedition was to live from hand to mouth, nourishment being always too small and too late, yet in sum far exceeding what would have originally sufficed for success.

PLANS

So much for a general introduction. In presenting the story of the campaign itself it will be attempted, with as little confusion as possible, to deal with both the attack and the defense. For reasons of sympathy and because more material for the study of the attack is available, it is common to attribute the British failure

solely to the mistakes they made. While it is true that if these errors had not been committed; the British would in all probability have succeeded, the fact should not detract from the credit due a successful and forceful defense, laboring under many difficulties and inevitably falling into error on occasion. If the British demonstrated how not to make a landing attack, the Turks under their German commander maintained a defense from which we can draw many lessons of value.

In proceeding, we will consider first the plans of the British, then the disposition of the Turks and then the execution of the attack and of the defense.

THE BRITISH COMMANDER

First let us consider Sir Ian Hamilton and the forces he commanded. Hamilton was 62 years old at the time, had served in the Afghan and Boer Wars and several expeditions, and was in command of the Home Defense Forces in England at the time of his appointment to command the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

He was sent out in such a hurry that not all his staff could be assembled to accompany him and such important sections as those of the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General were left behind to join later. Moreover, Kitchener for no apparent reason refused to allow him to take his own chief of staff with whom he had worked for several years in close harmony, and appointed a stranger. All the information Hamilton had to take with him was a 1912 handbook of the Turkish Army, a pre-war report on the Dardanelles defenses, and an inaccurate map.

Kitchener gave him peremptory orders that the military forces should not be employed until the fleet had exhausted all efforts; not to attack until all his forces had been assembled; that the scheme of forcing the straits could not be abandoned; that his attack was not to extend to the Asiatic mainland; that the 29th Division was only a loan from the Western Front to be returned as soon as possible; and that he had better not ask for reinforcements. Even the 10% that normally accompanied British expeditions as first replacements were left 3,000 miles behind in England.

To these handicaps imposed by one who had no real idea of the situation was added that of Hamilton's own character. Brave, energetic and kind-hearted, he was vacillating and wavering in decision; he transmitted this spirit to his subordinates and tolerated it in them. This major factor in the failure of the campaign is also largely due to Kitchener, for he had no use for any except pliant characters and Hamilton was chosen because Kitchener liked him. One instance will suffice to show the effect of Kitchener's despotism and Hamilton's character. Before he attacked but when he had been on the scene long enough to doubt the sufficiency of his strength, Hamilton heard that the French might allot another division to his force, and he inquired of Kitchener if the rumor was true. Anxious as he was to have the division, he was afraid of creating the impression that he was asking for it, so he ended his message, "Just in case there is truth in the report, you should know that Mudros Harbor (his base) is as full as it will hold." Hamilton was one of a number who proved that a yes-man may wear stars but that he will never be a great general.

TROOPS

His force was composed of:

The 29th Division (17,500), commanded by Major General Hunter-Weston, and organized into the 86th, 87th and 88th Brigades.

The Royal Naval Division (10,000), commanded by Major General Paris and composed of the 1st and 2nd (Naval) Brigades and the 3rd (Marine) Brigade.

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, (30,000), commonly known as Anzacs, commanded by Lieutenant General Birdwood, and organized into the 1st Australian Division with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Australian Brigades, and the New Zealand and Australian Division with the New Zealand Brigade and the 4th Australian Brigade.

The Corps Expéditionnaire D'Orient commanded by General d'Amade with one division (16,000) of two brigades.

The British brigades had four battalions each, there being no regimental organization; the French had two regiments per brigade. Each British battalion may be considered as having an approximate strength of 1,000 men.

These troops were not of the highest class. Even the 29th Division, composed of veterans mostly, drawn from India and foreign stations, had practically never been exercised as a division. The Naval Division was a recently created body of troops with neither artillery nor the special units usually included in a division. The French contingent had been improvised from colonial troops and included some native Africans. Furthermore, the divisions did not have all the units a division usually included; especially, except for the French, they were very weak in artillery. The four British divisions had only 118 guns altogether, whereas their

tables of organization called for 304, a deficiency which the naval guns available would more than make up, in numbers at least. Some of the battalions were below war strength when they started and the normal troop replacements were absent.

To support the landing and to furnish its chief artillery support was a fleet of seventeen battleships, led by the 15-gun *Queen Elizabeth*, a number of cruisers, destroyers, mine sweepers, trawlers and others. The harbor of Mudros on the island of Lemnos was the base, both for the landing force and for the 200 various types of war vessels and the 60 transports.

Air support was chiefly in the form of reconnaissance and some spotting was furnished to a limited degree by a few unreliable aircraft and a kite balloon operated by the navy. In a preliminary conference in London, Hamilton's chief of staff told Kitchener that it was vital they have a marked degree of air superiority over the Turks and that, whatever else they lacked, he begged the expedition be furnished with proper planes and personnel. In his Diary, Hamilton says, "K. turned on him with flashing spectacles and rent him with the words 'Not one.'"

There was, of course, no gas, no tanks, no hand grenades, no trench mortars. Ammunition supply for artillery, both naval and shore guns, was inadequate and there were many other deficiencies of matériel.

THE TERRAIN (See Map 1)

Let us now consider the terrain as it was known to both sides. Hamilton's knowledge had been increased since his arrival by the acquisition of more maps and by reconnaissance; the Turks, of course, had a greater familiarity with the ground.

The peninsula of Gallipoli forms one side of the straits of the Dardanelles which lead into the Sea of Marmora, at the head of which is Constantinople. The straits are bounded on the other, the southeast side, by the Asiatic mainland, with the historic plains of Troy at the entrance.


The peninsula itself is about 45 miles long and as much, in some places, as 12 miles wide. It is connected with the European mainland (Thrace) by the isthmus of Bulair, about three miles wide at its narrowest point, which forms part of the southeastern shore of the Gulf of Saros. Here the water is shallow and transports would have to lie nearly a mile off shore. The only convenient landing place is Bakla Bay.

Southwest of Bulair, the peninsula widens until it reaches Suvla Bay. Along this stretch, the coast is entirely unsuitable for landing except at Ezelmer Bay, which is too narrow and restricted for any but a small force. From Suvla Bay south to two or three miles below Gaba Tepe, the coast is practicable for landing in calm weather, although Hamilton had failed through his maps and reconnaissances to discover any part of this beach except that adjacent to Gaba Tepe.

Just south of Suvla, the peninsula begins to narrow again until it forms a sort of isthmus between Gaba Tepe and Maidos. North of this narrow portion and dominating it is a mountain mass known as Sari Bair, with three main summits: Hill 971 (elevation in feet), Hill Q and Chunuk Bair. From Gaba Tepe to Maidos across the peninsula, the terrain is in the form of a broad, flat valley with a low watershed, fertile and well cultivated.

The Kilid Bahr plateau is the next important feature. It was the main stronghold or final defensive position

(Continued on page 53)



Map 1

MARINES AS AN AID TO DIPLOMACY IN CHINA

CAPTAIN EVAN F. CARLSON, U.S.M.C.

■ It is the purpose of this study to inquire into the use made of Marines for the protection of American lives and property in China, with especial regard to the effect of their use on American diplomacy in that country.

The legality of the use of Marines for the protection of the lives and property of our citizens abroad is, of course, based on the right of government to intervene for the protection of its nationals. J. B. Moore writes in *American Diplomacy* that "The right of the government to intervene for the protection of its citizens in foreign lands and on the high seas never was doubted; nor was such action withheld in proper cases." Ellery C. Stowell, in his book "Intervention in International Law," says: "It sometimes happens that a weak or harassed government is unable or unwilling to compel its nationals to observe international law. In such a situation, the state whose nationals or whose interests are endangered may act directly to compel the observance of international law. Action so taken is called 'self help,' and is a remedy which supplements interposition."

Mr. William R. Castle, Jr., a former official of the State Department, wrote in an article for the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE entitled "Why Marines Are Landed," which appeared in the issue of August, 1934:

"One positive and one negative fact seems clearly indicated throughout the learned discussions of the lawyers—unsought and, therefore, generally unwelcome interference in the political life of a foreign country is always intervention, whether the interference occurs through diplomatic agencies or through the use of troops, and the protection of one's own nationals in a foreign country, when that country has made it impossible for them to obtain justice, is not intervention, even when troops are sent to protect their rights. American courts have repeatedly stated that protection of its citizens is the first and highest law of the state, and the fact that those citizens may be temporarily living in foreign countries in no way diminishes the duty of protection."

A myth prevails that Marines are used in support of this principle of international law because the landing of units of the Army on foreign shores would be an act of war. The assumption is without legal basis. It has grown up, doubtless, through the habitual use of Marines for this purpose; which practice has developed purely out of expediency, it being more convenient to land troops which serve aboard ships with the Navy and are, consequently, at or near the affected area.

SECTION 1—THE MARINE CORPS

(a) *Historical background.*—Marines are seafaring soldiers. They are attached to gunboats, cruisers and battleships, where they serve the ships' guns along with sailors. But their specialty is landing operations, and it is as the spearhead of a fleet in the initiation of operations ashore that the Marines enter a field of activity which is peculiarly their own.

There have been Marines on the vessels of every navy which has sailed the seven seas since Solomon built for himself swift galleys of war. A number of noted families of the Phoenicians, and later the Carthaginians, organized under them seagoing infantry. This organization was inherited, in turn, by the Greeks and Romans.

The first modern corps of Marines was organized by the British in 1664. An officer of this corps was John Churchill, better known as the Duke of Marlborough.

The United States Marine Corps dates from November 10, 1775, when it was organized by special act of the Continental Congress.

While these soldiers of the sea have participated in all of the various wars in which this nation has been engaged during the past one hundred and fifty-nine years, they have been repeatedly used as a form of international police for the enforcement of the accepted principles of international law, especially to assure security for the lives and property of our citizens abroad. In the execution of this mission they have been called upon to quell revolutions, to secure redress for crimes, and to obtain expiation for injured national prestige. Marines have, by the very diversified character of the duty required of them, become an exceptionally mobile, flexible and versatile military organization, an important component of the navy.

The present strength of the Marine Corps comprises, in round numbers, a thousand officers and sixteen thousand enlisted men. Detachments of from fifty to one hundred men form part of the complement of all gunboats, heavy cruisers and battleships. In China a regiment of one thousand men is stationed in the International Settlement at Shanghai, while a guard of five hundred men guards the Embassy at Peiping. Marines are also stationed at the Cavite navy yard in the Philippine Islands, and on the island of Guam. The important naval station of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii has a garrison of Marines, as has the submarine base of Coco Solo, in Panama, while a squadron of Marine aviators is based at St. Thomas, in the Virgin Islands. At home Marines guard all navy yards, and units of the Fleet Marine Force are stationed at the important bases of Quantico, Va., and San Diego, California.

SECTION II—CHINA

(a) *Its geography.*—The boundaries of the country known as China have always been poorly defined. Broadly speaking China as we know it is that vast area of land in southeastern Asia which stretches from the highlands of Turkestan for 2,500 miles east to the Yellow and China Seas, and lies between the Mongolian deserts on the north and the tropical jungles of Burma and Indo-China 2,000 miles to the south. The political vicissitudes of the years since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1912 have resulted in the contraction of China's boundaries. The area today is estimated to comprise 1,532,800 square miles, and contains a population of 458,779,714 people (1925 postal estimate). On the north Manchuria, with the Inner Mongolian province of Jehol, has become the empire of Manchoukuo, under the tutelage of Japan. Outer Mongolia has for many years been considered within the Russian sphere of influence. In the west Sinkiang, or as it is popularly known, Chinese Turkestan, is a victim of Russian penetration, while Thibet is torn between a movement for complete autonomy, and a possessive attitude of the British on the south and the Russians on the north.

Geographers have a way of dividing China by an imaginary line running east and west about midway between the Yangtze and the Yellow rivers, and calling the two divisions, respectively, North and South China.

While both sections have much in common, there are many differences in geographic environment.

The North is brown and arid, with areas of level land where agriculture is precarious, and where famines are frequent. The people are taller and speak a uniform dialect known as Mandarin, or kuan hua. Donkeys, mules, horses and the Bactrian camel furnish the means of transportation, while food consists of keoliang, millet, wheat and beans. The North is the land of Confucius and the sages, the home of culture and conservatism.

South China is the land of canals and paddy fields, of rice and bamboo. The South is green and the growing season here is from nine months to a year. Cultivation is intensive and crop failure rare. The water buffalo, and canal and river boats, are the popular means of transportation. The people are shorter in stature, and speak a multitude of dialects. They are radical and restless, which accounts in large measure, probably, for the fact that rebellions and revolutions usually have their origin in the South.

No survey of the geography of China can afford to ignore the three great river basins. The Hwang Ho, or Yellow river, in the north, wanders down for 2,700 miles out of the northwest to eventually empty into the Gulf of Chihli. Its proclivity for overflowing its banks and changing its course has caused it to become known as "China's Sorrow."

In central China the Yangtze river bisects the country from Thibet to Shanghai. Thirty-two hundred miles in length, it is the sixth longest river in the world. While the Yellow river is navigable by steamers for only a short distance in the province of Honan, and for fifty miles from its mouth, the Yangtze is navigable from the sea for sixteen hundred and thirty miles to Suifu in the province of Szechuan.

The third great river of China is the Si Ho, or West, which flows from Yunnan province for eleven hundred eighteen miles through the southeast to enter the sea at Canton.

Originally a continental nation whose front door faced the caravan routes which stretched westward across the Central Asian highlands, the advent of the trans-ocean sailing vessel compelled China to turn her face to the sea, an evolution which she managed with small grace during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries.

(b) *Historical background.*—The history of China may be said to begin with Yao the Great, or about 2357 B.C. It falls roughly into the following three divisions: The Feudal Period, 2357 B.C.—221 B.C.; the Monarchical Period, 221 B.C.—A.D. 1912; and the Republican Period, from 1912 onwards.

Since the beginning of the monarchical period when feudal chieftainships in what are now the provinces of Shansi, Shensi, Hopei and Shantung, were welded together into an empire under the first Emperor, Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, the history of China has been a history of strong dynastic government interspersed with periods of disintegration. The first emperor united the existing walls on the north to form one continuous wall from the Gulf of Chihli westward over mountains and through valleys for 1,145 miles to Kansu, a monument to his reign which stands today.

Literature, art and military studies flourished during the Han dynasty (206 B.C. to 221 A.D.). Military operations added northern Korea, on the east, and Kansu, on the west to the empire. Several minor dynasties succeeded the Han, and the empire was divided into the three

kingdoms of Shu, Wu and Wei. The strong T'ang dynasty reigned from A.D. 618 to A.D. 907, a period which is identified in Chinese history with the development of the art of poetry. Another short period of disintegration followed, and then the powerful Sungs came to the throne. These emperors were patrons of literature, philosophy and the ceramic arts. In 1211 began the great Mongol invasion under Ghenghis Khan. His successor, Kublai Khan, invaded the south, conquered Yunnan and annexed Burma. By A.D. 1280 Kublai Khan had mastered all of China and set up his capital on the site of what is now known as Peiping, which he called Cambulac. It was here he received the Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, on whom he bestowed various official appointments.

China has probably never been better governed than under Kublai Khan, but with his death strong leadership among the Mongols began to wane. By 1368 rebellion was rife, and the leader, Chu, captured Nanking, where he set up the Ming (Bright) dynasty. In 1421 the third Ming emperor, Yung Lo, moved the capital to Peiping (Peking), where he enlarged the city of the Khans and adorned it with fine altars and temples to heaven, earth and other objects of worship, many of which still exist.

Foreign elements began to creep in during the Ming dynasty. The Dutch settled in Formosa, the English penetrated to Canton, and Jesuit missionaries of different nationalities were rapidly gaining ground.

In 1644 the Manchus arose in the north, swept into China and captured Peking, where they set up the Ch'ing dynasty, which was to reign until the establishment of the republic. Under the emperor, K'ang Hsi, and his grandson, Ch'ien Lung, the borders of the nation were extended still further to the west, north and south, and culture reached a high plane.

The nations of the west knocked more persistently than ever at China's gates during the 18th and 19th centuries. Protected on land as she was by great natural barriers on the north, west and south, she was unable to avoid contact by way of the sea. Her dominant position had convinced Emperor and people that the Emperor was in fact the Son of Heaven, as Confucian philosophy implied, and consequently superior to other temporal rulers. This bigoted point of view was responsible for the almost insurmountable obstacles which were placed in the paths of foreign embassies which sought to establish trade relations with China. The 19th Century therefore, is marked with frequent clashes between China and the foreigners, culminating in the Boxer uprising of 1900. The only internal war of any importance was the Taiping rebellion (1850-64), an uprising of unorthodox native Christians against the government which resulted in the extermination of 20,000,000 of Chinese.

The revolution of 1912, led by a Western educated doctor named Sun Yat-sen, opened a new political era for China. Overnight the centuries old imperial system of government was swept away. A republican form of government was established, but the revolutionists had not thoroughly worked out the mechanics of governmental control with the result that chaos soon reigned in the provinces. Feudal war lords arose with limited jurisdiction and it was not until these war lords were won over or driven out by the armies of the Kuomint'ang party, in 1928, that China was finally united under a central government.

Let us consider for a moment the religious beliefs of the Chinese people. Confucianism is by far the most important of these. For over 2,000 years the philosophy of Confucius has exerted a profound influence over the

moral, social and political life of his countrymen. His doctrines of humanity, justice and reverence still form the backbone of Chinese ethics.

Taoism, established by Lao Tzu even before the times of Confucius, still has many adherents. However, in later years Taoism fell upon evil ways, taking over the magical practices of the people and thereby losing its universal appeal.

Buddhism was introduced from India during the Han dynasty, about the year 67 A.D. Coming by way of the caravan route through Sinkiang and Mongolia, many converts were made among the Mongols, where a form of Buddhism known as Lantsim exists today. Buddhism was favored by the Khans during the Yuan dynasty, and also flourished during the reign of Ch'ien Lung in the 18th century.

While the influence of Mohammedanism is less than that of the two major religions of China, nevertheless its effect is profound in the northwestern provinces, and must not be overlooked.

(c) *Commercial importance.*—Silk was the commodity which first found its way from China to the West. Silk, tea and artistic products such as porcelain, jade and lacquer brought traders and foreign embassies to China's shores with the advent of the sailing vessel. But finding products acceptable to the Chinese with which to load ships on the outward voyage was a difficult matter. When the first British ambassador sought to open trade relationships with China in 1793 the Emperor Ch'ien Lung replied: "Strange and costly objects do not interest me. As your ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange and ingenious and have no use for your country's manufacturers." (*China's Geographic Foundations*, by Cressey).

Silver, furs, ginseng and even rice filled the holds of the Yankee clippers of New England when they travelled to the port of Canton.

It was partially to stop the steady flow of silver to China that the importation of opium was introduced, and subsequently it was the large purchases of opium by China which caused silver to flow out rather than in to the country.

While during the first half of the 19th century foreign countries were interested chiefly in Chinese imports, trade developments of the past two decades have reversed this concept. Cotton goods, raw cotton, sugar, petroleum products, rice, metals, chemicals, tobacco, flour, paper, machinery, dyes, wheat and timber are now the principal imports, the total for 1931 amounting to 1,433,489,194 Haikwan taels (a Haikwan tael being equivalent to about 75 cents U. S. Currency). Of this amount Haikwan taels 321,341,671 came from the United States. During the same period China's exports aggregated 909,476,000 Haikwan taels, of which 120,205,000 taels worth of products went to the United States. Chief exports are beans and bean products, raw silk, hides and leather, coal, cereals and peanuts. (*China Year Book*, 1934.)

During the year under review (1931) the British Empire secured the bulk of China's foreign trade, with the United States and Japan in second and third places, respectively.

SECTION III—FOREIGN DIPLOMACY IN CHINA

(a) *First steps and first treaties.*—The Portuguese have the distinction of being the first Europeans to arrive in China by way of the sea, a Portuguese vessel reaching Canton in 1516. Their conduct soon convinced the authorities that they were more interested in loot than in

legitimate trade, and their activities were restricted to the island of Macao, not far from Hongkong.

The Spanish arrived in 1575, the Dutch in 1604, the English in 1637 and the Americans in 1784. While these nations were making contact with the south the Russians succeeded in concluding with China the first modern treaty. The Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 was an agreement for the regulation of trade, and for the control of peoples moving back and forth across the Manchurian-Siberian frontier.

In 1757 the Manchus definitely restricted trade by Europeans to the southernmost port of Canton. The conditions of trade were determined exclusively by the Chinese, and the charges were made as heavy as the Chinese thought the traffic would bear. Only a small part of the income reached Peking, the balance being pocketed by the collectors and the officials from magistrate to viceroy. A guild of Chinese merchants engaged in foreign trade, known as the Co-hong, came into existence and all foreigners were looked upon as a lower order of moral being, and were so treated.

American commerce with China began immediately after the close of the revolutionary war. In 1784 the Empress of China sailed from New York for Canton with a cargo of ginseng, a mild tonic for which the Chinese still have an appetite. The cargo was in charge of Major Samuel Shaw, who later became the first official representative of the United States in China. Shaw returned to the United States in 1785, but the following year he was "elected by Congress" to the post of Consul to China, without salary, being allowed to engage in trade.

In 1792 the British government sent an embassy headed by Lord Macartney to China to undertake the task of negotiating a trade agreement with the Peking government. It was the Chinese custom for those approaching the throne to perform the kowtow, kneeling three times while touching the head to the floor nine times. This humiliating custom was objected to by Lord Macartney, as well as by subsequent ambassadors. The Emperor handed him a haughty reply to King George, and the burdens of trade became heavier instead of lighter. Subsequent attempts to negotiate were not more successful.

Another source of annoyance to foreigners was the Chinese system of justice. Chinese jails and the Chinese conception of justice were wholly at variance with those of European and American countries, a fact which was responsible for the extra-territorial clauses in subsequent treaties.

The Opium war of 1842 was fought by Great Britain to obtain national recognition on terms of reasonable equality. It ended in the Treaty of Nanking, by which Hongkong was ceded to the British, and the ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai were opened for trade.

The Treaty of Nanking was negotiated between Major General Sir Henry Pottinger, Bart., on behalf of the Empress of Great Britain, and the High Commissioners Ki ying and Il I pu on the part of the Emperor of China. The treaty was signed on board H.M.S. *Cornwallis* at Nanking on the 29th day of August, 1842. It contained thirteen articles.

Article one provided for the restoration of peace and friendship between the two countries.

Article two read as follows:

"His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees that British Subjects with their families and establishments, shall be allowed to reside for the purpose of carrying on their Mercantile pursuits, without molestation or restraint at

the cities and towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow-fu, Ningpo, and Shanghai, and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, will appoint Superintendents or Consular officers, to reside at each of the above named cities or Towns, to be the medium of communication between the Chinese authorities and the said Merchants, and to see that just duties and other Dues of the Chinese Government as hereinafter provided for, are duly discharged by Her Britannic Majesty's Subjects."

Other articles of the treaty dealt with the cession of Hongkong to Great Britain, abolition of the co-hong, payment of indemnity, and equality between the two nations.

On October 8, 1843, Sir Henry Pottinger signed another treaty with Ki ying, known as the Treaty of Bogue. It has become famous because of the "Most-Favored Nation Clause" which was contained in Article VIII. It reads as follows:

"The Emperor of China having been graciously pleased to grant to all foreign Countries whose Subjects, or Citizens, have hitherto traded at Canton the privilege of resorting for purposes of Trade to the other four ports of Fuchow, Amoy, Ningpo and Shanghai, on the same terms as the English, it is further agreed, that should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be pleased to grant additional privileges or immunities to any of the Subjects or Citizens of such foreign Countries, the same privileges and immunities will be extended to and enjoyed by British Subjects; but it is to be understood that demands or requests are not, on this plea, to be unnecessarily brought forward."

It fell to the lot of Caleb Cushing, a member of Congress from Massachusetts, to negotiate the first American treaty with China. He went to Macao in 1844 and secured from the Chinese government the same trade rights which had been accorded the British in the Treaty of Nanking, and in addition secured for American citizens extra-territorial jurisdiction. This treaty, because of its fullness of detail and its clear statement of rights, became the leading authority for the settlement of disputes between the Chinese and foreigners up to the treaty revision of 1858-60.

The treaty was signed at Wanghia on July 3, 1844 by Caleb Cushing for the United States and Ki ying for China. Article XXI, which deals with jurisdiction reads as follows:

"Subjects of China who may be guilty of any criminal act toward citizens of the United States shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities according to the laws of China, and citizens of the United States who may commit any crime in China shall be subject to be tried and punished only by the Consul or other public functionary of the United States thereto authorized according to the laws of the United States."

Article XXV reads: "All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between citizens of the United States in China shall be subject to the jurisdiction of and regulated by authorities of their own government; and all controversies occurring in China between the citizens of the United States and the subjects of any other Government shall be regulated by the Treaties existing between the United States and such Governments respectively, without interference on the part of China."

The final article of the treaty embodied a provision for the revision of the treaty at the expiration of twelve years.

The influx of foreigners which marked the more liberal trading conditions with China necessitated special

arrangements for their regulation and care at the treaty ports. At Shanghai an amicable agreement was made by the British with the local authorities whereby ground was set aside for foreign residents, the land being rented to them in perpetuity. Under the Land Regulations of 1845, and re-affirmed in the Land Regulations of 1854, the foreign concession became an International Settlement. The French, however, preferred not to join other nations in sharing the settlement, and in 1849 the French consul secured a concession for France adjacent to and south of the International Settlement. Thus was established the principle of foreign concessions in China, which became the practice at all treaty ports.

The second Anglo-Chinese war commenced in 1858, the immediate cause being the capture by Chinese of the Lorcha "Arrow," although the continuing failure of the Chinese Government officials to treat Great Britain as an equal, and the repeated refusals to discuss treaty revision were strong contributing factors. Lord Elgin was now the British plenipotentiary on the ground. Under his direction British troops and ships captured Canton, then moved north and stormed the fort at Taku, outside Tientsin. The Treaty of Tientsin resulted. It provided for the residence at Peking of the British Minister, a privilege never before granted. Article X provided for British trade on the Yangtze, especially with the port of Chinkiang. Article XI established the new treaty ports of Newchwang, Tangchow, Taiwan (Formosa), Swatow and Kiungchow (Hainan). Another article prohibited the use of the term "barbarian" when addressing or speaking of the Government or subjects of the Queen of England.

However, when Lord Elgin's brother, Sir Frederick Bruce, tried to enter Peking as Minister, the way was barred at Taku. An attempt to force the forts again with a British squadron under Admiral Hope brought disaster to the squadron, which was compelled to retire to Shanghai, after suffering heavy losses. The following year (1860) a British and French squadron returned to Taku, took the forts and troops marched on Peking. They were further incensed by the capture of Mr. Harry Parkes and Mr. Loch, Lord Elgin's secretary, who were operating under a flag of truce. These men, their attendants, and a group of French, were tortured and some of them killed. For this act of treachery Lord Elgin directed that the Yuan Ming Yuan (summer palace) be burned. He considered it necessary to mark "in a manner that could not soon be forgotten the punishment awarded for an act of treachery so gross as that which had characterized the Emperor's policy, and which had resulted in the murder of so many officers and men."

The Treaty of Peking was signed on the 24th of October, 1860. The treaty reiterated the clause of the Tientsin Treaty which had provided for the residence of the British Minister in Peking. An additional article provided for the cession of Kowloon, across from Hongkong, to Great Britain.

Mr. Anson Burlingame was the first American Minister to reside in Peking, where he arrived in April, 1862.

(b) *Diplomacy and the use of Marines from 1850 to 1900.* — It was the T'ai P'ing Rebellion which caused the first use of American Marines in China. The T'ai P'ings had seized Nanking and, early in 1854, launched a campaign against Shanghai. It happened that Commodore Perry, commissioned by the President to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce with Japan, visited Shanghai at about this time with his squadron en route

(Continued on page 47)

FORCE COMMANDER AND STAFF

1. Brigadier General Douglas C. McDougal assumed command of the Force 1 September, 1935, Headquarters Marine Base, San Diego, Calif. Previously Assistant to the Major General Commandant.

2. Colonel James J. Meade assumed command of the First Brigade 1 September, 1935, Headquarters Marine Base, Quantico, Virginia. Last duty, Officer in Charge of Recruiting, Headquarters Marine Corps.

3. Colonel Charles F. B. Price, Executive Officer, First Brigade, assigned duties 1 September, 1935. Last duty, Commanding Officer, Rifle Range Detachment, Marine Base, Quantico, Virginia.

4. Colonel Philip H. Torrey, Commanding 6th Regiment (Infantry), assumed command 31 October, 1935, Headquarters Marine Base, San Diego, Calif. Last duty, Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Puget Sound, Washington.

5. Colonel Harold L. Parsons, Commanding 5th Regiment (Infantry), assumed command 31 August, 1935, Headquarters Marine Base, Quantico, Virginia. Last duty, under instruction, U. S. Army War College.

6. Lieut. Colonel Roy S. Geiger, Commanding Aircraft One, assumed command 5 June, 1935, Headquarters Marine Base, Quantico, Virginia. Last duty, Officer in Charge of Aviation, Headquarters Marine Corps.

7. Colonel Edward W. Bunker, Force Quartermaster, appointed 1 October, 1935. Last duty, under instruction, Marine Corps Schools, Senior Class.



8. Major John Halla, Force Paymaster, appointed 2 December, 1935. Last duty, Paymaster's Department, Headquarters Marine Corps.

9. Lieut. Colonel Harry K. Pickett, Commanding 10th Regiment (Artillery), assumed command 1 July, 1935, Headquarters Marine Base, Quantico, Virginia. Last assignment, under instruction, Coast Artillery School, U. S. Army.

10. Colonel Emile P. Moses, appointed Chief of Staff of the Force Commander 1 September, 1935. Previous duty, Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C.

SELECTION



John Colt Beaumont — but it's "Johnny Beau" out of earshot by all ranks; with a record and reputation worthy of legacy. His life was acclaimed by rank and file with the wish that the best the Corps can give may be his lot in life.

(SENIOR BOARD)
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Washington, D. C.
4 November, 1935.

To: Major General James C. Breckinridge, USMC,
President, Senior Selection Board, USMC.,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Subject: Senior Selection Board, USMC.

1. A Selection Board, consisting of yourself as president and the following-named officers as additional members, viz:

Major General Charles H. Lyman, USMC.,
Major General Louis McC. Little, USMC.,
Brigadier General Randolph C. Berkeley, USMC.,
Brigadier General Frederic L. Bradman, USMC.,
Brigadier General Douglas C. McDougal, USMC.,
Brigadier General Richard P. Williams, USMC.,
Brigadier General Thomas Holcomb, USMC., and
Brigadier General James T. Buttrick, USMC.,

and of Lieutenant Colonel John M. Arthur, USMC., as recorder, is hereby ordered to convene at the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., on Monday, 2 December, 1935, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, for the purpose of recommending for promotion eligible officers of the ranks of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major, and for the purpose of recommending an officer of the rank of colonel for appointment as head of the Paymaster's Department of the Marine Corps, in accordance with the Act of May 29, 1934.

2. The following oath or affirmation will be administered to the recorder by the President of the Board:

"You, John M. Arthur, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will keep a true record of the proceedings of this Board."

The following oath or affirmation will then be administered to the President and the other members of the Board by the recorder:

"You, and each of you, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will, without prejudice or partiality, and having in view solely the special fitness of officers and the efficiency of the naval service, perform the duties imposed upon you as provided by law."

3. The names of all officers eligible for consideration for selection for promotion and for appointment as head of the Paymaster's Department of the Marine Corps, together with their records, will be furnished the Board when it convenes. The Board is informed that such officers may not appear before the Board in connection with the consideration of their names.

4. The Board will recommend one (1) officer of the rank of colonel for appointment as head of the Paymaster's Department of the Marine Corps.

5. The numbers of colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors to be recommended by the Board for promotion to the next higher grade will be made the subject of a separate communication which will be attached to and made a part of this precept.

6. The proceedings of the Board will be conducted, in so far as may be practicable, in accordance with the provisions of Naval Courts and Boards. The report of the Board shall be signed by all the members and shall certify that the Board has carefully considered the case of every officer eligible for consideration by the Board, and that in the opinion of at least six of the members, the

officers therein recommended for promotion are the best fitted of all those under consideration to assume the duties of the next higher grade, and the officer recommended for appointment as head of the Paymaster's Department is the best fitted of all those under consideration to assume the duties of that office. In determining an officer's fitness for promotion, administrative staff duty performed by him under appointment or detail, and duty in aviation, or in any technical specialty, shall be given weight by the Board equal to that given line duty equally well performed. The names of the officers recommended for promotion and the name of the officer recommended for appointment as head of the Paymaster's Department shall be entered in handwriting.

7. The Board may, in its discretion, designate for retention on the active list until the end of the next fiscal year, as authorized by section 7 of the Navy personnel act of March 3, 1931, any officer who has lost numbers or precedence and has been promoted after suffering such loss.

8. The members and the recorder of the board and all persons through whose hands the record passes in its course to the President are enjoined to preserve the secrecy of the proceedings and recommendations of the board, and to refrain scrupulously from divulging by any means to any person information thereof. The record of proceedings of the Board will be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, direct, but not before ten days have elapsed from the date of the convening of the Board.

CLAUDE A. SWANSON,
Secretary of the Navy.

FINDINGS

The following officers were selected by the Senior Board. The Navy Department agrees, and the White House gave an approving signature.

COLONELS FOR PROMOTION TO BRIGADIER GENERAL (LINE)

Colonel John Colt Beaumont
Colonel James Joseph Meade

COLONEL FOR PROMOTION TO BRIGADIER GENERAL (STAFF—PAYMASTER'S DEPARTMENT)

Colonel Russell Benjamin Putnam

LIEUTENANT COLONELS FOR PROMOTION TO COLONEL

Lt. Col. Albert Edward Randall
Lt. Col. David Monroe Randall
Lt. Col. Alley David Rorex
Lt. Col. Leander Alston Clapp
Lt. Col. Thomas Stanley Clarke
Lt. Col. Joseph Charles Fegan
Lt. Col. Alexander Archer Vandegrift
Lt. Col. Roy Stanley Geiger
Lt. Col. Charles Dodson Barrett

MAJORS FOR PROMOTION TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL

Major Charles Arthur Wynn
Major Roger Wood Peard
Major Charles Ira Murray
Major Samuel Calvin Cumming
Major Gilder Davis Jackson, Jr.
Major Fred Guy Patchen
Major Edwin Platt McCaulley
Major Graves Blanchard Erskine
Major Louis Reeder Jones
Major William Wallace Ashurst
Major Francis Patrick Mulcahy
Major Robert Martina Montague
Major Daniel Earle Campbell
Major Maurice Gardner Holmes
Major James Emmet Betts
Major James Withrow Webb
Major Louis Ernest Woods
Major William McNary Marshall
Major Franklin Augustus Hart

ITION RESULTS

(JUNIOR BOARD)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Washington, D. C.
December 10, 1935.

To: Colonel Holland M. Smith, USMC,
President, Junior Selection Board, USMC,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Subject: Junior Selection Board, USMC.

1. A Selection Board, consisting of yourself as president, and the following-named officers as additional members, viz:

Colonel Robert L. Denig, USMC,
Colonel Charles J. Miller, USMC,
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Clarke, USMC,
Lieutenant Colonel William H. Rupertus, USMC,
Lieutenant Colonel William G. Hawthorne, USMC,
Lieutenant Colonel Leo D. Hermle, USMC,
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Whitehead, USMC, and
Major Field Harris, USMC.,

and of Lieutenant Colonel Alfred H. Noble, USMC., as recorder, is hereby ordered to convene at the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., on Tuesday, 14 January, 1936, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, for the purpose of recommending for promotion eligible officers of the ranks of captain and first lieutenant, in accordance with the Act of May 29, 1934, as amended by the Act of July 22, 1935, Public No. 212.

2. The following oath or affirmation will be administered to the recorder by the president of the Board:

"You, Alfred H. Noble, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will keep a true record of the proceedings of this Board."

The following oath or affirmation will then be administered to the president and the other members of the Board by the recorder:

"You, and each of you, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will, without prejudice or partiality, and having in view solely the special fitness of officers and the efficiency of the naval service, perform the duties imposed upon you as provided by law."

3. The names of all officers, eligible for consideration for selection for promotion, together with their records, will be furnished the Board when it convenes. The Board is informed that such officers may not appear before the Board in connection with the consideration of their names.

4. The numbers of captains and first lieutenants to be recommended by the Board for promotion to the next higher grade will be made the subject of a separate communication which will be attached to and made a part of this precept.

5. The proceedings of the Board will be conducted, in so far as may be practicable, in accordance with the provisions of Naval Courts and Boards. The report of the Board shall be signed by all the members and shall certify that the Board has carefully considered the case of every officer eligible for consideration by the Board, and that in the opinion of at least six of the members, the officers therein recommended for promotion are the best fitted of all those under consideration to assume the duties of the next higher grade. In determining an officer's fitness for promotion administrative staff duty performed by him under appointment or detail, and duty in aviation, or in any technical specialty, shall be given weight by the Board equal to that given line duty equally well performed. The names of the officers recommended for promotion shall be entered in handwriting.

6. The members and the recorder of the Board and all persons through whose hands the record passes in its course to the President are enjoined to preserve the secrecy of the proceedings and recommendations of the Board and to refrain scrupulously from divulging by any means to any person information thereof. The record of proceedings of the Board will be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, direct, but not before ten days have elapsed from the date of the convening of the Board.

CLAUDE A. SWANSON,
Secretary of the Navy.

James Joseph Meade — from buck private to General in thirty-six years through all ranks it's been "Jimmy" off the record. Always enjoyed loyal and efficient commands — they reflected his character. His star rises December next. May it reach its zenith.



FINDINGS

The following officers were selected by the Junior Selection Board. The Navy Department agrees, and the White House approved.

CAPTAINS SELECTED FOR PROMOTION TO MAJOR

Bailey Metcalf Coffenberg
Samuel Wesley Freeny
Otto Edwin Bartoe
John Kellogg Martenstein
John Kaluf
Albert William Paul
Arthur Dannel Challacombe
William Floyd Brown
Ralph Wick Culpepper
Paul Robert Cowley
George DuRell Hamilton
Norman Evans True
Carl Warren Meigs
Paul Alvah Lesser
William Dale Bassett
James Duncan Waller
Cyril Walter Martyr
Frank Shepard Gilman
Melvin Ellis Fuller
Francis Ivan Fenton

Gerald Carthrae Thomas
Thomas Jackson Cushman
Clyde Harold Hartsel
Benjamin Walker Atkinson
William Leslie Bales
Frederick Calvin Biebush
Gale Taylor Cummings
Edwin James Farrell
Augustus Harry Fricke
Julian Neil Frisbie
Gordon Hall
William Stanley Fellers
Ralph Dewey Leach
George Wilburne McHenry
William Lake McKittrick
Charles William Pohl
Stanley Emanuel Ridderhof
Morris Lowe Shively
Max Dix Smith
David Anderson Stafford

FIRST LIEUTENANTS SELECTED FOR PROMOTION TO CAPTAIN

Robert Hartenstine Rhoads
Robert Samuel Viall
Ralph Donald McAfee
William Michael O'Brien
Frank Peter Pyzick
Joseph Wayne Earnshaw
Walter Lewis John Bayler
Marion Lindsay Dawson, Jr.
Harold Guthrie Newhart
Frank Matthew June
George Hubbard Potter
Earl Sanford Piper
Robert Alexander Olson
Francis Marion McAlister
Jack Phillip Juhan
Harold Dale Hansen
Jesse Strother Cook, Jr.
Miles Stanley Newton
Archie Edward O'Neil
Allen Clark Koonce
Alan Shapley
Jefferson Goodwyn Dreyspring
David Ferguson O'Neil
John Calvin Munn
Jaime Sabater
William Richard Williams
Roger Trask Carleson
Frank Galvin Dailey
Frank Henry Wirsig
John Seymour Letcher
Robert Burneston Luckey
Karl Krueger Louther
Paul Drake

Clinton Eugene Fox
Harold Robert Lee
George Owen Van Orden
Walker Alpha Reaves
Louis Christian Plain
Robert Lewis Peterson
Kenneth Herbert Weir
Arthur Fremont Binney
Clovis Clyde Coffman
Perry Ormiston Parmelee
John Joseph Heil
Max William Schaeffer
Thomas Gates Ennis
Ernest Edwin Pollock
Wilson Thomas Dodge
Boeker Charles Batterton
Frank Cornelius Croft
Saville Trice Clark
Hewin Owain Hammond
Lester Stanley Hamel
Joseph John Tavern
Joe Allen Smoak
Alva Bryan Lasswell
William Irving Phipps
William Francis Coleman
Homer Carr Murray
Frank Hawse Schwable
Edward Colston Dyer
Melvin George Brown
Manley Lamar Curry
Samuel Blair Griffith, 2d
Raymond Fowler Crist, Jr.
Ep.

PAYMASTERS

Past—Present—Future



Harold C. Reisinger — around clubs it's "Reddy Rei" — hailing from Pennsylvania, his family saw service with Benedict Arnold in the days of 1775. He claims Washington as his home and will tell you with a snap that he is of the clan of Carusi. Almost thirty-six years to the day he traveled the ranks of the Corps from Second Lieutenant to Brigadier General, Paymaster.

Thumbing through his record, one is attracted by the number of places Uncle Sam has sent him and the interesting assignments he has enjoyed. This experience has taught him the important need of protecting the financial interests of our roving personnel who serve in places where pay days are the only figures on their calendar. For the past ten years he has been Executive Officer of our Pay Department. So when General Richards went on his final leave and handed the check book of the Corps over to him it was no event — it had been on the cards

for him for some time — because the fine reputation he had built throughout his long service gave every one a confidence in him that is truly enviable.

Until November, 1940, anyone looking for him may wind his way to Room 3235, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps.

■ Time has ushered many of our prominent and popular general officers on the retired list during the 160 years of public service of our Corps, but no general has ever left us who has had a wider circle of friends, both in and out of the country than George Richards. His Pay Department was truly a professional household, if we ever had one. His knack of personally endearing himself with his juniors and friends in civil life accorded him fine loyalty and popularity. Very few of us ever worry about the correctness of our pay check. Very few officers know when pay legislation is proposed or ready for payment — we take it for granted that the Paymaster will be our financial counsel.

It has long been the custom in our Corps to look for the Pay Department to find a way to see that we get all the law allows when we travel, when we move from one pay period to another, when we want allotments made and finally when we retire. The man who has piloted his Department to enjoy this fine reputation is General Richards, and so on February 6th we are to lose him. He is to retire, because of statutory demand as he reaches the age of 64 years.

He entered the Corps in 1893 after graduating from the Naval Academy. Midshipman "Rosy" Richards elected to follow the gold and scarlet banner. He served as a line officer until 1899, when he entered the Paymaster's Department as a Brevet Major. 1901 found him a Brevet Lieutenant Colonel for his distinguished service at the Battle of Tientsin, China. In January, 1909, he was made Paymaster of the Corps with the rank of Colonel. In 1916 he received his Brigadier General rank for duty as Paymaster of the Corps. So for twenty-seven years he

Russell B. Putnam, usually just plain "Put", of Louisiana and Texas — from a country where men say exactly what they think. His service includes 32 years of duty as a line officer and a paymaster. He has been through and seen about all the excitement of the Corps affairs. His fine character and experience have won for him the reputation of "friend in need." His selection has been whispered as a settled fact for many moons. The Board merely confirmed "the way the Corps would have it."



handled the purse strings of our Corps.

General Richards wears the following medals: Distinguished Service Medal, Brevet Medal, French Legion of Honor, Dominican Military Medal of Merit, Nicaraguan Medal of Distinction, West Indian Medal, Cuban Campaign, Spanish Campaign, Philippine Campaign, China Campaign, Expeditionary, Victory, Nicaraguan Campaign.

General Richards is a member of the Chevy Chase Club, and has served on the Board of Governors. He is also a member of the Army and Navy Club, and was at one time the President of the club. He has been General Treasurer of the Sons of the Revolution, and an officer in the Loyal Legion Society, and a member of the Board of Control of the U. S. Naval Institute. He is also Vice President of the Marine Corps Association, and a member of the Sojourners' Club, the Carabao Club, and the Military Order of the World War.

As General Richards leaves us he will carry away one of the real characters of our Corps. The offices and corridors of the Navy Building will miss his cheerful salutes, his entertaining stories, his bits of personal research of the doings of the older officers of our Corps. The clubs in Washington will not seem quite the same, and the Paymaster's Department will feel his absence — above all. There'll never be another George Richards. They just don't make 'em.

In his retirement order the Major General Commandant wished him a long and happy rest, due and well deserved by a valuable officer of our Corps. With this wish the Corps concurs one hundred per cent.

ED.

GENERAL GEORGE RICHARDS



WHEN OUR COMMANDANT TOOK THE FIELD

MAJOR C. H. METCALF, U.S.M.C.

■ Andrew Jackson's spectacular and apparently thoroughgoing expedition against the Seminole Indians, and his encroachment on the territory of Spain in Florida during the so-called first Seminole War only temporarily solved the difficulties with the Indians of that tribe. Shortly after the transfer of Florida to the United States, land-hungry emigrants from the nearby states began to flock into that newly-acquired territory and encroach upon the domains claimed by the Seminole Indians. They soon began to retaliate by attacks on the settlers. Arrangements had previously been made to remove all of the Indian tribes from the Southeastern States to new reservations west of the Mississippi River. Attempts to carry out this emigration scheme further aggravated the Indians. The Seminoles in Florida had agreed in 1832 to this move. After two years' delay General Wiley Thompson was sent to Florida with a force of troops to carry out the removal of the Seminoles who, under Osceola, were resisting the move. While carrying on negotiations with Thompson, Osceola was imprisoned for his insolence and put in irons for a day by the impetuous general. Burning with revenge, Osceola stirred the Seminoles to such an extent that they went on the warpath and continued to resist their removal by various desperate operations for nearly seven years. They were only subdued after repeated combined operations of the Regular Army, Marine Corps, Navy and volunteer troops from the nearby states.

Active fighting against the Seminoles broke out in December, 1835. The army operating against them was based on Tampa Bay and the rebellious Indians were located at that time in central Florida. General Clinch, while attempting to protect the settlers, had with a small force occupied Fort Drane, near the present town of Gainesville. His garrison was in a very exposed position and in great danger of being overwhelmed by the hostile Indians. Major Dade from Fort Brooke, at the head of Tampa Bay, attempted to march to his rescue with a little over one hundred soldiers and was ambushed on December 28, 1835. He and all of his force were massacred except four who later died of wounds received in the encounter. On the same day Osceola with a small band crept upon Fort King, located a short distance east of Fort Drane, surprised General Thompson, who was dining with five of his friends and murdered them. Osceola got his revenge by personally scalping the general. A short time afterwards, forces under both General Clinch and General Gaines fought indecisive battles with the Seminoles in that area.

At the outbreak of these hostilities the West Indian Squadron, under the command of Commodore A. J. Dallas, was ordered to cooperate with all available men and ships in helping to suppress the Seminoles. The Marines from the ships of the squadron soon became actively engaged in many phases of the war. Shortly after the Dade massacre a detachment of several officers, fifty-seven Marines and seven sailors under the

command of First Lieutenant N. S. Waldron, U.S.M.C., was sent from the *Constellation* and the *St. Louis* to garrison Fort Brooke until additional army forces could arrive. The arrival of this detachment on January 22, 1836, proved to be just in time to ward off a serious attack by the Indians against the Fort. General Gaines arrived on February 10 from New Orleans with a force of eleven hundred regular army and volunteer troops and immediately took the field with his troops, leaving Waldron with his detachment and a few army troops to hold the base at Tampa Bay. Gaines' expedition into the interior proved a failure. He was attacked on February 27 at Fort King and besieged until March 6. He was reinforced by General Clinch on the latter date after having lost fifty-one killed and wounded. He left his troops to hold some interior forts and returned to his regular post at New Orleans. Shortly afterwards General Winfield Scott arrived in the theatre of operations and assumed command. During one of Scott's operations along the Withlacoochie River in March, 1836, the Marines under Waldron took part in the operation and engaged in several fights against the Indians. Waldron's detachment continued on shore duty at Fort Brooke and vicinity until August. In the meantime the vessels of the West Indian Squadron were called upon many times to support the Army and to protect settlements along the coast of Florida.

Early in January, 1836, a landing force of sailors and Marines from the *Vandalia* protected the settlers in the vicinity of Pensacola at the request of the Governor of Florida. Several expeditions were sent from the ships of the squadron to protect the settlements on the keys off southern and eastern Florida. One or more vessels of the squadron remained in Tampa Bay during the greater part of 1836 in close support of Fort Brooke. The squadron, to be sure of a full-time job, had the additional mission of preventing the illegal landing of slaves in Florida and of protecting American commerce in that vicinity. On March 31 Lieutenant L. M. Powell, U.S.N., with a detachment of Marines and sailors from the *Vandalia* went on a boat expedition up the Charlotte (Caloosahatchee) River in response to requests for protection by the white settlers. While on this expedition they were called upon to cooperate with the army in a campaign up the Macacca River, from which operation they returned to Tampa on April 27.

The situation for the army in central Florida grew more difficult throughout the early part of 1836. A force of not more than one thousand Regulars were attempting to conquer and deport from the country more than three times their number of Indians. The State troops in the vicinity soon had enough of the trying conditions and practically all of them left early in the year. The campaign proved to be most arduous. In addition to the large number killed, many more died of disease and exhaustion due to the very unhealthful and trying conditions of the campaign. This little army, in addition to fighting the Indians, had with the occasional assistance of State troops built ninety forts and stockades and opened up 480 miles of road. But still greater difficulties were in store for it.

The Creek Indians, with whom arrangements had also been made for their transfer to the West, went on

the warpath in Georgia and Alabama in order to resist the move and to help their Seminole brethren in Florida. They committed depredations and murderous attacks against settlers, mail carriers, stage coaches, and even against the steamboats on the rivers. They burned Roanoke, Georgia, and threatened to attack Columbus and Tallahassee. Thousands of white settlers fled from the area to escape their murderous operations. General Scott was ordered from Florida to conduct the war against the Creeks. Their outbreak necessitated the army shifting its main effort from the Seminole country to the Creek country around Columbus, Georgia, and neglecting the former area. In the midst of all of these difficulties the Marine Corps, true to its traditions, threw its sword into the scales.

A law had shortly before been enacted which empowered the President to order the Marines to duty with the Army. In spite of the fact that all of the regular stations and receiving ships occupied by Marines in the United States were hopelessly undermanned, the situation was one calling for great sacrifice and Colonel Commandant Archibald Henderson volunteered the services of a regiment of Marines for duty with the Army in the operations against the Creek Indians. The offer was promptly accepted and on May 23, 1836, President Andrew Jackson issued orders for all available Marine Corps personnel to report to the Army. In spite of his being over 52 years of age and having nearly thirty years' service as an officer of the Marine Corps and Commandant of the Corps for about half of that time, Colonel Henderson did not hesitate to offer to personally lead the Marines in their operations against the Indians. But of course he was then only in the prime of life, as he continued to serve as Commandant of the Corps until he was 76 years of age. By taking practically all officers, reducing navy yard detachments to one sergeant, one corporal and twelve privates, and limiting receiving ships' detachments to one corporal and ten privates—all of whom were unfit for duty in the field—Colonel Henderson was able to mobilize more than half the total strength of the Corps for field duty in addition to the Marines serving on board ships of the Navy, a part of whom also participated. The mobilization proceeded and the expedition went to the theatre of operations very much like the number of expeditions that have been sent out in the hundred years of Marine Corps history since that time.

The Marines were mobilized in two contingents which proceeded separately to the scene of the conflict. This first battalion was assembled at Fortress Monroe under the direct command of Colonel Henderson. Its components arrived from Washington, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Gosport (Norfolk) by steamboats. The battalion then proceeded on June 2 on the chartered steamer *Columbus* to Charleston, where it arrived on June 5. It immediately went by rail on the then longest railroad in the United States to Augusta, Georgia, where it arrived the following day, and a few days later took up a fourteen days' march of 224 miles to Columbus, Georgia. The other battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William H. Freeman, was assembled in New York from the detachments on receiving ships and at navy yards at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Charlestown, Massachusetts, and New York. Additional small detachments were made available from the stations farther to the south after the mobilization of the first battalion. This battalion sailed from New York by steamer to Charleston and proceeded to Co-

lumbus in the same manner a few days after the first battalion.

In equipping and outfitting this expeditionary force of Marines the heavy and burdensome high-caps and frock coats of the day were left behind and only the white fatigue uniforms were taken. Most of the Marines were armed with muskets, while a few were supplied with the newfangled Colt rifles which they later found were prone to explode if carried loaded for a few days before firing. As the result of such experience they stuck by their trusted and tried muskets.

Colonel Henderson's regiment was sent to a position in the Creek country fifteen miles below Columbus and established a camp at the head waters of summer navigation, which was called Camp Henderson, later Fort Henderson, on the Alabama side of the Chattahoochie River. The Creek Indians at this time were especially active in the area and the marines lived in constant expectation of being crept upon in the middle of the night for their scalps. The camp was twice attacked at night, but on each occasion the Marines appear to have soon had the situation well in hand. By June 3 they were sufficiently organized in their new position to begin active field operations. The First Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Miller searched the country between the Euchee and the Hatcheechubby Rivers for a distance of about twelve miles for a hostile Indian concentration which had been reported. The warriors fled, however, leaving only the squaws and papooses to be captured by the Marines. A few weeks later Companies A and B, under the command of Captain Levi Twiggs, who later won fame and lost his life in the Mexican War, went on an extensive operation in search of Indians in the swamps near Camp Henderson. Shortly afterwards Company E carried on an extensive search patrol for reported hostile Indians. Similar patrols continued throughout the summer of 1836, the most important of which was company patrol to Upton Mills, Georgia, where it remained on duty for some time for the purpose of intercepting the Indians who tried to escape into Florida. For more than two months the Marines were constantly searching for Jim Henry, the chief of the Creeks in that vicinity. Supplies were being constantly forwarded by steamboat up the river from New Orleans for the army in the Creek country. In addition to their field operations the Marines erected a strong picket work and two storehouses for these supplies.

General Scott was recalled on June 28 for an investigation of the conduct of the war against the Creek and Seminole Indians and turned over the command of the army to Major General T. H. Jesup. After the usual long drawn-out investigation General Scott was exonerated and restored to his command, it having become apparent that he had done everything possible with the means at his disposal in conducting the war. With the assistance of the Marines and some volunteer forces the army was able to bring the Creek Indian War to a successful termination during the summer of 1836. The Creeks gave up completely and were concentrated at various points one of which was located at Talessee, Alabama, and guarded by Colonel Henderson with three companies of Marines. The Creeks were taken to their new reservation in what is now Oklahoma under the escort of the army assisted by part of the Marines. Shortly after the close of the Creek War, Henderson's Marine regiment made its way into Florida. By August 30 Henderson, with most of the unit, was in Tal-

lahassee. The Marines who had taken part in moving the Creeks did not reach Florida until early in October. The regiment was reassembled at Appalachicola on October 18, moved to the Seminole country and based for some time on Fort Brooke.

During the war against the Creek Indians the West Indian Squadron continued to cooperate with the land forces in various ways. Waldron, with his Marines, help to hold Fort Brooke throughout this period. Small expeditions were sent ashore at various places along the coast in response to reports from the settlers that Indian attacks were imminent. These were so common at Tallahassee that Commodore Dallas was kept busy sending landing forces back and forth between St. Mark and Tallahassee when, in his opinion, there was no real reason for alarm. Dallas' squadron also manned three steamers with special guards of seamen and Marines, which kept open the communications on the Chattahoochie River between the Gulf and Columbus. Upon the arrival of the Marine regiment at Fort Brooke the ship's detachments under Waldron were withdrawn, returned to their ships and later took an active part in expeditions along the keys off the south and east coasts of Florida. The largest of these expeditions, consisting of several naval officers, two Marine officers, ninety-five Marines and fifty sailors, left Key West October 13, 1836, reached Cape Florida, near Miami, October 21, and after extensive river patrolling returned to the *Vandalia* at Key West December 9. Similar boat expeditions were sent to Charlotte Harbor.

For some time after the arrival of the Marine regiment at Fort Brooke the forces in that area were not sufficient to take the field in a determined operation to crush the Seminole rebellion. The operations during the remainder of 1836 consisted of sending out large patrols and holding the forts which were located at important places in the interior. The Marines had some initial experience in officering "native troops." A force of Creek Indian Volunteers had been brought down from Alabama. During some of the operations against the Seminoles these Creeks were largely officered by Marine officers. On November 21 a force of Creeks so officered successfully attacked the Seminoles in Wahoo Swamp, near Dade's battlefield. First Lieutenant Andrew Ross, U.S.M.C., was killed in the operation. Shortly after this incident a force of Marines took part in a joint operation with the Alabama Volunteers into the interior but with no decisive results. The Marines were used at times to escort supplies from the base of Tampa Bay to the forts in the interior.

During the closing months of 1836, while the army was assembling forces for a major offensive against the Seminoles the naval forces in the vicinity continued to carry out supporting and protecting missions. Boat expeditions of Marines and sailors operated among the keys and up the rivers around the southern end of Florida. Special barges and shallow draft boats were developed for this class of operations. One or two revenue cutters were kept on duty with the navy in that vicinity throughout the period of the Florida Indian War. When the army had concentrated sufficient forces to take the field in a determined operation the naval squadron relieved some of the bases and forts near the coast with landing parties in order to make all possible army troops available for the field. A detachment of three officers, thirty-eight sailors and twelve Marines from the *Constellation* took over Fort

Clinch, located about fifteen miles up the Withlacoochee River from the Gulf. Similar landing forces helped to hold Fort Brooke and Fort Foster. The squadron further assisted by sending sixty Marines on a special river boat to operate up the Clear River about twenty miles north of Tampa Bay against a reported force of Indians in January, 1837.

The assistance from the squadron and the arrival of additional regular army units, twelve hundred Tennessee troops, a regiment of Georgia infantry and a regiment of Creeks gave General Jesup sufficient force for a determined operation against the Seminoles. All necessary arrangements and preparations for the campaign were completed early in January. The army was divided into two brigades. The Second Brigade, consisting of one regular artillery regiment, the Fourth Infantry, the Georgia Volunteers, a battalion of friendly Indians and the Marines, was placed under the command of Colonel Henderson. It was apparent that the greatest difficulties would be to locate the enemy and to supply the troops while operating in a country void of roads and local food supplies.

After several unsuccessful efforts to gain contact with the enemy Henderson moved his brigade eastward towards the headwaters of the Ocklawaha, where a strong force of Seminoles was reported. A recently abandoned Indian camp with horses, baggage and a number of squaws, indicating that a considerable force was near by, was found on the morning of January 27. The warriors had fled into the nearby swamp. Henderson left one company behind to guard the Indian camp and pushed on with the remainder of his troops in pursuit. They soon encountered the enemy, who had taken up a position behind the Hatchee-Lustee River, a stream too deep to ford. During the attack that followed the Marines and other troops forced the stream by swimming and crossing on foot logs. The Indians were driven further into the swamps with repeated contacts until they were lost in a dense and deep jungle at nightfall, thereupon Henderson gave up the pursuit and withdrew his forces. A number of Marines were killed or wounded in the operation. Colonel Henderson and several of his officers were recommended for brevet rank for their heroic conduct and a number of Marines were promoted for their gallantry in action.

Jesup's army continued to harrass the Indians throughout their country. They were not permitted to plant their crops when the time arrived or otherwise make a living. When they were found encamped they were promptly attacked and driven from home. Facing starvation they soon began to give themselves up to the armed forces. After some preliminary understanding an agreement was entered into March 6 with the chiefs for a general capitulation. They agreed to assemble their people near Tampa Bay for transportation to the West. The coming of the Indians proceeded until most of them were in camps near Tampa Bay and twenty-six vessels were standing by in the bay to take them to New Orleans for further transfer to their new reservation. The sailing was delayed from time to time by the pleas of the chiefs that still more were to come in. It appeared that the war was over. The volunteers and militia were sent home and the Marines were ordered north. Colonel Henderson departed on May 22 with all of the Marines except two companies, 189 men, left in command of Lieutenant Colonel Miller, at Fort Brooke. The landing forces from the squadron

that had been holding forts were returned to their ships and the support of the squadron was withdrawn. Too much trust, however, had been placed in the word of the Indian chiefs.

Early in June the Seminoles began to run away from the concentration camps. Osceola was among the first to go and again stirred his people to go on the warpath. Warriors came into the emigration camp and carried away those who were unwilling to leave. General Jesup reported that his whole campaign had proved a failure and asked to be relieved. The war was renewed and lasted for five more years. With reduced forces the army again took up the thankless task. Jesup stayed on in command for several months. Colonel Zachary Taylor took command of part of the troops and made a campaign against the Seminoles, who had retreated farther into the interior, this time towards the Everglades. Taylor came upon them along the south shore of Lake Okeechobee on Christmas Day, 1837, and fought a desperate battle in which he lost twenty-six killed and 112 wounded. The Indians retreated farther south into the Everglades and Big Cypress Swamp. They had lost their Chief Osceola by capture under a flag of truce by General Jesup, who sent him to prison in Charleston, where he died. Despite the efforts of nine thousand troops to run them down the Seminoles held out in the fastnesses of the Everglades, where the troops could penetrate only with the greatest difficulty and defied the entire forces of the country.

The war assumed a different phase for the Navy and the Marine Corps. The command of the small Marine battalion at Fort Brooke was taken over by Captain William Dulany in July, 1837. It was reduced in strength in September and by November only four officers and 170 Marines remained on duty in Florida. Some of these were used in escorting Indians to the West. Several Marine officers acted as Indian agents and conducted their troublesome charges by steam-boats as far as Fort Gibson, in what is now Oklahoma. Early in 1838 the Navy again attempted to come to the rescue of the army in dealing with the seemingly impossible task of rounding up the Seminoles in the Everglades. A special detachment of the squadron consisting of small schooners, a small steamer, a few barges and a large number of canoes with an initial strength of 160 sailors and Marines was organized under the command of Lieutenant John T. McLaughlin, U. S. Navy. Its mission was considered so important that it was removed from the authority of the Commander of the West Indian Squadron and ordered to cooperate directly with General Zachary Taylor, who was then in command of the army in Florida. The strength of the detachment was increased shortly afterwards by giving it two regular companies of Marines and raising the total strength to 541 men. Ships and additional men were gradually added until by June, 1841, the socalled "Mosquito Fleet" had seven small vessels, two barges, 140 canoes, sixty-eight officers, 130 Marines and an aggregate strength of 622. This little squadron proceeded to carry out some of the most unusual tasks ever executed by a naval force. The squadron was given the additional duty in June, 1839, of intercepting all communications of the Indians from fishing and other boats operating from islands off the coast of Florida. Former Spanish subjects were at that time trying to aid the Seminoles in every way possible.

To recite all of the operations carried on by McLaughlin's squadron throughout the more than three years of its existence would take too long for a short account of this kind. Only a brief mention of its activities as a whole and a short description of the more important operations can be given. The remaining records are too incomplete for detailed accounts. In March, 1838, a detachment of this force had a successful encounter with the hostile Indians near the headwaters of the Juniper River and in addition carried out many other missions. During the following year detachments took part in a number of operations along the east coast of Florida and into the interior of the Everglades prompted by reports of Indian activities and requests for protection by the settlers. In July, 1839, Lieutenant Sloan, U.S.M.C., with a small detachment of Marines, while on a boat expedition in the western edge of the Everglades, ran down and captured a group of Indians, including their chief. In December the Mosquito Fleet was divided for a time into two detachments, each operating independently in direct cooperation with units of the army in different areas.

Throughout the following year the task assigned to the army was becoming more and more difficult. The Indians had dispersed in small groups and hidden themselves in the most inaccessible places in southern Florida. Every known means was used to locate them, including the use of bloodhounds. The army as well as the Mosquito Fleet, underwent untold hardships in this then vast and almost impenetrable jungle. Their losses from disease was always many times greater than those resulting from occasional encounters with the Indians. They were not deterred by these many difficulties, but vigorously pursued the Indians wherever they could be located.

One of the most extensive expeditions into the Everglades by McLaughlin started out in December, 1840, with sixty Marines under Sloan and ninety seamen, all under his personal command. The force worked in cooperation with an army detachment of one hundred soldiers commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harney. The combined expedition made various trips into the Everglades in different types of boats, and finally in March, 1841, shifted to canoes in order to penetrate still farther into the less accessible parts of the swampy region. Its efforts continued until May of that year, by which time it had attracted considerable attention, and came to be called the "Florida Expedition." McLaughlin sent similar expeditions into the Everglades, and Big Cypress Swamp in the months of July and October. A base for these operations was established near the present location of Miami and called Fort Dallas. Another base used in conjunction with the army was established at Fort Lauderdale. Both of these forts were at various times garrisoned by Marines attached to McLaughlin's command. Another extensive combined operation started out in November, 1841, with two companies of the Third Field Artillery and 150 Marines and sailors from Fort Dallas and went around Florida and up the Carlosahatchee River from the west to Lake Thompson, near Lake Okeechobee. The Indians were encountered close to the former lake, but immediately fled to the east and the expedition pushed on into Lake Okeechobee. They then made their way east across the lake and the Everglades and got back to Fort Dallas about a month after they started. One of the most extensive of these expeditions was undertaken by Commander John Rodgers, who went inland

on February 15, 1842, and lived in canoes for 58 days in an expedition to various parts of the Everglades. A similar expedition of Marines and sailors was undertaken in May.

The West Indian Squadron continued to cooperate with the Army throughout this last phase of the Second Seminole War. Occasional landings were made for the protection of settlers who lived outside of the area occupied by the army. Waldron, with his Marines from the *Constellation*, continued to perform such missions. They protected the white settlers in the vicinity of Tallahassee for some time during the early months of 1838. Captain Dulany's Marines at Fort Brooke stayed there until April, when they were transferred by sea to Baton Rouge and to the Cherokee country for further duty with the army. The Cherokees had agreed two years before to remove to their western reservation, but had avoided in every possible way actually making the move. In order to carry out their transfer the army concentrated a considerable force in their territory and General Scott, who was in command, issued what amounted to an ultimatum to proceed peacefully or they would be compelled to do so by all the available military forces. They gave in and more than fifteen thousand went peacefully and unaccompanied to their new reservation in what is now Oklahoma, where a part of their tribe had a few years previously settled. Captain Dulany's Marines, which then consisted of only Companies D and E, of Colonel Henderson's regiment, was then relieved from duty with the army and returned via Fort Cass, Tennessee, to Washington late in July, 1838.

Finally, after long years of dreary efforts in attempting in every possible way to run down the Seminoles the task was practically given up and those who could not be persuaded to remove to the West were given a small reservation in the midst of the Everglades, where some of their descendants still live. The Florida naval expedition was gradually disbanded between May and August, 1842. The Marines attached to it returned north in July of that year.

The Marine Corps as well as the army gained valuable experiences during these operations against the Indians, which was soon to prove invaluable to them in the more important and far flung operations of the Mexican War. Nearly half of the Marines who saw duty at various times in the Florida War were called a few years later to those more serious duties. Several army generals, who were later successful leaders in the Mexican War, got their initial experience in fighting the Seminoles. The losses to the regular forces were perfectly staggering when considered in proportion to the number of troops involved. The regular army alone lost 1,466 killed and died of disease. The total dead of the Marine Corps was 61. A proportionate number of Navy personnel died or were killed in various expeditions along the coast and into the interior of Florida. It should be remembered also that these arduous and trying duties performed by the Marines and the West Indian Squadron followed shortly after more than twelve years of intermittent fighting of pirates in the West Indies. Notwithstanding the various criticisms that were made from time to time, the country as a whole, Congress and the President of the United States showed due appreciation for the duties performed by the regular service with many expressions of gratitude for the manner in which

the duty was performed and by awarding of commendations, brevet ranks and added promotion to the personnel who served during these trying campaigns.

ARTILLERY AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC MAPPING

(Continued from page 22)

Let us hasten to give credit to our aviation for what they have done so far in this respect. Certain individuals in aviation have taken a lively interest in this matter and have devoted their time and personal efforts to this matter to a commendable degree. But let us also bear in mind that mapping is not an aviation function, and their interest in it is largely academic. From the nature of things it will probably always be thus. It is to the people who operate on the ground that a map is of such vital importance and they should naturally be the ones to make them. With the proper equipment, the aviators will give you the kind and number of pictures you want within the realm of their capabilities. We are further handicapped by the fact that our aviation is to all intents and purposes naval aviation and draws its appropriations from funds available for naval aviation.

The Navy, not being interested in aerial photographic mapping is not going to appropriate any considerable funds for projects of this nature unless they are convinced of the necessity. It is our duty to convince them such a necessity exists. Now if the infantry officer thinks that this is the artilleryman's worry alone, let him pause to consider that the artillery is contemplating throwing some shells over his head and in his, the infantryman's immediate front with data prepared from maps and he will probably help the artilleryman worry a little bit—at least during office hours.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT MACHINE GUN

(Continued from page 15)

operates as a unit, the two sections sometimes being slightly separated. Single guns operate alone only under very unusual conditions. The effective range of the gun is considered to be two thousand yards, just beyond the tracer burn out range. Therefore in order to be mutually supporting the platoons are sited about one thousand yards apart and within five hundred to a thousand yards of the boundary of the area to be defended. After the platoons have been placed in a rough circle around the area, if any additional platoons are available they are placed near the center of the area to take care of any planes penetrating the outer circle. This arrangement is subject to drastic change on account of terrain features, the paramount consideration being that all possible avenues of approach be covered. In planning the defense attention should be given to the prevailing direction of the wind and provision made for breaking up smoke laying formations. Provision should also be made for defending the searchlight positions at night. All batteries of artillery are provided with two or more machine guns. Infantry units are assumed to be capable of defending themselves against attack planes. This leaves the anti-aircraft machine gun units free to defend the area in which vital activities are located.

THE INFANTRY-ARTILLERY TEAM

FIRST LIEUTENANT RANDALL M. VICTORY, U.S.M.C.

■ The infantry is the backbone of the attack and the role of other arms is to help it reach and close with the enemy. All must work in cooperation to that end but as the artillery is the force which furnishes the main support the cooperation and teamwork between the infantry and artillery must be of the closest nature. Let us follow along and see how this cooperation and team work, more properly called liaison, is developed and efficiently effected.

It is for the very purpose of close support that we usually find the command post of the artillery battalion commander located in close proximity to the regimental command post of the infantry which he is supporting. With this arrangement the association between infantry and artillery commanders becomes much closer and the spirit of team work is fostered. Intimate associations between the commanders and staffs of these two units is essential if the team work between the two is to be of the fullest. Broadly speaking the mission of the artillery is to assist the supported troops by fire and thereby reduce their loss to a minimum. In principle the fire is against those targets which, under the situation and at the time, offer the greatest menace to the success of the troops supported. Intimate association between the two commanders makes for a more thorough understanding of the needs of each other and also for quicker and more accurate decisions to be made. The result will be that fire missions will be assigned which take the fullest possible advantage of the capabilities of the artillery without overlooking its limitations. Every effort is made to concentrate the mass of the artillery fire on the decisive objectives at the critical times. To accomplish this it is necessary that the infantry staff keep the artillery staff informed of their plans. The time of attack, direction of main effort, expected rate of advance, whether or not a preparation is desired, and if so, of what duration, and the location of front line units all are vital factors in the assignment of fires and the making up of fire schedules.

Up to this point we have been dealing with a set up that is quite a distance in rear of the front line rifle companies. It is obvious that it will take information of the successes or failures of the troops in front quite a few minutes at best to filter back through the company headquarters, through the battalion C. P. to the regimental C. P. and then to be passed on to the artillery battalion C. P. in the form of a request for fires. Closer liaison is needed and it is for this very purpose that we find two liaison officers and two liaison details in each artillery battalion. Thus a liaison officer and his section is available to be sent to each front line infantry battalion. The establishment and maintenance of liaison is the duty of the artillery commander furnishing the supporting fire. The personnel assigned to a liaison section will vary, but a good working section will include one scout sergeant, one scout corporal, one radio sergeant, two radio operators and two scouts. This composition provides for radio and telephone personnel, a visual team and messengers. You may say that it is too large a detail but

before you arrive at a fixed opinion stop and consider the difficulties of getting wire and radio equipment forward to a position that would provide the liaison officer with suitable observation. Then consider the extreme difficulty of maintaining wire communication in this forward zone. And don't overlook the fact that this section may have to function twenty-four hours a day for several days at a time. When they cease to function the front line units will have little success in getting artillery on the desired targets at the desired time.

Liaison officers are selected with due regard to the importance of the duties they are to perform; they must be qualified artillerymen. They keep the supported commander informed as to what the artillery can do under the circumstances and, at the same time, keep the artillery commander informed as to the enemy dispositions in the zone of action or sector of the supported troops, the disposition and location of the components of the supported troops and the details of their projected movements, the general effectiveness of the artillery fire, and the fire their supported commander considers necessary. Clarity, accuracy and completeness in their reports are essential. It is especially important that the time of the event reported be stated; otherwise, the officer receiving the report may be led to false conclusions.

Supported troops must be advised that, except for fires conducted by the liaison officer himself with a pre-arranged liaison battery or batteries, some time may elapse before calls for fire, except schedule fire, can be complied with, due to the time required for the transmission of messages, assignment of fire missions to fire units, and preparation of fire.

The information sent back to the artillery should be definite and concise, should accurately describe the targets to be attacked, and should assure the accomplishment of the mission in the shortest possible time and the safety of friendly troops. Since an exact knowledge of the character of his target and of the purpose of his fire is essential to the battery commander, the following data must be given in reporting targets on which fire is desired:

- (1) The exact location of the target with respect to base points, reference points, prominent features of the terrain, or by coordinates.
- (2) A clear designation of the character of the target.
- (3) Whether or not the target can be seen by the liaison officer. In cases when the liaison officer alone can see the target and immediate fire on it is required, that he can observe and adjust the fire.
- (4) The exact position of friendly troops in proximity to the fire desired.
- (5) The time element in relation to the fire mission.
- (6) The nature of the fire mission.



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THAT MYSTERIOUS "PEKING MUTINY"

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■ The Manchu Dynasty was no more! The Chinese Revolution had swept the ancient Empire of all Manchu authority! The Dragon Flag had been replaced with the rainbow-five-striped standard of the new Republic. The abdication of the Manchu Boy Emperor Henry Pu-Yi (today, Emperor Kang Teh of Manchukuo) was history! The Forbidden City no longer was forbidden! The Imperial Gates in the walls of the Imperial and Tartar cities were open to all! The Temple of Heaven had lost its sacred character and gained a swarm of coolies! Had China won by democracy! Or lost something of undefinable greatness!

From October 10, 1911, when the Revolution flared forth at Wuchang, the American Asiatic Fleet under Rear Admiral Joseph Ballard Murdock, was strategically stationed in Chinese waters to execute adequately the mission of protecting American lives and interests. The customary expeditionary battalion of American Marines on the *Rainbow* was part of the Fleet. A strong garrison of Marines, commanded by Major (the present Major General Commandant) John Henry Russell, protected the American Legation at Peking (now Peiping) as part of the Asiatic Fleet command. At Tientsin was the Fifteenth United States Infantry, that was not under naval command, thus impairing unity of command in an otherwise satisfactory American defense.

Sun Yat Sen, that magnificent dreamer whose dreams had partially come true, had been elected Provisional President of the Republic late in December, 1911. He was big enough to transfer command to the only Chinese citizen who seemed at that time capable of leading the Republic through the tangle of Asiatic, American, and European politics. In a dignified message to the National Assembly in February of 1912 Sun Yat Sen resigned his office and recommended the election of Yuan Shih Kai, the strong man of China, to carry on from where he left off. Sun Yat Sen imposed the conditions that Nanking must be the capital, Yuan Shih Kai must be inaugurated at Nanking before Sun Yat Sen's resignation be accepted, and the new Constitution must be maintained.

An impasse appeared. The old problem of North versus South. The Republicans were inflexible in their demand that Yuan Shih Kai be inaugurated at Nanking. The Northerners insisted on Peking. Yuan Shih Kai, neither desired Nanking as capital nor to go there to take the oath of office. The wish is often parent to the act of fulfillment. With dramatic suddenness Peking was splattered with the often, but never satisfactorily, explained mutiny of February 29, 1912.

"At 7.30 P. M., on the evening of February 29, 1912, the City of Peking was absolutely quiet," reported Major Russell. Five minutes later "a three-inch Krupp shell fell in this Guard Compound" contiguous to the American Legation. It struck about two feet in front of a tent, ricochetted and passed through the tent, struck the barrack wall and dropped to the ground without bursting or injuring anyone. Shortly afterwards rifle firing was heard about the city and spent

bullets frequently dropped in the Guard Compound. The American Marines went to battle stations, seized the Chien-Men Gate House, threw up barricades and made adequate preparations for defense. Vivid recollections of the Boxers of less than twelve years before encouraged efficient energy.

Fires broke out in various parts of the city. Details of Marines were sent out to bring Americans into the American Legation and Guard Compounds. Guards were sent to the American Missions. A detachment of Horse Marines was organized to better carry out required missions of protecting Americans. What had happened? That was the question in the foreign minds as well as those of the Chinese Republicans. Had Yuan Shih Kai's own troops enacted an inspired "mutiny?" No oral answer to that question. In plain view, however, was a lawless outbreak in which Yuan's soldiers looted and burned and killed.

The mutinous riots continued during the first two days of March. The situation was deemed so serious that the American Minister, William James Calhoun, telephoned a request to Tientsin for the commanding officer of the Fifteenth United States Infantry to send up two hundred soldiers on a special train leaving at midnight. But mutinies and riots in Tientsin intervened.

Chinese troops who, shortly before, had been brought into Tientsin by the Viceroy, determined to have their share of the loot. They mutinied on the evening of the second of March. Attacked and looted the Imperial Mint. Then set the buildings on fire. Two companies of American infantry soldiers were ready to leave on the special train at midnight as arranged. A large force of Chinese soldiers, with artillery mounted on a bridge over the railroad at Fengtai, had refused to allow the 4.00 P. M. train to pass through from Tientsin to Peking. Deliberation and decision to advance. The American troop train steamed out of Tientsin at 3.00 A. M. prepared to shoot their way through if necessary. The Chinese mutineers offered no obstacle. The American soldiers reported to Major Russell in Peking about 9.00 A. M. They were soon after relieved by Marines from the Rainbow Expeditionary Battalion. This set the Marine strength in Peking at about five hundred.

The American Minister, on March 4th, telegraphed to Admiral Murdock, at Shanghai, that: "The situation in North China is very grave, practically no government. Mutinous troops have been rioting in Peking, Tientsin and elsewhere. Local authorities Tientsin have requested Foreign Powers to police city. Can you send a vessel to Taku?" Admiral Murdock immediately despatched the *Buffalo* to Taku. On March 5th the *Cincinnati* and *Abarenda* (transporting two companies of the Rainbow Marines) sailed from Shanghai for Taku.

"The last week will be memorable in the history of the Revolution in China, from the mutiny in Peking and the temporary collapse of all authority in Northern China," reported Admiral Murdock.

"Well informed observers differ as to the cause of the disorder which started suddenly in Peking on the evening of February 29th," continued the Admiral. "It was started by the soldiers of the Third Division, com-

posed of troops supposed to be loyal to Yuan Shih Kai, and spread until it included nearly all the troops in the city." Order was "temporarily restored on the first of March, but the looting, murder and arson broke out again in the evening. The disorder continued from day to day diminishing in degree."

"Soldiers who were thought to have engaged in looting in the first outbreak were employed in arresting and decapitating looters," on March the second was the illuminating comment of Admiral Murdock. In the meanwhile a telegram from Yuan Shih Kai was received by the Chinese authorities in Tientsin shortly after noon on March 3d emphatically ordering them to restore order immediately. This mandate, accompanied with many decapitations, was efficiently executed.

A complete breakdown of all authority in North China seemed imminent. A firm strong hand was required to create order out of chaos. That same firm hand was required in the North to maintain order and peace. There was only one Chinese official capable of this achievement. He was Yuan Shih Kai, who the South demanded must go to Nanking to take the oath of President.

The Peking mutiny proved conclusively, as far as Yuan Shih Kai was concerned, that he could not leave the North. Disaster to the Republic would follow if he did. Came suspicions openly expressed in the South. Was the mutiny of Peking inspired? Obviously there was a motive! Was it just a coincidence? Had it been a "Controlled Mutiny?" Those interrogations will never be answered adequately. At any rate, regardless of its cause, the effect produced by the mutiny permitted Yuan Shih Kai to thwart the Southern demand that he go to Nanking.

"There is no question that a large element of the Republicans are convinced that the outbreak at Peking was brought about by Yuan to demonstrate the impossibility of his going to Nanking," reported Admiral Murdock, and they "resent his action." On another occasion the Admiral wrote that there was "unquestionably an opinion among some of the Republicans that Yuan, if he had not fomented the trouble was privy to it, as showing the absolute necessity of his remaining in Peking."

Sun Yat Sen met this charge by a public announcement that "he had every confidence in Yuan's integrity and patriotism, and that the Nanking Government would assist him in restoring order," again wrote Admiral Murdock. However, Yuan Shih Kai telegraphed Sun Yat Sen not to send Southern Troops to Peking, as he was capable of restoring order without such assistance.

The American Navy and Marine Corps were well represented at the inauguration of Yuan Shih Kai as President of China, but it was at Peking, not Nanking.

DESTROYER TAKES NAME OF MARINE ACE

■ A second lieutenant of the Marine Corps, who lost his life in an airplane crash sixteen days before the World War Armistice, will be honored by having a destroyer named for him, under orders issued by the Navy Department.

Ordinarily reserved for former officers of distinguished rank, the honor was accorded to Ralph Talbot, whose mother, Mrs. Mary Talbot, of South Weymouth, Mass., has been invited to christen the destroyer, one of the 1500-ton class now nearing completion at the Boston Navy Yard.

Lieutenant Talbot, who won the Navy Medal of Honor and special commendation for valorous service, was killed on October 25, 1918, when a bomber which he was piloting, capsized and caught fire. He served in the Marine Corps from June, 1918, to the time of his death. He was trained at Miami, Florida, went overseas on the *De Kalb*, and was assigned to duty with the Northern Bombing Group. Talbot was one of the youngsters whose service and spirit of comradeship were strictly in accordance with the ideals of the Marine Corps.

FORMER MARINES MAKING ATHLETES

■ Our best radio shouters who entertain us every Saturday afternoon during the fall and winter and save us the price of admission and cost of travel to some of our big football clashes spend much time in telling "who is who" among the athletic actors, fail to mention, as a rule, anything in regard to the coaches of football teams. After all, it is interesting to know who these athletic tutors are and where they learned so much about the old game that they can draw down big salaries and be able to tell our young brain and brawn what to do and how to do it.

In this coaching business among the colleges former Marines are doing a few stunts behind the scenes and from the benches.

Among these are no less than one Captain of Marines in the Reserve, Bernie Bieman—a graduate and letter man from Minnesota—now their head coach. What Bernie has done up at Minneapolis with the University of Minnesota's football team in the past two years has wrecked the lives of lots of other coaches. Bernie was one of our captains overseas. He used to help the Marines when he coached at Mississippi State and Tulane. He can be seen regularly, taking his training as a Reserve officer, at Quantico.

Then there is our former Second Lieutenant who served with us in the Quantico Officers' Training Camp, on the U.S.S. *Mississippi* and in Santo Domingo during 1917 and 1918. John F. Meagher, head coach down at Auburn, Mississippi. What he did to Georgia Tech, Duke, Tulane and Kentucky this last fall with his squad of pig skinners is still bemoaned around corner drug stores, frat houses and official football conferences. "That damned Marine" stuff follows him around. He hails from Elgin, Ill.

Princeton, too, gave us a fine Marine and football coach in Earl Martineau, who was assistant coach at the University of Minnesota a short while ago, and is now back-field coach at Yale.

Then there is Captain Richard Hanley, of Cloquet, Minn., and our Reserves, who started out as coach of the Haskell Indians, and was so successful that Northwestern University gave him a contract as head coach. While at Northwestern he had his ups and downs, but turned out as good or better teams on an average than any other coach. He is now head coach at Boston University.

Then way out West there was the famous Clifford Lee (Brick) Mitchell, who coached the University of Nevada for years. He was assistant coach at the University of California before he went to the University of Nevada. Mitchell hails from Elmira, Colorado, and was made a gunnery sergeant (Aviation) upon being discharged in 1918. Possibly there are others, but the writer is not familiar with them.

ED.

ARTILLERY BY MAIL

1ST LT. JAMES P. S. DEVEREUX, U.S.M.C.

■ Since the revamping of the courses offered in the Correspondence School there has been included in the Junior Course a short introductory subcourse in artillery which is applicable to the Marine Corps. It is believed that other articles in this issue of the Gazette will stress the absolute necessity of trained artillery personnel and a general knowledge of artillery by all officers for the proper performance of the Corps' various missions. I shall give the aim in view of the Correspondence School.

This subcourse is given with two objectives; (1) that of an introduction to artillery for the officer who will continue in the study of artillery technique; and (2) a general grounding in artillery for all officers so that they can appreciate its capabilities and limitations. Having this twofold purpose there will be of necessity certain sections which may be too technical for the officer not directly interested in artillery work. It will also be found that the course is lacking in certain features which would be of interest to all officers. This lack of details is occasioned by two considerations, namely, confidential nature of data which will not permit its printing and dissemination as is incumbent upon a correspondence school; and the state of change and experimentation now existing in Marine Corps Artillery.

There are many parts of the subcourse which warrant criticism; helpful criticism by experienced officers is solicited. Initiating a course such as this is not an individual task and no one officer is responsible. Many officers have been consulted and many of the existing publications have been generously included. The attempt has been made to take the best, if applicable to the Corps, regardless of its source. It must be remembered that in the development of any subject we must borrow from experience; borrowing from the Army and Navy publications is nothing more.

The subcourse is divided in twelve sections as follows: Historical Review, General Fundamentals, Description of Weapons, Ammunition, Organization of Marine Corps Artillery, Reconnaissance, Selection and Organization of Position of Light Artillery, Tactical Employment of Light and Heavy Artillery, Marine Artillery in Landing Operations, Light and Heavy Artillery in Base Defense, Antiaircraft Artillery in Base Defense, Light Artillery in Small Wars, and Orders. In conducting this subcourse the system to be employed will be similar to any other correspondence course. Some sections will be merely reading matter to give the student artillery background; others will be accompanied by lesson questions. These questions will bring out essentials and also oblige the officer to study the text prior to formulating his answers; other sections are included for reference. There will be several map problems to bring out tactical principles. Solutions to the lesson questions will not be given in so many words.

The student will be referred to the section and paragraph therein where the answer may be found. This system obviates the tendency of simply studying an

approved solution. Mistakes in map problems will be pointed out to the individual. Marks will be given as satisfactory or unsatisfactory. *The aim is to guide the student's studies in his profession for his own and the Corps' benefits. The student himself will know if he has submitted an excellent or fair paper.*

This subcourse parallels the Resident Junior Course in Artillery. In the near future it is hoped to have a technical course completed for artillery officers which will parallel the Resident Base Defense Weapons Class. This latter course will be largely of technique which should be an excellent study to supplement the artilleryman's practical experience. More concerning this course will be published when the school is prepared to enroll students.

In addition to the above mentioned subcourses the Correspondence School covers still another phase in artillery work. This appears in section one of the "Service Afloat Manual." The section is strictly Naval ordnance and gunnery. It is designed to assist an officer in his first tour aboard ship; it is based entirely upon those paragraphs of the text Naval Ordnance and Gunnery required in promotion examinations. The course consists of numerous lesson questions and reference answers. It should be of great assistance in preparation for examinations.

SECRETARY OF NAVY ALLOWS "HONOR PLATOON LEADERS" REGULAR COMMISSIONS

■ 1. On 13 December, the Secretary of the Navy approved the recommendation that the upper five per cent (5%) of the Senior Division, Platoon Leaders' Class, be designated as "Honor Graduates" provided that they maintain a marking of ninety per cent (90%) or better in every subject of the two-year course of training.

2. Upon graduation from the university in which matriculated, those members of the Senior Division who are Honor Graduates will be eligible for a commission as second lieutenant in the regular Marine Corps. They will be eligible for entrance into the Marine Corps without further academic examination. One member of the Platoon Leaders' Class—Western—1935 and five members of the Platoon Leaders' Class—Eastern—1936, are eligible for these appointments during the summer of 1936.

3. The following members of the Platoon Leaders' Class, 1935, received recommendations for the regular Marine Corps upon the completion of the training in August, 1936:

- A. Platoon Leaders' Class (Western):
 1. Warner, Gordon—University of Southern California.
- B. Platoon Leaders' Class (Eastern):
 1. Boyer, Kimber H.—Ohio University.
 2. Tobias, Justin C.—5th Battalion, Fleet Marine Corps Reserve (Roanoke College).
 3. Berger, Spencer S.—University of Virginia.
 4. Hilli, Richard A.—Tufts College.
 5. Bracken, William O.—Tufts College.

R. P. WILLIAMS,
Brigadier General, U.S.M.C., in charge of Marine Corps Reserve.

LEGISLATION

BY MAJOR C. A. KETCHAM, U. S. M. C. R.

■ The second session of the 74th Congress, which convened on January 3, 1936, and is now in session, has passed the following acts pertaining to or of interest to the Marine Corps:

Private Act No. 373 (H.R. 4799), approved January 21, 1936.

Earthquake losses, Managua. This act authorizes and directs the Secretary of the Treasury to pay such sums, amounting in the aggregate not to exceed \$38,877.04, as may be required by the Secretary of the Navy to reimburse certain officers and enlisted men or former officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps for losses of or damage to reasonable and necessary personal property resulting from the earthquake which occurred at Managua, Nicaragua, on March 31, 1931.

The list of claimants includes 61 officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps. To secure payment under the act it will be necessary for each claimant to make a written application addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury (Division of Bookkeeping and Warrants), Washington, D. C., citing Private No. 373, 74th Congress, approved January 21, 1936, and giving the address to which check in payment should be mailed.

Public Act No. 416 (S. 2774), approved January 16, 1936.

Officers specially commended for performance of duty in actual combat during World War. It is provided by this act that all officers of the Navy and Marine Corps who have been retired or may hereafter be retired for physical disability and who have been commended for the performance of duty in actual combat with the enemy during the World War by the head of the Executive Department under whose jurisdiction such duty was performed, shall be placed on the retired list with the rank of the next higher grade: *Provided*, That such promotion shall not carry with it any increase in pay.

The effect of this act is to add physical disability as cause of retirement, in connection with the other conditions set forth, to the causes already provided for—age, ineligibility for promotion or ineligibility for consideration by a selection board after completion of the designated periods of service for their respective grades. (34 USC 399.)

Public Act No. 425 (H.R. 9870), passed over the President's veto January 27, 1936.

Bonus. Provision is made for the immediate payment of the World War adjusted service certificates and for the cancellation of unpaid interest accrued on loans secured by such certificates.

BILLS IN STATUS QUO

The following bills retain the legislative status given in the May and November issues of the GAZETTE, except as noted:

H. R. 35, "To establish boards in the Navy and Marine Corps for hearing and passing upon petitions for the correction of records of persons discharged under other than honorable conditions."

H. R. 133, "To authorize the Secretary of War and

the Secretary of the Navy to furnish a firing squad to fire the customary salute for any ex-service man."

H. R. 3027, "Authorizing the pay of warrant officers on the retired list for transferred members of the Reserve who served as commissioned officers during the World War."

H. R. 3029 and H. R. 5231, "To amend Section 2 of the Act of May 23, 1930 (46 Stat. 375)." Credit on retirement to Reserve members for Army service and double time authorized by law to be counted for retirement.

H. R. 3032, "To amend the Act of April 27, 1916, establishing the Army and Navy medal of honor roll." Would make eligible *retired* persons who served during war and attain age of 65 years.

H. R. 3618, "To amend an Act providing for promotion by selection and retirement of officers of the line of the Navy, by extending its provisions to officers of the Marine Corps, and for other purposes."

Provides for promotion to next higher grade of officers specially commanded for duty in actual combat during the World War by head of the executive department under which the duty was performed *or by the Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France*, if retired for age ineligibility for promotion, or ineligibility for consideration by a selection board after completion of the designated periods of service for their respective grades, *or on voluntary application or for physical disability*, and with no increase in pay. So much of this bill as provides for advancement if retired for physical disability is covered in the act approved January 16, 1936.

H. R. 7957. This bill was similar to the Senate bill No. 2774. The Senate bill was passed January 16, 1936, as Public No. 416.

H. R. 4016, "To repeal Section 16 of the Act entitled 'An Act to regulate the distribution, promotion, retirement, and discharge of commissioned officers of the Marine Corps, and for other purposes,' approved May 29, 1934."

Passed House of Representatives March 27, 1935. Hearings held by Senate Naval Affairs Committee May 21, 1935. No report as yet by Senate Committee.

H. R. 5257, "To amend Section 7 of the Act approved May 29, 1934 (48 Stat. 811)."

Would provide boards composed of major generals as far as possible for selection of brigadier generals for advancement to major general.

H. R. 5270 and S. 1975, "To authorize certain officers of the United States Navy, and officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps, to accept such medals, orders, diplomas, decorations, and photographs as have been tendered them by foreign governments in appreciation of services rendered."

In connection with these bills authorizing the acceptance of decorations, etc., attention is invited to Public Resolution No. 52 of the 73d Congress, approved June 27, 1934, which authorized the acceptance of such decorations by *retired* officers or employees of the United States, and provided

"That the Secretary of State is hereby directed to furnish to the Seventy-fifth Congress and to each alternate Congress thereafter a list of those retired officers or employees of the United States for whom the Department of State under the provisions of the Act of January 31, 1881 (U.S.C., title 5, sec. 115), is holding decorations, orders, medals, or presents tendered them by foreign governments."

H. R. 5303, "For the relief of Charles W. Eaton."

Would permit him to count, for retirement purposes, time served as a member of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Philippine Islands.

H. R. 5374, "Authorizing members of the naval service to whom a commemorative or special medal has been awarded to wear in lieu thereof a miniature facsimile of such medal and a ribbon symbolic of the award."

Similar bill, *S. 1208*, was passed April 25, 1935, as Public No. 43.

H. R. 5731, "To amend in certain particulars the Act approved February 28, 1935, entitled 'An Act to provide for the creation, organization, administration, and maintenance of a Naval Reserve and a Marine Corps Reserve,' as amended and for other purposes."

This bill would amend Sections 6, 14, 21, 35, and 38 of the present Reserve law. The bill was reported by the Naval Affairs Committee of the House April 9, 1935. No further action thereon.

A subcommittee of the House Committee on Naval Affairs held extended hearings on a new basic law for the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve January 16 to 27, 1936, and is expected, as a result thereof, to rewrite the entire law for the Reserve. The bill has not as yet been introduced.

H. R. 6120, "To give highest temporary rank to retired officers of the Navy." Would apply to the Marine Corps.

H. R. 6710, "To provide for the retirement of certain enlisted men of the United States Marine Corps and of the Marine Corps Reserve who served as officers in the Garde d'Haiti."

H. R. 7030 and *S. 2479*, "To place George K. Shuler on the retired list of the United States Marine Corps."

H. R. 7144, "To extend the benefits of the World War veterans' legislation to certain military and naval personnel, permanently disabled as a result of aviation or submarine activities."

H. R. 8010, "For the relief of the late Colonel Richard M. Cutts, United States Marine Corps."

Reimbursement for loss of personal property in fire at Port au Prince, Haiti, April 26, 1930.

S. 95, "To amend paragraph 1 of Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, by providing for the carrying of officers and enlisted men of the military and naval service while on leave of absence or furlough at own expense at reduced rates."

S. 1211, "Authorizing the assignment of two officers on the active list of the United States Marine Corps not below the rank of colonel to duty as assistants to the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps."

S. 1606, "To prohibit the unauthorized wearing, manufacture, or sale of medals and badges issued by the Navy Department."

S. 1966, "Providing for the advancement on the retired list of the Marine Corps of Hiram I. Bearss."

H. J. Res. 294, "Authorizing the award of a Medal of Honor to Ralph E. Updike."

H. R. 4846, reimbursement for fire losses, Signal Battalion, Quantico, October 5, 1930.

H. R. 6708, "To authorize the presentation of a Distinguished Flying Cross to Lieutenant Colonel Francis T. Evans, United States Marine Corps." Passed House July 12, 1935. Reported favorably by Senate Committee on Naval Affairs February 12, 1936.

H. R. 7110, "To authorize the President to bestow the Congressional Medal of Honor upon Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap, United States Marine Corps, de-

ceased." Amended to read Navy Cross and passed the House of Representatives July 12, 1935. Reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs on February 6, 1936.

S. 1976, Allowances for enlisted men when absent on temporary duty.

S. 2460, Retired men who served as officers in the World War to have the pay and allowances of warrant officers of branch of service in which serving at time of retirement.

S. 2504, "To incorporate the Marine Corps League."

NEW BILLS

The following new bills have been introduced since the convening of the current session of Congress on January 3, 1936:

H. R. 11139, "To prohibit bands of the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard from furnishing music on occasions beyond the scope of their service duty."

Introduced (by request) by Mr. McSwain February 3 and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

H. R. 10992, "To authorize the award of a decoration for distinguished service to Acors Rathbun Thompson," formerly private, Marine Corps.

Introduced by Mr. Johnson February 6 and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

H. R. 10126, "To amend section 10 of the Act entitled 'An Act to regulate the distribution, promotion, retirement, and discharge of commissioned officers of the Marine Corps, and for other purposes,' approved May 29, 1934 (48 Stat. 811)."

Introduced by Mr. Vinson January 13 and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

This bill would amend section 10 of the Marine Corps personnel act so that

(a) First lieutenants, captains, majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels, to be eligible for consideration by selection boards for promotion must have four years' service in the grade in which then serving;

(b) In the case of such officers, except those detailed to staff duty, two years of the four years' service in grade shall be with troops;

(c) Officers of the Marine Corps shall not serve on duty in Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, more than 4 years out of any 8 consecutive years.

H. R. 10636, "To amend section 22 of the Act approved March 4, 1925, entitled 'An Act providing for sundry matters affecting the naval service, and for other purposes.'

Introduced by Mr. Vinson January 27 and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

This would increase the total personnel authorized for the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps (including the Marine Corps Reserve Officers' Training Corps) from 1,200 to 2,400.

H. R. 10297, "Authorizing the President of the United States to appoint Corporal Robert Slover as a first lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps and place him on the retired list."

Introduced by Mr. Taylor January 15 and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL

The Naval subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations began hearings February 17 on estimates for support of the Navy and Marine Corps for the fiscal year 1937.

RESERVE NOTES

AVIATION RESERVE:

■ The distribution of Marine Corps Aviation Reserve personnel on June 30, 1935, was:

	Officers.	Commissioned and Warrant	Enlisted	Total
Fleet Marine Corps Reserve.....	87	554	641	
Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve	54	470	524	
Totals	141	1,024	1,165	

FLEET AND VOLUNTEER RESERVE:

The strength of the Fleet and Volunteer Reserve on June 30, 1935, was:

<i>Fleet Marine Corps Reserve—Line</i>	
Class I—Officers.....	136
Warrant Officers	2
Class II—Enlisted men transferred after 16 and 20 years	538
Class III—Enlisted Men.....	250
Class IV—Enlisted men	3,529
<i>Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve—Line:</i>	
Class V—Officers	398
Warrant Officers	9
Class VI—Enlisted Men.....	3,034
Total Line	7,896
Total Aviation	1,165
Total Marine Corps Reserve	9,061

RESERVE OFFICERS

APPOINTMENTS

FROM 26 SEPTEMBER, 1935

- 2d Lieut. Edward L. Hotchkiss
- 2d Lieut. John M. Maury, Jr.
- 2d Lieut. Justin C. Tobias
- 2d Lieut. Sylvester L. Stephan
- 2d Lieut. Charles T. Hagan, Jr.
- 2d Lieut. Wayne A. Geib
- 2d Lieut. Leonard P. Schwarzbach
- 2d Lieut. Walden G. Golien
- 2d Lieut. Philip W. John

FROM 17 OCTOBER, 1935

- Captain Robert V. Dallahan
- 2d Lieut. Guy E. Tannyhill
- 2d Lieut. Lunsford D. Fricks

FROM 8 NOVEMBER, 1935

- 2d Lieut. R. B. Bell, VMCR.

FROM 22 NOVEMBER, 1935

- 2d Lieut. Karl F. Haworth, FMCR.
- 2d Lieut. Carl O. Wyman, USMCR.
- 2d Lieut. William C. Smith, USMCR.
- 2d Lieut. Melvin M. Smith, VMCR.
- 2d Lieut. Byron W. Thornton, FMCR.

FROM 13 DECEMBER, 1935

- 2d Lieut. Edward F. Howatt, VMCR.

FROM 9 JANUARY, 1936

2d Lieut. James J. Lewis, FMCR.

PROMOTIONS

FROM 25 MAY, 1935

1st Lieut. Karl T. Mooney, VMCR.

FROM 24 JULY, 1935

- 1st Lieut. Harry J. Beyer, from 2d Lieut.
- 1st Lieut. Peter W. Hazes, from 2d Lieut.
- 1st Lieut. Arthur Von B. Menken, VMCR.

FROM 7 NOVEMBER, 1935

- Major Karl S. Day, VMCR.
- 1st Lieut. Harlan Hull, VMCR.

RESIGNED

- Captain Edward T. Harrison, Oct. 5, 1935
- 2d Lieut. Clay R. Apple, Oct. 28, 1935
- 2d Lieut. Judson B. Drengwitz, Oct. 28, 1935
- Major John D. Nevin, USMCR., Nov. 26, 1935
- Captain James J. Tunney, Jan. 4, 1936

DISCHARGED

- 2d Lieut. Henry V. Van Valkenberg, Oct. 8, 1935
- Captain Thomas J. Luckett, Oct. 9, 1935
- 2d Lieut. Henry C. Ewing, Oct. 11, 1935
- 2d Lieut. Michael Sampas, Oct. 15, 1935
- 2d Lieut. William C. Miller, Oct. 24, 1935
- 2d Lieut. Winsor B. Williams, Oct. 28, 1935
- 2d Lieut. Louis G. Johrden, VMCR., Nov. 15, 1935
- Captain David W. Hopkins, VMCR., Nov. 26, 1935
- Captain John P. Manton, VMCR., Dec. 2, 1935
- Captain Ralph Ellis, VMCR., Dec. 2, 1935
- 1st Lieut. John G. Coffin, VMCR., Dec. 2, 1935
- 1st Lieut. James B. Griffin, VMCR., Dec. 4, 1935
- 1st Lieut. Francis J. Donohue, VMCR., Dec. 7, 1935
- 2d Lieut. Henry A. Schweinhaut, VMCR., Dec. 7, 1935
- Captain Samuel J. Montgomery, VMCR., Jan. 6, 1936
- 1st Lieut. Timothy B. E. McLure, VMCR., Jan. 18, 1936
- 2d Lieut. Oscar H. Wisthuff, VMCR., Jan. 17, 1936
- 2d Lieut. John F. Bynon, VMCR., Jan. 16, 1936
- 1st Lieut. Chas. A. Whalen, VMCR., Jan. 24, 1936
- 2d Lieut. George W. Brice, VMCR., Jan. 22, 1936
- Aviation Cadet David H. Ellis, Jan. 22, 1936

RETIRED

Capt. Lewis C. Cassidy, VMCR., Nov. 7, 1935

DIED

Major Samuel L. Rothafel, VMCR., Jan. 13, 1936

The following have been appointed Aviation Cadets:

FROM 9 JANUARY, 1936

- James L. Mueller
- Robert E. Galer
- Gregory Boyington
- Fred R. Emerson
- Norman J. Anderson
- Desmond E. Canavan
- Harry F. Baker
- Ralph L. Johnson
- Cameron Walker
- Stephen S. Marshall, Jr.

ED.

MARINES AS AN AID TO DIPLOMACY

(Continued from page 30)

to the Lew Chew islands. Fearing for the safety of American citizens he left the sloop *Plymouth* at Shanghai on his departure, with orders to join him when local conditions improved. On April 5th the foreign consuls decided that a camp of Imperialist troops which had become a serious annoyance to foreigners on the edge of the Settlement, must be moved. An ultimatum to the local Chinese authorities had no effect. By direction of the American Consul, Captain Kelly, of the *Plymouth* then landed a detachment of sixty Marines and sailors which joined a British detachment from H.M.S. *Encounter*, and proceeded to drive the Imperialist troops from the borders of the Settlement in what became known as the Battle of Muddy Flat.

Piracy was rife along the China coast and Marines were frequently used in expeditions against their hideouts. In 1855 Lieutenant Jones with Marines and sailors from the sloop *Pocahontas* operated against pirates in Ty-ho Bay, near Hongkong.

In 1856 the unprovoked firing by Chinese forts at Whampoo, near Canton, on a boat bearing the American flag and carrying Commodore Foote from the frigate San Jacinto to Canton, caused the Commodore to attack the forts. Captain Simms, with 150 Marines and sailors, two surgeons and six naval officers constituted the landing party which went ashore and captured the forts after the sloop *Portsmouth* had executed a preliminary bombardment.

Newchwang, in Manchuria, was the next place where Marines were used to protect American citizens or to uphold American dignity. In 1866 the American consul there, Francis P. Knight, was assaulted by a group of Chinese called the "Sword racks." The sloop *Wachusett*, Commander Townsend commanding, was sent to the scene. It appeared that the Chinese authorities had taken steps to punish all of the offenders except the leader. On June 20, Lieutenant Phillip was sent ashore in command of 100 Marines and sailors. He captured the bandit leader, and guarded him throughout his trial. On July 7, punishment having been awarded, the Consul was taken aboard the *Wachusett* and transported to Chefoo.

Since the early days of history the geographical location of Korea, joined to Manchuria on the north, and separated by a narrow strait from the mainland of Japan, has made her the stepping stone between China and Japan. Korea was the battle ground of Chinese-Japanese wars from the Han dynasty down through 1894-95, and the independence of Korea was one of the provisions sought by the Japanese in the treaty of Shimonsoeki.

The war of 1894-95 arose out of the refusal of the Japanese to recognize Chinese suzerainty in Korea. Both countries sent troops there in 1894 to quell a rebellion. When Korea became quiet each country refused to withdraw her troops until the other had done so. War ensued, victory going to the Japanese. Since the Meiji restoration in 1868 the Japanese army and navy had been completely reorganized and modernized. The leaders of both their land and sea forces demonstrated their mastery of modern tactics and strategy.

The Treaty of Shimonsoeki, which brought the war to a close, provided for the independence of Korea, the ceding to Japan of the Liaotung peninsula in southern Manchuria, the island of Formosa and the Pescadores group, and for the payment of an indemnity. All foreign nations were interested in the article which provided for the

opening of four new treaty ports, those of Shasi and Chungking, on the upper Yangtze, and Soochow and Hangchow, on the Grand Canal.

Before the exchange of ratifications of the treaty had been made Russia, Germany and France sent a joint note to Japan in which they objected to that part of the treaty which ceded to Japan the Liaotung peninsula on the grounds "that the proximity of the territory to Peking made its possession by any Power other than China a perpetual threat to the Chinese capital." They suggested the payment to Japan of an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 taels in lieu of the territory. The suggestion was adopted by Japan.

Read Admiral Charles C. Carpenter commanded the Asiatic Squadron at this time, while diplomatic affairs of the United States in China were in charge of the Minister, Colonel Charles Denby, at Peking. Disorders incident to the war were frequent in the Tientsin-Peking area, and some anti-foreign feeling was evident. Admiral Carpenter was directed to place his Marine guard at the disposition of Colonel Denby for use in protecting the Legation. He moved his flagship, the *Baltimore*, to Chefoo and despatched the Marine guard of fifty men under Captain George F. Elliott, to Tientsin by steamer. At Tientsin it was found that the Chinese government objected to the movement of foreign troops to Peking, and the guard was held on board the small gunboat *Monocacy*, at Tientsin until May 16th, 1895, when it was returned to the *Baltimore*.

The distinction of establishing the first Marine guard at the Legation in Peking fell to First Lieutenant Robert McM. Dutton. The occasion was the unrest caused by the reform movement in 1898, which developed into the more serious Boxer movement in 1899 and 1900. Mr. Edwin H. Conger had become American Minister. His request to Admiral Dewey, in command of the Asiatic Squadron, that a guard at the legation might be wise met with instant approval. On the 4th of November a detachment of eighteen Marines chosen from the cruisers *Baltimore*, *Boston* and *Raleigh* established the guard in Peking, remaining there until the 15th of March, 1899.

Russia had been one of the Powers which objected to the ceding of the Liaotung peninsula to Japan in 1895. However, on May 7, 1898, Russia signed a convention with China ceding to her Port Arthur and Talienwan on that peninsula. On March 6th of the same year Germany secured a rich Concession in Shantung by the Kiaochow Convention and the Railway and Mining Concession. Britain, not to be outdone by her contemporaries signed a lease for a concession at Weihaiwei on the north coast of Shantung.

The Battles of the Concessions, as it was called, brought forth from the United States a sharp protest against what she termed the partitioning of China. The protest took the form of a letter to the Ambassadors of the United States to England, France, Germany, and Russia from Mr. John Hay, Secretary of State, and was dated September 6, 1899.

Mr. Hay stated that the "sphere of interest" marked out by the Powers was repugnant to the United States. He then proceeded to proclaim the famous "Open Door" policy under which all Nations were to have equal opportunity for trade with China.

(c) *The Boxer Rebellion.*—The so-called Boxer movement was the outgrowth of the reaction which had accumulated in China over a period of years as a result of the granting of concessions to foreigners, the seizure of

ports by European powers, the defeat at the hands of Japan and the antipathy which developed against missionaries and their converts. Members of secret societies and of militia were organized into groups known as I Ho T'uan, or Righteous Harmony Fists, which designation was responsible for the sobriquet of "Boxers" by which they became known in the West. These groups conducted demonstrations and spread propaganda against the foreigners. At first the Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi, or Old Buddha, as she is more popularly known, appeared to oppose the Boxers, but subsequent evidence showed that she aided and abetted them.

On May 28, 1900, a band of marauders attacked Christian converts in the town of Fengt' ai, a railway junction eight miles southwest of Peking, burning the railway station. The diplomatic corps suddenly awoke to the realization of the extent and bitterness of the Boxer movement, and cabled to the naval commanders of their respective countries, requesting guards for the legations. The following day Marines and bluejackets began to move from the ships which lay at anchor off Taku, below Tientsin.

The American contingent consisted of Captain John T. Myers and 25 Marines from the USS *Oregon*, Captain N. H. Hall, Chief Machinist Peterson, Assistant Surgeon Lippit, U.S.N., and 23 Marines from the USS *Newark*. Captain McCalla, who commanded the two ships, accompanied the party to Peking, with his aide, Naval Cadet Courtney. He returned to Tientsin on June 2, leaving Captain Myers in command.

The Marines and naval units of Russia, Japan, Italy, Great Britain and France accompanied those of the United States to Peking. On June 3rd the German and Austrian contingents arrived, bringing the strength of the International Legation Guards to 19 officers and 388 enlisted.

The attitude of the Chinese increased in hostility as the days passed, but no untoward act occurred until June 20th, when the German Minister, Baron von Kettler, was shot and killed by Manchu soldiers while he was proceeding officially in his sedan chair to the Chinese Foreign Office at Tsungli Yamen. The Diplomatic Corps realized that this was the first stroke of the offensive against foreign governments, and prepared for defense against an attack which came that night. The fighting was spasmodic throughout the entire period of siege, which lasted until the International Relief Column from Tientsin arrived on August 14th. Much of the fighting was atop the Tartar Wall, which adjoined the legation area on the south. The total casualties sustained by the foreign forces during the siege were 4 officers and 49 men killed and 9 officers and 136 men wounded. Of this number the American contingent lost seven enlisted killed and two officers and eight men wounded.

The final protocol for the settlement of the difficulties between China and the Powers incident to the Boxer uprising was signed at Tientsin on September 7, 1901, by Prince Ching and Viceroy Li Hung-chang for China, and by the Plenipotentiaries of Germany, Austro-Hungary, Belgium, Spain, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Holland and Russia. Mr. W. W. Rockhill represented the United States. The Protocol provided for an apology to Germany for the murder of von Kettler, as well as the establishment of a monument on the place where he was killed; punishment for the Boxer leaders; an embassy of regret to Japan for the death of Mr. Sugiyama; indemnity to the Powers; the destruction of the Taku forts and certain river improvements

on the Pei Ho and Whangpoo rivers. From the military standpoint Article VII is of greatest importance. It reads as follows:

"The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occupied by the Legations shall be considered as a quarter especially reserved to their usage and placed under their exclusive police, where the Chinese shall not have the right to reside, and which may be put into a state of defense.

"By the protocol annexed to the letter of 16th of January, 1901, China has recognized that each Power has the right to retain a permanent guard in the said quarter for the defense of its Legation."

Article IX is also of importance. It reads:

"The Chinese Government has recognized that the Powers, by the protocol annexed to the letter of 16th of January, 1901, have the right to occupy certain points to be determined by agreement between them, in order to maintain free communication between the capital and the sea. The points occupied by the Powers are: Huangtsun, Langfong, Yangtsun, Tientsin, Ch'enliangch'eng, Tangku, Lutai, Tangshan, Lanchow, Changli, Chinwangtao, Shankaiwan."

(d) *The fall of the empire.*—The Boxer rebellion, with its disastrous effect on China, signalled the approach of the end of dynastic government in that country. The reform movement became more widespread and in 1905-06 the Manchu court issued edicts which ordained that the educational system should be modernized, the Manchu garrisons disbanded, the army and navy reorganized, railways extended, opium suppressed, and the laws and government revised.

The preceding year, 1904-05, Japan had moved a step closer to China by defeating Russia in Manchuria in the second great war of her career as a modern nation. Russia, after denying the Liaotung peninsula to Japan as part of the latter's reward for defeating China, secured a twenty-five year lease to that area from China in 1898. In 1903 she had completed a railway from Harbin, on the Chinese Eastern section of the Trans-Siberian railway, to Port Arthur, on land secured by secret agreement with China in 1896. Japan, envious of Russia's influence in Manchuria, considered that increased Russian activity there menaced her own interests, and declared war. The treaty of Portsmouth settled the war. Japan received Russia's title to the southern end of the Liaotung peninsula, known as the Kwangtung Leased Territory, as well as title to that portion of the railway which lies between Port Arthur and Chang Chun. Other territory was returned to China.

On November 15, 1908, the Emperor Kuang Hsu died, and the following day the death occurred of the Empress Dowager. The infant son of Kuang Hsu's younger brother ascended the throne as Hsuan T'ung under the regency of Prince Chun. Prince Chun proved to be weak and corrupt, and soon every high office was filled with Manchu princes and nobles whose only aim was to secure the spoils of office. The days of the empire were numbered.

Sun Yat-sen, a native of Kwangtung province, had been an earnest revolutionary worker for years. Educated in the College of Hawaii, he returned to Canton and entered Queen's College in Hongkong. After another trip to Hawaii he commenced the practice of medicine in Canton, later going to Hongkong. It was while he was in the latter place that he organized a secret society called the Chung Hsin Hui, for the overthrow

of the Manchu dynasty. Sun was forced into exile, and travelled in various parts of the world carrying on propaganda and organizing societies for the liberation of China. On October 9, 1911, a bomb in a revolutionary's house at Hankow exploded accidentally, and compelled a group of revolutionists to act promptly to save themselves. They precipitated the revolution, the initiation of which had been planned for a later date. Dr. Sun, who was in San Francisco at the time, returned hurriedly to China and assumed the leadership. However, Yuan Shih k'ai, a man of long public service under the Empress Dowager, but who had been dismissed by the regent, was called to become the first President of China. On February 11, 1912, he brought about the Manchu abdication, taking the oath as President in Peking on March 10, 1912, in the presence of representatives of the five united peoples of China: the Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans.

Under the provisions of the 1901 Protocol the Powers decided to establish troops along the railway between Tientsin and Chinwangtao to keep the line open during the unsettled period following the overthrow of the monarchy. Early in 1912 the United States despatched the 15th Infantry from the Philippine Islands to Tientsin to provide America's quota for this purpose. The regiment remains in Tientsin today.

The history of China from the establishment of the Republic to the unification of the country under the banner of the Kuomint'ang party in 1928, is a story of weak, ineffectual government, of provincial war lords battling provincial war lords, of scheming foreign financiers seeking ways and means to secure a strangle hold on profitable Chinese concessions, of the ever increasing evidence of Japanese determination to dominate China, and of the trumpeting voice of young China, foreign educated, or educated by foreign methods, sounding the note of a new spirit of nationalism, and demanding a voice in national affairs.

When the European war broke in 1914 Japan, as one of the Allies, attacked the German concession of Tsing-tao, in Shantung, seizing it for her own. She relinquished this prize concession with great reluctance and then only when pressure was brought upon her by the Powers at the Conference for the Limitation of Armaments at Washington in 1921. In 1915 Japan indicated in no uncertain terms her desire for Asiatic hegemony by submitting to China twenty-one demands which, if accepted, would have made of China a vassal state. These demands intensified a bitterness among Chinese against Japan which has rankled and become an open sore with the passing years.

Despite the unsettled conditions in China during the period from 1911 to 1925, there were remarkably few occasions when it was necessary to land Marines for the protection of American citizens. A guard of Marines was, of course, stationed at the American Legation in Peking, the moral effect of which was great in the north.

Early in November, 1911, the gun boats *Albany* and *Rainbow* were at Shanghai. When the news came on the 4th of November that a serious revolt against the Manchu government was in progress it was deemed advisable to send guards of twelve men to each of the two cable stations. These guards were withdrawn on November 14th.

The revolutionary troops were active around Shanghai in 1913. The *Albany*, commanded by Commander Mark L. Bristol, and the *Rainbow*, commanded by Lt. Com-

mander Wurtsbaugh, were there most of the year. On July 7th it became necessary to land Marines, though they were withdrawn the following day. On the 28th Marines were again landed from both the *Albany* and the *Rainbow*, and remained ashore until the 14th and 17th of August, respectively.

The deliberations of the representatives of the Powers at the Conference for the Limitation of Armaments in Washington in 1921 were productive of much that was important to China. On the 6th of February, 1922, the plenipotentiaries of the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal signed a treaty the preamble of which follows: "Desiring to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity, have resolved to conclude a treaty for that purpose."

The first paragraph of the first article of the treaty reads "The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree: (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China." Other paragraphs emphasized the determination of the Powers to maintain equality of opportunity for all nations in the matter of trade with China.

Another treaty between the nine Powers related to the Chinese customs tariff, while a treaty between China and Japan was for the settlement of outstanding questions relative to Shantung. The first article of the latter states: "Japan shall restore to China the former German Leased Territory of Kiaochow."

(e) *The rise of the Kuomint'ang and the Nationalist revolution.*—It has been pointed out that much of the work of preparing for the revolution of 1911-12 was performed by Sun Yat-sen, but that when the Republic was established he stepped aside in favor of the more practical and experienced public servant, Yuan Shih-kai. It soon became apparent to Doctor Sun that those leaders who controlled the new government had not caught the unselfish spirit of democracy which formed the basis of his own philosophy of government, and he soon was as much of an outcast as he had been in the days of the empire. He attempted to set up a government at Canton, but was overthrown by the militarists and fled to Shanghai. However, he continued to expound his theories, and to plan for their practical application. In 1919-20 he reorganized his party, which had been renamed the Kuomint'ang, or party of the people. In 1921 he set up his provisional government in Canton, but it was not until January, 1925, that he was able to muster sufficient military strength to gain a strong foothold there. He went to Peking to confer with the leaders there, hoping to bring about a rapprochement between the two groups. He contracted an illness which brought about his death on March 12, 1925, at Peking. But the party he had built moved on and gained power, and the canonized Sun Yat-sen became the rallying point of converts to nationalism.

The San Min Chu I, or Three Principles of the People is the epitome of the Kuomint'ang philosophy. The Principles are government by the people and for the people, a sufficient livelihood for all, and freedom from control of foreign nations. The powers of government are distributed among five departments. The first three, the executive, legislative and judicial, correspond to the three divisions of our government; the remaining two he called

the control yuan, charged with the prevention of graft and malfeasance, and the examination yuan, charged with determining the qualifications of all applicants for public office. The last two yuan were part of the old imperial system of government. This five-power system of government came into operation at Nanking in 1927, and continues to form the basis of government in China.

At the time of the death of Doctor Sun a brilliant military leader was emerging from obscurity in the Kuomint'ang camp. General Chiang Kai-shek first won distinction in 1923 as director of the Whampoa military academy at Canton, when he suppressed a revolt against the Kuomint'ang. In 1925 he restored order in Canton, and in 1926 he was appointed to command the troops of the Northern expedition.

Doctor Sun's final plan for the establishment of constitutional government in China contemplated its accomplishment in three phases. The first phase was to be the period of military conquest, during which all provinces were to be brought forcibly under control. This was to be followed by the Period of Political Tutelage, when one party, the Kuomint'ang, would control the government while the people were being educated to exercise their constitutional rights. The third and final phase was to be that of constitutional government, under which the citizens were to be accorded their full rights of suffrage.

It is necessary now to mention another element which stalked into the Chinese scene in 1923, and which exercised a profound influence for many years. In that year Doctor Sun, despairing of aid from any of the Powers, decided to accept an offer he had received from the Russian Soviet government for financial and advisory assistance, with the provision that he would adopt the principles of Communism. Russia sent a delegation of military, political and economic advisors headed by Michael Borodin. The army was sovietized, and when it launched the Northern campaign in June, 1926, political advisors accompanied each army division. Towns, counties and provinces were sovietized as the army won its way northward, either by fighting or buying off the opposing commanders.

Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian war lord, dominated the Peking government at this time. Other strong regional leaders were Wu Pei-fu, at Hankow, Yen Hsi-shan, governor of the model province of Shansi, and Feng Yu-hsiang, so-called Christian general, head of the Kuomin-chun armies in Kansu and Shensi provinces, to the west. Shanghai was controlled by henchmen of Chang Tso-lin, Generals Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tsung-Chang.

Hankow, metropolis of the middle Yangtze country, fell in October, 1926, and the Nationalist capital was moved there. Nanking and Shanghai were the next objectives. But now some of the salient features of Soviet propaganda began to bear fruit. One of these was the development of hatred for the despised foreigner. An anti-foreign wave swept the country. Foreign missionaries and business men were forced to seek the foreign concessions for protection. By the time the Kuomint'ang armies were nearing Shanghai, in January, 1927, the Powers decided that summary action was necessary if their citizens and interests were to be protected. Great Britain sent an army division to Shanghai in command of Major General John Duncan. America sent the Fourth Regiment of Marines with Colonel Charles Hill

in command. The International Settlement at Shanghai became an armed camp.

SECTION IV—DIPLOMACY UNDER THE KUOMINT'ANG

(a) *The defense of Shanghai* (1927).—The Fourth Marines arrived at Shanghai on February 24, 1927, after a record run across the Pacific from their base at San Diego, California. Military or naval forces of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Spain and Portugal landed during the next week. The Nationalist forces were at Sungkiang, thirty miles southwest, where is located the tomb of Frederick Townsend Ward, the American who organized and commanded the Ever Victorious Army during the T'ai-p'ing rebellion. Under the leadership of General Duncan, the British commander, who was also the senior military officer present, the Settlement was prepared for defense. The American Marines were kept aboard ship pending an actual threat to the city, American officials preferring to follow an independent policy.

On March 21st the Nationalist troops entered the native sections of Shanghai, the troops of Sun Chuan-fang retiring by boat to the north. The only occasion for action by foreign troops occurred when some of the retreating units endeavored to force their way into the Settlement and were repelled by British troops which manned the barbed wire barrier. The American Marines were allotted the responsibility for the internal security of the Settlement.

(b) *The Bombardment of Nanking*.—While the eyes of the world were centered on the situation at Shanghai a much more serious condition was fast reaching a climax two hundred miles up the Yangtze at Nanking. This city, capital of China under the first Ming emperors, had become of late an educational center for central China. A number of foreigners were located there at the various missions and colleges. The USS *Noa* and HMS *Emerald* were standing by in the river when the Nationalist troops entered the city on March 24th. Blame for the subsequent looting, rioting and attacks on the homes and consulates of foreigners was shifted back and forth between the Hankow and Peking governments. The fact remains that the assaults were made and resulted in the death of many foreigners, among them Doctor Williams, president of Nanking University. Other Americans, including Consul Davis and his family, made their way to the Standard Oil installation on what is known as Socony Hill, from which point their evacuation was accomplished under the protection of a barrage from the *Noa* and *Emerald*. This incident resulted in a note which was presented simultaneously by the consular representatives of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy to Eugene Chen, the Foreign Minister of the Hankow (Kuomint'ang) government on April 11, 1927, which reads in part as follows: "Under instruction of the American Government I am directed by the American Minister to present to you the following terms, which are simultaneously being communicated to General Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist armies, for the prompt settlement of the situation created by the outrages against American nationals committed by Nationalist troops at Nanking on March 24, last:

"(1) Adequate punishment of the commanders of the troops responsible for the murders, personal injuries and indignities, and material damage done, as also of all persons found to be indicated.

"(2) Apology in writing by the Commander in-Chief

of the Nationalist army, including an express written undertaking to refrain from all forms of violence and agitation against foreign lives and property.

"(3) Complete reparation for personal injuries and material damage done.

"Unless the Nationalist authorities demonstrate to the satisfaction of the interested Governments their intention to comply promptly with these terms, the said Government will find themselves compelled to take such measures as they consider appropriate." The Nationalist Government responded on April 15th with a note in which it indicated that a thorough investigation was in progress, and its willingness to take action immediately the identity of the culprits was assured.

Probably the most important result of the Nanking incident was its reaction on Chiang Kai-shek, who determined that the time had come to expel the radical element from the Kuomint'ang, and to follow a course down the middle of the road. He forthwith set up the National government at Nanking. Civil war between the Nanking and Hankow elements of the party followed resulting in triumph for the more conservative wing of the party under Chiang. The Russian advisers were sent back to Russia, and diplomatic relations with that country were severed.

Another result of the Nanking outrages was the despatch to Shanghai by the United States of two more regiments of Marine infantry, a battalion of Marine artillery and an air squadron. These last named forces went to Tientsin in June, 1927, remaining there until January, 1929. They were commanded by Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler of the Marines. In October, 1927, Admiral Mark L. Bristol relieved Admiral Clarence Williams as Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

(c) *The Tsinan incident.*—The Northern campaign was resumed in the spring of 1928. By that time the Nationalist armies had been augmented by the armies of Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. The only remaining anti-Kuomint'ang war lord of any importance was Chang Tso-lin at Peking.

The Japanese had a concession at Tsinan, located in western Shantung province where the Tsingtao railway joins the Tientsin—Pukow (opposite Nanking) railway. The concession was guarded by Japanese troops. On May 2d a clash occurred between Nationalist and Japanese troops at Tsinan. The Japanese made much of the incident, using it as justification for the landing of a regular army division and the occupation of the Tsinan—Tsingtao railway. It happened that Mr. H. J. Timperley, an Australian newspaper man who represented the Manchester (England) *Guardian*, was in Tsinan when the incident occurred. In an article by him which appeared in *The Nation* (N. Y.) for the week of August 8, 1928, he said: "No organized attack on the part of the Nationalists was discernible at any time. . . Accepting as accurate the Japanese story that the trouble began with the looting of a Japanese house, it is certain that if the Japanese had reported the matter to Chiang Kai-shek, and had requested him to quell the disturbance the Nationalist Generalissimo would have taken immediate action. Instead they sent a platoon of men charging down a crowded street with fixed bayonets and within a few minutes afterward put the whole city in a panic by raking the main thoroughfares with machine gun fire."

This was the first of a series of clashes which Japan was to have with the Nationalist government. From the time that the Kuomint'ang party began to show signs of its ability to unify China, that party and the government it established were the objects of persistent and violent opposition on the part of Japan. A strong Chinese government did not fit in with her plans for Japanese expansion and hegemony in Eastern Asia.

The occupation of the Tsinan—Tsingtao railway by Japanese troops was a serious embarrassment to the Northern expedition. However, Chiang Kai-shek pushed on and on June 5th Peking was occupied. One of the first moves of the government was to change the name of Peking, which means "northern capital," to Peiping, meaning, "northern peace."

Foreigners in the Tientsin—Peiping area were uneasy during the period of the turnover from the Chang Tso-lin regime to that of the Nationalists, but no untoward incident occurred. The Marine guard of five hundred men at Peiping and the brigade of 3,000 Marines at Tientsin proved to be sources of comfort to foreigners, and probably exerted considerable moral effect on the Chinese, but they were not called upon to quell any disturbance nor prevent any act of violence. In January, 1929, the brigade at Tientsin was returned to the United States.

It became necessary for Chiang Kai-shek to put down a rebellion within the Nationalist fold in 1930. Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian general, and Yen Hsi-shan of the model province of Shansi, combined to test his strength. Chiang was aided by Chang Hsueh-liang, who had succeeded his father, Chang Tso-lin, as the dominant figure in Manchuria. Chiang again triumphed, but when Chang Hsueh-liang tried to return to Manchuria an incident occurred which was to change the map of Eastern Asia.

(d) *The Mukden Incident.*—As has been mentioned before, under the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Japanese succeeded, with the consent of the Chinese to the rights, privileges and properties appertaining to the railway between Chang-chun and Port-Arthur in Manchuria. This railway they renamed the South Manchurian. Legal title was based on the Russo-Chinese railway Agreement of 1896, which gave the railway company "absolute and exclusive administration of its lands." This last quoted clause was used by the Japanese as authority for the establishment of guards along the railway. On the night of September 18th, 1931, the guards at Mukden became involved with Chinese troops. The subsequent investigation of the affair by the League of Nations' Commission, headed by Lord Lytton, reported the following version.

"According to the Japanese versions, Lieutenant Kawamoto, with six men under his command, was on patrol duty on the night of September 18, practising defence exercises along the track of the South Manchurian Railway to the north of Mukden. They were proceeding southwards in the direction of Mukden. The night was dark but clear and the field of vision was not wide. When they reached a point at which a small road crosses the line, they heard the noise of a loud explosion a little way behind them. They turned and ran back, and after going about 200 yards they discovered that a portion of one of the rails on the down track had been blown out. The explosion took place at the point of junction of two rails; the end of each rail had been completely severed, creating a gap in the line of 31 inches. On arrival at the site of

the explosion, the patrol was fired upon from the fields on the east side of the line. Lieutenant Kawamoto immediately ordered his men to deploy and return the fire."

By 11:30 p.m., the Japanese troops in the Mukden area were attacking the Chinese barracks there in retaliation for the destruction of the tracks of the South Manchurian railway by the Chinese.

On September 19th Lieutenant General Honjo, who commanded the Kwangtung army in Manchuria, arrived in Mukden, having ordered a concentration there. The result is known to the world. The Japanese army occupied Manchuria, and all armed Chinese were treated as bandits. The capital was established at Chang-chun, the name of the city being changed to Hsin-king, or "new capital." An Administrative Council was organized with Japanese chosen Chinese as members. On February 18th, 1932, the Council formally declared the "independence" of Manchuria, and renamed the new state Manchoukuo, or country of the Manchus. Mr. Henry Pu Yi, former Emperor of China under the title of Hsuan Tiung, was invited to become head of the new state and on March 4th he was "persuaded" to do so. He was formally inaugurated "Regent" of Manchoukuo on March 9th. On March 1st, 1934, Pu Yi was enthroned as Emperor of Manchoukuo under the reign title of Kang-te.

(e) *The Sino-Japanese incident at Shanghai.*—While the empire of Manchoukuo was in the making the Japanese were creating a diversion at Shanghai. On January 18th, 1932, five Japanese monks wandered, for reasons unknown, from the Honkew District of the International Settlement, where most of the Japanese interests and residences are located, into the adjoining Chinese district of Chapei. They attracted attention first by playing Japanese musical instruments, then sang the Japanese national anthem. A small riot followed, the Chinese at this time being unusually upset over the series of events occurring in Manchuria. Three of the monks were injured, one of them dying.

The following day Japanese Consul General Murai violated diplomatic practice by presenting the Mayor of Shanghai, General Wu Teh-chen, with four demands. These called for a formal apology for the attack on the Japanese monks; the arrest of their assailants; the payment of solatium and hospital expenses; and suppression of all boycott activities and the immediate dissolution of all anti-Japanese associations. The demands were backed by the action of the Japanese navy. A fleet of ten warships under Rear Admiral Shiozawa arrived at Shanghai on January 21, and he issued a statement that unless Mayor Wu agreed unconditionally to the demands he would "take appropriate steps to protect the rights and interests of the Imperial Japanese Government." On the 22d five more warships arrived, including an aircraft carrier bearing 70 fighting crafts.

On January 27th Consul General Murai presented an ultimatum to Mayor Wu demanding a reply before 6:00 p.m., the following day. At 2:00 p.m., on the 28th Mayor Wu's secretary presented to Consul General Murai a note in which the Mayor accepted the demands in full.

The next step in this drama is less clear. The United States, Great Britain, Italy and Japan had troops available for the defense of the Settlement. To put them into action it was necessary for the Municipal Council to declare a state of emergency, and to request the Senior Consul to invite his colleagues to direct the defence forces of their respective countries to proceed to the defence of

the Settlement. The Council met at 11:00 a.m., on the 28th and took the necessary action. The defence forces were mobilized. At 8:30 p.m., Admiral Shiozawa announced that he had decided to send Japanese troops into Chapei, "where Japanese nationals reside in great numbers, for the enforcement of law and order in that area."

In the Chapei and adjacent area troops of the Chinese 19th Route Army, commanded by General Tsai Tin-kiai, were stationed. At midnight on January 28th 3,000 Japanese blue-jackets from the fleet moved into Chapei and encountered a stubborn resistance from General Tsai's 19th Route army. So well did these Chinese troops stand their ground that Japan had to reinforce the naval landing force with two army divisions before the Chinese were compelled to withdraw. Fighting continued until March 4th, when an armistice was declared. On May 5th an armistice agreement was signed which provided for the withdrawal of the troops of both parties. A joint Commission, in which the assistant friendly Powers, the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, and the two parties concerned were represented, was established to certify the mutual withdrawal.

During the course of hostilities the Fourth U. S. Marines were constantly on duty assuring protection to the life and property of Americans, as well as other foreigners, within the section of the Settlement assigned to them. The defense sector of the Marines was opposite the right flank of the Chinese line. Several times the Japanese attempted to send armed men in civilian clothes into that area. They were apprehended by the Marines and disarmed. This incident indicates that if American Marines, and other foreign troops, had not been present the entire Settlement would probably have been used as a base of operations by the Japanese.

In late February, 1932, reinforcements were deemed necessary and the 31st U. S. Infantry was sent to Shanghai from Manila, P. I., returning to Manila in July, 1932.

SECTION V—CONCLUSION

In the course of this survey we have found that in ancient times China was a proud and haughty nation, content to live within the limits of her own resources. Within her borders culture, as represented by painting, sculpture, the production of artistic objects in porcelain, the art of poetry and the development of philosophy, reached a high state of perfection. However, her isolation and her success in dominating her neighbors had given the people, especially the nobility, an exaggerated idea of their relative importance in the world. They were not willing to meet other nations on a basis of equality, and had no conception, even as late as 1860, of the fundamental principles of international law.

As transportation facilities and other means of communication improved it became less and less possible for nations to maintain a position of isolation. In the case of China it was necessary to forcibly break down her resistance to foreign intercourse before diplomatic relations on a basis of equality could be established.

Unfortunately for China, once the barriers were destroyed foreign nations took advantage of their dominant positions to attempt a virtual partitioning of the country by carving out special spheres of influence for themselves. Chinese resentment was manifested in the Boxer rebellion, which in turn paved the way for the revolution of 1912.

Out of the ashes of civil war there has arisen a new China, but circumstances bring her face to face at this crucial time with a new Japan intent on making of China a vassal state.

Throughout this period of transition American diplomacy has been signally aided, when a strong hand was necessary, by the U. S. naval forces, which include the Marines. Invariably the use of Marines has been contingent on the judgment of the diplomatic official concerned, this policy assuring harmony of action between these two branches of the government service. Even the best diplomacy has to be reinforced by military power from time to time. The successful use of this power is secured when it is employed skillfully by officers who work in close sympathy with competent diplomats.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

(Continued from page 26)

of the Turks, for the heights dominate the Narrows, the opposite Asiatic shore, and the Gaba Tepe-Maidos valley.

Next, to the south, are the heights of Achi Baba, which command the slopes to the end of the peninsula but which do not control the Narrows.

The coast, from a point about three miles south of Gaba Tepe to Cape Tekke, is precipitous and in general not adapted for landings with the exception of a few minor places such as Y. Gully, and X Beaches. East of Tekke are several good but restricted and compartmented beaches: W, V, and, in Morto Bay, S. The shore line inside of the straits was out of the question, since a landing on either side would be subject to fire in the rear from the opposite coast.

On the Asiatic side from the Narrows south to Besika Bay, the country is hilly, cut by numerous streams and stretches of swampy ground. Besika Bay itself furnishes some shelter for a possible landing and there are other practicable beaches.

The communications leading into the peninsula followed three main routes: by sea from Constantinople to the town of Gallipoli, which was the most frequently used; through Thrace and across the Bulair isthmus; and down the Asiatic shore and across the Narrows. Within the peninsula, communications were poor, consisting of a few roads and trails over favorable ground and of practically nothing in the mountainous sections.

So much for a general outline of the terrain. Such parts of it as became important in the operations will be considered later in more detail.

THE MISSION

The most important of the Turkish defenses in the straits and those which had prevented the passage of the fleet were at the Narrows. From his instructions as well as from his study of the problem, Hamilton deduced his mission and expressed it as follows: "The object of the expedition is to assist the Fleet to force the Dardanelles by capturing the Kilid Bahr plateau, and dominating the forts at the Narrows." This capture of Kilid Bahr might be accomplished in one of two ways: by operations against the plateau itself, or by operations against the lines of communication which were essential to the Turks if they were to maintain themselves on the peninsula.

ALTERNATIVES

In considering the plans open to Hamilton and the one which he finally adopted, let us first clear up the question of making the main landing on the Asiatic shore. Actually, Hamilton could not consider this, for it had been forbidden by Kitchener, but it was the plan favored by the French as well as by many others. Landing places may be roughly classified into two groups. There are those where the landing will be difficult because of the opposition offered by the enemy or the terrain or both, but from which are suitable lines of operation leading to an objective of value. Then there are those where the landing will be easy but from which lines of operation, if they exist at all, lead to an unimportant objective. Besika Bay and other places on the Asiatic shore seem to fall into this latter class, for the distance to the Narrows is at least 25 miles, the terrain is difficult, the right flank of an advancing force would be in the air and the left flank enfiladed by fire from the peninsula, and since the hills on the peninsula dominate the Asiatic shore, the destruction of the forts on the east side of the Narrows would not necessarily open a passage for the fleet nor cause the evacuation of Gallipoli. As the site for a main landing, the Asiatic shore was out.

An obvious point of attack and one which many critics not responsible for the operation have maintained to be the most suitable was the isthmus at Bulair. At first glance, it would seem that possession of this isthmus would isolate the defenders and cause their capitulation. This was not necessarily so, however, for, as we have seen, they had other lines of communication. Considering its relation to the objective of the expedition,

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the occupation of Bulair offers no assistance to the Fleet problem of passing the Narrows and the distance from Bulair to the Kilid Bahr plateau is excessive. The importance of Bulair was as obvious to the Turks as to Hamilton and he was aware that strong measures had been taken for its security. Finally, the navy opposed a landing at such a distance from the base at Lemnos. Thus Bulair as the site of the main landing was unacceptable although Hamilton, as his plan will show, employed the Turkish concern regarding this area to his own ends.

We may pass lightly over the area around Suvla Bay. Its chief advantage was that it appeared to be unprepared for defense but, on the other hand, Hamilton's reconnaissances had disclosed no practical landing areas in this vicinity. It was, furthermore, too far from the objective.

North of Gaba Tepe, the suitability of the beaches was not fully appreciated but it is apparent that a landing here, followed by an advance to the crest of Sari Bair, would dominate the Turkish communications and facilitate further advance to the Narrows. The main disadvantages of such a landing were that the beach was isolated from the sea in rough weather, that water was scarce, and that an advance over rough and broken country would be involved, while naval gunfire would be unable to enfilade the enemy lines.

A landing south of Gaba Tepe followed by an advance across the valley would place the attacker in a position giving immediate access to the Kilid Bahr plateau. It was the nearest landing place to the objective and was, contrary to Hamilton's opinion, lightly

defended. But these beaches were also exposed to the weather, Sari Bair would have to be occupied to protect the advance and most of the open ground to be crossed could be covered by guns on Kilid Bahr.

There were a number of points in favor of Helles, the group of beaches and the area at the toe of the peninsula. The beaches were sheltered from the weather (but not from the fire of guns on the Asiatic shore), Helles was nearest to the base, the terrain was less rugged than farther to the north, and it was thought that an advance here could be well supported by gunfire from the ships delivering flanking fire on the enemy lines. Its disadvantages were the limited extent of the beaches, two of which, in addition, were known to be strongly wired and entrenched; its distance from the objective; and the fact that Achi Baba formed an additional hill mass to be crossed before Kilid Bahr could be assaulted.

To conclude these preliminary considerations, let us note Hamilton's estimate of the enemy. He believed that there might be 34,000 Turks on the peninsula and that one division was at Bulair, one or more between that point and Kilid Bahr, and one south of Achi Baba. He was also aware that there were some Turks on the Asiatic mainland.


HAMILTON'S DECISION (See Map 2)

After weighing the advantages and disadvantages offered by the various landing places, Hamilton finally decided to make his main landings at Helles and on the beach north of Gaba Tepe. These landings were to be assisted by a demonstration by the Naval Division at Bulair, another by part of the French forces at Besika Bay, and a landing by a small French force at Kum Kale. This last was for the purposes of preventing gun fire from this point interfering with the landing on the beaches at Helles and to hold the garrison on the Asiatic shore from crossing over to the assistance of those on the peninsula.

The 29th Division was to make the landing at Helles, the Anzac Corps on the beaches north of Gaba Tepe.

The question of whether to land at night or in daylight was considered. The Navy opposed the night landing on account of navigational difficulties which were increased by the bad currents common in these waters. Hunter-Weston, whose division was to land at Helles, concurred in this view and also considered that the night landing would cause too much confusion on shore. He was allowed, therefore, to plan his landing for daylight. Birdwood, commanding the Anzacs, took the opposite view, holding that the cover afforded by darkness was worth all the risks of confusion, and his landing was planned to begin just before daybreak.

The naval support was to consist of attending the landing parties with battleships and smaller vessels close to the shore and providing fire support from these positions as well as from ships farther out. The primary target of the ships' guns to assist the troops was specified as the hostile artillery, with hostile troops as secondary targets. Ships were directed to open fire whenever enemy troops were observed or for a definite tactical object, and always to open fire at any target when requested by the troops ashore. We may note that ammunition allowances which were not to be exceeded without urgent military necessity were 20 rounds per gun for 9" to 12"; 80 rounds for 7.5"; and 100 rounds for 6", 4" and 12-pounders.



Map 2

The exact date of the attack depended on the weather. Finally, its execution was ordered for the 23rd. Like a time bomb, the plan was set to burst 36 hours after the mechanism was set in motion; thus the actual landing was to be made in the early hours of the morning of April 25th.

THE TURKISH COMMANDER AND TROOPS

A week elapsed after the defeat of the last effort of the British fleet to force a passage before a real effort was made to defend the peninsula. On March 25th, the Fifth Army was formed of troops already on the peninsula and other units.

Field Marshal Otto Liman von Sanders was placed in command. He was 60 years old, had come to Turkey as chief of the German Military Mission in 1913, and had been appointed Inspector-General of the Turkish Army. Von Sanders was the typical Prussian officer with all the virtues and defects of the character. He was stiff and tactless but he had the firmness of character to insist on what he thought proper even in the face of his political and intriguing superiors in the Turkish government. He realized that his love of country and loyalty to the Emperor were better served by ruthlessness than by kindness and he tolerated no failure of duty in his subordinates. His positive and aggressive attitude was transmitted to those below him. He was not perfect and he made many natural errors of judgment but, unlike Hamilton, he redeemed them by his control of the situation after the action had begun. In 1918, he was badly diddled by Allenby and Lawrence in the Palestine campaign but at Gallipoli, he proved more than a match for Hamilton.

He had only a few German officers with him, most of his commanders and staffs being Turkish. His army was composed of six divisions (the 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 11th and 19th), two Gendarmerie battalions and, later, a cavalry brigade. Each division had 9 to 12 battalions, each battalion 800 to 1,000 men. The total strength of his force was given as 84,000, but this included supply and other services as well as some unarmed labor troops, and we may consider his strength in rifles as about 45,000 as compared with Hamilton's rifle strength of about 50,000.

The combat efficiency of his divisions varied considerably. Some were composed of veteran soldiers, while others contained a proportion of unreliable Arab units. The Turks had one advantage which had more effect later than at the start of the campaign: they lived on a lower scale and were less affected by the hardships of prolonged field service under the conditions existing in their own country.

Von Sanders had no heavy artillery, aircraft or mechanical transport. Ammunition, tools, obstacle materials and supplies of all kinds were inadequate. Precautions had even to be taken that sandbags were not diverted from their proper use to serve as clothing.

TURKISH DISPOSITION (See Map 2)

On arrival in Gallipoli on March 26th, Von Sanders found affairs in a state by no means satisfactory to him. Quite contrary to his principles, he says, the troops were scattered all along the coast in a cordon defense so that everywhere the enemy would meet with a certain amount of resistance, but, due to the absence of reserves, no sustained and vigorous defense. Roads and trails were bad, and from lack of training the

troops had lost whatever virtues of mobility they had ever possessed.

The enemy was on the way. Already, reliable evidence as well as rumor had informed the Turks that anywhere between 50,000 and 100,000 Allied troops were being assembled for the attack. What Von Sanders required was time to make his dispositions and preparations and, as we have seen, he was given a full month to prepare.

He considered an attack on the Asiatic shore very probable. On the peninsula, he believed there were three main danger points: Helles, Gaba Tepe, and Bulair. He was especially sensitive about the latter point. Von Sanders well realized the inherent weakness of his position in trying to defend a large area with a relatively small number of troops; that is, that the attacker knows where he is going to strike and can prepare and concentrate his troops accordingly, but that the defender must be ready in all directions and can only gradually concentrate against the point of attack. This loss of initiative must be overcome by mobility on the part of the troops and flexibility in the mind of the commander. He realized that it was impossible to guard all possible landing places and that his forces must be distributed in accordance with the relative importance of the various areas.

Consequently, the force was divided into fighting groups and distributed as follows. The 3rd and 11th Divisions were placed on the Asiatic shore. Here, although they could not enter into the initial defense of the peninsula, they were not entirely lost for this purpose, for if the Asiatic shore was attacked but lightly or not at all, some of these troops could be moved into Gallipoli via Chanak and thus exert a belated effect on the action; and they were so used on occasion. The 5th and 7th Divisions were in the Bulair area. The Gendarmerie battalions were on the coast north of Suvla. The 9th Division defended the sector from Suvla south to the toe of the peninsula, and the 19th Division was assembled near Boghali as Von Sanders' general reserve.

Von Sanders ordered the divisions to hold their troops together and to send only the most indispensable security detachments to the coast within their sectors, for, as he said, his success depended not on holding tightly to the coast but on the mobility of the battle groups; and this was impressed on division commanders as forcefully as possible. Thus the coast line was no longer the main line of resistance but became the line of outpost and delaying positions, supported by strong concentrations of troops at strategic points.

It was necessary to move the troops into their new positions at night, for they were under the observation and fire of hostile ships cruising off the coast and, more particularly, of hostile aircraft. The mobility of the troops was increased by frequent marches and exercises. Communications were improved by setting labor battalions to work constructing suitable roads, and by assembling boats in various ports on the straits in order that troop movements might be made by water.

The dispositions remained unchanged, with two minor exceptions, until the British attack on April 25th. Both of these exceptions, more by accident than design, were favorable to the defenders. The Gendarmerie battalion in the Suvla Bay area was sent to reinforce the southern zone of the south sector and was relieved by a battalion of the 19th Division (reserve). This battalion

was on the march toward Helles when the attack began. On the 23rd, British aviators made an air raid on Maidos and drove out the reserve of the northern zone of the south sector; these battalions moved into bivouac 1½ miles nearer Gaba Tepe.

COMMENT

With the two sides in position and the attack about to commence, let us pause at this point to inquire whether, in spite of all the follies of delay and lack of preparation, there is still a chance for the British attack to succeed. Our answer may well be "Yes" as we note the advantages of an attack made on so large an area where the possible locations of the attack are so far separated. Gallipoli is characterized by the fact that the lines of operation which lead to direct possession of the objective are so far distant from those which, by severing the defender's lines of communication, may accomplish the same object. As we see, in such a situation the defender must spread out over a large area. The attacker by his superior mobility on water can not only gain tactical surprise but, having also the initiative, can concentrate superior force at any one point. Thus we see that, in whatever area Hamilton decided to attack, he would at that point be superior in force to the defender. Hamilton, partly by chance, has made his concentration in the area where the defenders are weakest and, moreover, at points farthest from reinforcements. Remembering that the defender's numerical strength is about equal to that of the attacker, and his relative strength greater by reason of the advantages of the defensive on his own territory, we come to the final and most important conclusion that *speed* in gaining the objective before the opposing concentration can be made is the *essential element* and that included in *speed* are all the factors—drive and control from above, aggressiveness and initiative on the part of the lower ranks—which will produce it.

THE ATTACK

To introduce the story of the action itself, it is hardly possible to do better than to quote the words of the Official History.

"The 23rd and 24th April were days of matchless beauty, and the glistening splendor of sea and sky was a picture such as can only be found in the Aegean, and there only in days of early spring. To all who watched, amid those exquisite surroundings, the crowded ships of the covering force steam slowly out of Mudros, that unforgettable pageant of British manhood moving into battle is engraved on heart and mind as a proud and poignant memory. The task in front of the troops was one that no other army had ever been called on to face; and they were facing it as a long expected holiday." One of the transports had painted in large white letters on the side, "Turkish Delight"; another, "To Constantinople and the Harems." "As each transport passed through the waiting fleet, cheer upon cheer broke out from her crowded decks and the watching bluejackets cheered and cheered again. The die was now cast. One fact alone was clear. If the capture of the beaches was humanly possible, these gallant troops would do it.

"As the moon climbed slowly to her zenith on the night of the 24th April, lighting up the rugged coast of Imbros and the sombre outline of the peninsula, the sleeping waters of the northern Aegean were dotted with nearly 200 vessels heading for their various rendezvous. Away to the north, led by the battleship

Canopus, were the ships of the Royal Naval Division and their supporting squadron, bound for the Gulf of Saros. To the east of Imbros were the transports of the Anzac Corps, their covering squadron, their numerous trawlers and small craft, and their attendant battleships and destroyers packed with eager troops. Further south, near Tenedos, were the vessels allotted to the Helles landing; and further south again, the French squadrons heading for the Asiatic shore.

"The period of preparation with all its cares and anxieties was at an end. The hour for action had arrived. Everything that the naval and military commanders could think of to smooth the path of the troops had been done. The final issue, as always, lay with the infantry. It was they who must bear the brunt. It was they who must turn to best account the orders, good or bad, that had committed them to their various tasks. It was they who must answer whether even British and Australian troops could triumph in the face of such gigantic difficulties."

DEMONSTRATIONS AT BULAIR AND BESIKA BAY

The Royal Naval Division on 11 transports escorted by a battleship, two cruisers, two destroyers and some trawlers arrived soon after daybreak on the 25th and began a bombardment of the Bulair lines which continued throughout the day. In the afternoon, boats were swung out, men embarked, and just before dark the tows started for the shore but returned to their ships as soon as it was too dark for the return to be observed. During the night, an officer swam ashore, lighted flares along the beach and returned to his ship. The demonstrating force went south on the 26th to take part in the main landing.

This operation was highly effective in accomplishing its purpose. On the morning of the 25th, reports began to come to Von Sanders at his headquarters in Gallipoli (town) of the various landings, and his officers were much affected and startled by the fact that so many simultaneous landings were being made. Von Sanders went to the heights of Bulair, where he remained during the 25th and part of the 26th watching the actions of the Naval Division. In spite of the urgent calls for help from other sectors, it was not until the evening of the 25th that he would allow 5 battalions to start south. The next reinforcements were sent off the evening of the 26th, and not until the 27th was the remainder of the 5th and 7th Divisions ordered to the scene of the real landings. Thus the demonstration had fully realized its object; but let us remember, in assessing Von Sanders' actions, that the Bulair forces were not his general reserve, which was at Boghali.

The French demonstration at Besika Bay was made by six transports, a cruiser and two destroyers. It consisted in bombarding the shore and lowering boats, but it was ended at 1000 the 25th, and seems to have had little effect.

KUM KALE

The French attack at Kum Kale was designed to prevent interference by gunfire from this locality with the landings at Helles as well as to delay reinforcement of the peninsula from the Asiatic shore. One regiment and a field battery were to make the attack. The transports arrived about 0730 on the 25th, and the covering ships commenced firing. The tows started for the shore but the small French steamboats could not make headway against the current and had to be assisted by destroyers

and tugs, so that the landing was not made until about 1000. The bulk of the defending forces were behind the Mendere River; the fire of the covering ships kept them from advancing to the shore, so the landing met little opposition. The French were not able to progress beyond the village, however, and there was a sharp fight there that night. More troops were needed at Helles so, on the night of the 26th, the French evacuated. This landing prevented the Turks firing on Helles and no doubt had some effect in holding troops on the Asiatic shore. The Turks maintain that the troops could not be moved across the straits because of submarines and the lack of small craft but, whatever the cause, no troops from this side were engaged on the peninsula until the 29th.

HELLES: THE MAIN ATTACK (See Map 3)

The landing at Helles was planned as the main effort. The immediate objective assigned to the 29th Division, which was to make this landing under the command of Hunter-Weston, was Achi Baba, with Kilid Bahr as the ultimate objective. Three main landings were to take place on Beaches V, W and X. Minor landings were planned for Y and S Beaches to protect the flanks, divert the enemy and interrupt the arrival of reinforcements. Although the units were to some extent split up, we may simplify the story by saying that two battalions, the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth Royal Marine Light Infantry (attached from the Naval Division), were to land at Beach Y; one battalion, the Royal Fusiliers, at Beach X; one battalion, the Lancashire Fusiliers, at Beach W; three battalions, Hampshires, Royal Dublin Fusiliers and Royal Munster Fusiliers, at Beach V; and one battalion, the South Wales Borderers, at Beach S. These battalions were known as the covering force. The remaining five battalions of the 29th Division constituted the main body and were to be landed at either X, W, or V as circumstances might indicate.

We should note at this point that, although there was a certain degree of flexibility provided for the employment of the main body of the 29th Division, the commander-in-chief, Hamilton, had retained no general reserve and had therefore no direct means of influencing the action, a deficiency which was to have important effects.

As these various landing parties approach their beaches, let us examine in a little more detail the Turkish defense dispositions to meet them. There was one Turkish Division, the 19th, at Boghali as general reserve and only one division, the 9th, disposed for the defense of the whole area south of Suvla Bay. This one division was to meet the attack of the three British divisions, one at Helles, two at Gaba Tepe. This Turkish division was composed of three regiments (9 battalions) of infantry, three field batteries and two batteries of mountain guns. One regiment was assigned the northern zone with which we shall be concerned when considering the Anzac landing. One regiment was assigned to the southern zone and one was kept as divisional reserve on the Kilid Bahr plateau. The 26th regiment, in the southern zone, had one battalion along the coast between Gaba Tepe and Sari Tepe ($1\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of Y Beach). This left only two battalions south of Achi Baba, between 1,600 and 2,000 men. There was one platoon at Sari Tepe; nothing at Y Beach; 2 platoons at Gully Beach; 12 men at X Beach; one company at W Beach, and one company at V Beach. There were


two companies in support behind W and V Beaches. In the vicinity of Morto Bay was disposed the equivalent of one company. Two companies were in reserve near Krithia.

These 2,000 men, not all of whom were near the beaches where landings were to be made, hardly seem to constitute a formidable force to oppose Hunter-Weston's 12,000 infantry supported by all their guns as well as by those of the supporting ships which were expected to blast the Turks right off the beaches.


Y BEACH (See Map 4)

The landing at Y Beach was Hamilton's own idea, for here the coast line consists of steep, forbidding, scrub-covered cliffs about 150 feet high, with two breaks, formed by watercourses, offering a means of access to the top. He hoped that this beach would therefore be unguarded and that a landing here could be made without opposition. On the night of the 24th, the two battalions, embarked on two cruisers and a transport and accompanied by eight trawlers, met another cruiser and a battleship, which were to assist in covering the debarkation, at a rendezvous four miles off the coast. At 0230, the troops were transferred to the trawlers. At about 0415, the trawlers, towing cutters, steamed in till they grounded. The troops were then transferred to the boats and thrown on the beach.

The surprise was complete. Not a shot was fired and, by 0515, the whole 2,000 men were ashore without a casualty and were holding the western edge of Gully Ravine, still absolutely unopposed, and there they remained. At this time, each of the two battalion com-



Map 3



Map 4

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manders supposed himself senior to the other and therefore in command, for the officer to command at Y Beach had not been designated in writing. The one really intended to command had verbal orders to get in touch with X Beach—whether by signal or actual contact was not specified—and actually he did neither. Also, when the covering forces advanced from the southern beaches and came up to him, he was to join in their advance. He had no orders what to do if the advance did not materialize. So for the time being we will leave this force, greater than the total Turkish strength south of Achi Baba, in its temporary security and pass on to those who were less fortunate.

X BEACH

The first troops to land at X, W, and V Beaches were to be debarked from two battleships and a fleet sweeper in 18 tows off their respective beaches at daybreak. The southern end of the peninsula was to be covered by a heavy bombardment from the fleet beginning at 0500; half an hour later, the fire was to lift and the tows proceed to the beach. The troops for the flank landing at S were to be transferred from a battleship into trawlers and land on the north point of Morto Bay at the same time. Immediately after the first tows arrived at Beach V, a collier was to be run aground with 2,000 men aboard, and about three-quarters of an hour later, the rest of the covering force was to land. Thus the entire covering force was to be ashore by 0700 and the landing of the main body begin about 0830. In addition to the attendant ships which took the troops in, nine other vessels were to deliver supporting fire. The total number of naval guns available to support the landing, including that at Y Beach, was 345, of which more than half were 6" and larger. The ships had squared maps for target designation and, in addition, the southern end of the peninsula had been divided into areas, to each of which one or more ships had been allotted. All trenches or suspected gun emplacements that had been located by air reconnaissance were also shown on the special maps.

The assembling at the various rendezvous, the transfer of troops to boats, and the bombardment went off on schedule except that off S Beach the current delayed the progress of the tows toward shore. The bombardment was therefore continued until 0600, when the signal was given for the fire to lift and the tows to go ahead. All this time, there was no sign of life on shore. Except for a few shells from Asia, the terrific bombardment of the beaches had met with no response.

Beach X resembled Y Beach in that it was apparently unfavorable for a landing. There was a strip of sand about 200 yards long at the foot of a cliff about 40 feet high but not so steep as to be unclimbable. The beach was not wired and there was only a picket of 12 men on guard. The *Implacable*, 12" guns, accompanied the tows to within 500 yards of the beach with her anchor lowered just sufficiently to drag before grounding and, together with the *Swiftsure*, poured shells on to the beach. The battalion of Royal Fusiliers landed and climbed the cliffs without appreciable loss. The twelve Turks had been too stupefied by the fire to offer much resistance.

In fact, until much later in the operation when the situation was stabilized, ships' gunfire for many reasons, some of which are valid today, did very little damage. In the first few days, the Turks were severely

frightened by it but when they found that it was not very effective, they lost much of their fear. Aside from the unsuitability of ships' guns for fire against shore targets, most of the difficulty was caused by poor liaison between ship and shore. Some of the difficulties were inherent in the situation, others the result of carelessness.

As the troops began to advance inland, one Turkish company of the two in local support came into action against them. An advance was begun to the northeast to protect the left flank, and on the right, Hill 114 was attacked and its summit gained by 1100. So far, the landing at X Beach had progressed well and it may be noted that from the positions gained the landing party had a view of Hills 138 and 141, so that if a stronger force had been landed here, the defenses on these hills might have been taken in reverse. Also the shore of S Beach was visible, only two miles away, but no attempt was made to gain signal contact. Hamilton had been so secretive that he mystified his own troops as well as the Turks, for no one at X Beach had any idea that a landing was in progress at Morto Bay and it is doubtful just how much was known of the plans for the other beaches. (*To be continued*)

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BIRTHDAY PRESENT FROM CAPTAIN TOWNSEND

■ Our 160th Birthday Radio Broadcast brought many fine responses from all corners of our country and all kinds of business men, but one of the most genuine examples of appreciation of comradeship was that of Captain George L. Townsend, United States Army, who served with the Marines overseas in the old 5th Regiment, when he turned over to General Russell what is generally believed to be the best conditioned German machine gun in the possession of the Corps.

Its history runs like this: "Around October 3, 1918, during the scrap in the vicinity of B de la Vipere, France, this machine gun was captured by a raiding party from the 5th Regiment and turned over to Captain Townsend. After finding it too heavy to move around, it was sent to Paris via truck, then via American Express to Washington, D. C., where it has been in cosmolene ever since."

On the morning of November 27 Captain Townsend formally presented the gun to General Russell in the General's office in the presence of several officers of the old 5th Regiment, with the understanding it must be used only for trophy purposes. Captain Townsend said he always felt it belonged to the men of the 5th Regiment and not to him as one of the officers of the regiment—and so with that understanding it will go to headquarters of that regiment with Captain Townsend's thought of many months of hardship and many happy memories of his service under Major Ralph S. Keyser during the war days of 1917 and 1918.

What a fine gesture! What a genuine comradeship still lingers in Townsend's heart! The whole Marine Corps salutes him, and the old 5th Regimenters, active and inactive, give him three loud cheers.

ED.

FLEET MARINE FORCE LANDING BOATS

(Continued from page 10)

feet would be required for the squad. A boat for three squads would be at least thirty-six feet, with corresponding beam. This brings up the factor of storing the boats on the big ship. The thirty footer is about small enough for that. The squad boat is not so efficient in view of its carrying capacity and storing displacement.

In general it is submitted that the ideal boat is one which is large enough to carry two squads, not too large nor too slow to render the occupants an easy target, not too large to "nest" easily aboard ship, nor too heavy to be handled by ordinary tackle.

The ideal boat should and can be designed at the same time for other missions as well. Thus, a boat built for two squads, with a cruising radius of one or two hundred miles, could be used as a small gun-boat, for inshore reconnaissance, for launching a torpedo, for river patrol, for locating approaching air armadas if equipped with radio³ and for many other peace and war-time missions. For most of them, and for the primary mission of landing, it is submitted that the two-squad boat, about thirty feet in length, with an eleven-foot beam, would be most suitable. A boat for such purposes should be capable, when moderately loaded, of maintaining approxi-

mately thirty-five to forty miles per hour. The so-called sea-skiff type boats are incapable of speeds in excess of twenty miles per hour, and lose speed materially with a heavy load. Speed, and the ability to turn sharply, make tanks and boats difficult targets.

III. BRIEF ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BOAT DEVELOPMENTS

An examination of the hull design of fast boats, ranging from the small outboard "speed boats" up to fast runabouts and cruisers in the twenty-five to fifty-foot class, discloses the modern application of the "hydroplane" principle. These boats have a beam approximately one-third of their length. In most cases the stern has practically no taper, since it is necessary to get the stern up on top of the water and keep it there. Everyone is familiar with the flying boat and has seen planes of this type "take off." The only difference is that the planes leave the top of the water whereas the boats remain there. A very notable example of the "hydroplane" type of boat is Gar Wood's "Miss America." If my recollection is correct, Miss America IX was twenty-six by a ten-foot beam. The stern was fully as wide as any part of the boat. This boat had two steps, but the writer wishes to avoid a discussion of "step hydroplanes" because it seems quite clear that "step" boats are not safe for practical usage, nor are they at all seaworthy, and hence have no place in this paper. It is sufficient to say that without a "step" bottom the Miss America IX would still proceed with great rapidity.

When the flying boat starts the hull or pontoon pushes water. As the power is applied the pontoon gradually reaches the surface of the water. The plane could not get off otherwise. Once it skims the surface a clean take-off is simple. But quite a lot of power is required to get on top. After that most of the power is applied to speed. Pushing water slows any boat down. Watch the outboard racers go through the same process as the flying boat. Yes, sometimes they leave the water temporarily. Fifty horsepower outboard motors have exceeded fifty-five miles per hour, the motors turning over six or seven thousand revolutions per minute. Were it not for hull design such speed would be impossible.

A modified form of the hydroplane is found in the well-known Vee-bottom runabouts. Before the depression, and even now, stock runabouts built by Chris-Craft, Hacker, Gar Wood, Dodge, and others, have been and are seen on most lakes and harbors. These hulls are a concession to heavy seas, yet, for example, a twenty-five foot Chris-Craft, having a seven-foot plus beam with a "two-fifty" horsepower eight-cylinder motor, can make nearly forty-five miles per hour. When you first apply power the stern sinks and the bow rises, as the throttle is opened further the stern rises perceptibly, the bow drops but without touching the water, and the boat finally "planes" with the water breaking about ten or twelve feet from the bow. At the stern the bottom is almost flat, but the "V" becomes more acute all the way forward. As the boat hits heavy seas the bow cuts in with a rising and falling movement, thrusting the water to each side. Although these boats are uncomfortable in head seas, they perform excellently, and, from the writer's experience, are as seaworthy as any so-called "sea-boats"

³See "Components of An Anti-Aircraft Defense," by First Lieutenant F. A. Stephenson, U.S.M.C., Marine Corps Gazette, August, 1934, page 13.

at slower speeds. In the trough and in following seas higher speeds may be maintained with remarkable performance. Boats of this type have a double-planked bottom (mahogany invariably), with specially treated canvas in between the layers. They are quite expensive, of course; the hull can be damaged seriously under rigorous service; the "white plumes" thrown high in the air are somewhat of a "give-away." However, these boats can stop and start equally with an automobile, and turn more sharply at high speed. Additional weight materially reduces the speed of these boats. They have a tendency to push water at the point forward where the hull initially contacts the surface. At full speed you can look over the side and see the hull exposed to the very bottom; nevertheless, the bottom is not actually "on top," there is always some drag. These boats have a slight "boat-tail." It is so slight on several of the models that, in view of their comparatively superior performance with broad sterns, in derogation of the "stern-drag" principle, the writer should apologize for using the current term "boat-tail" in a previous article on Mark I bullets in this magazine. All of which, by way of digression, is an example of the strained application of terms, although with effort one may establish a norm or find some similarity between exceptionally diverse subjects; as, for example, the community of interest of Marines, traveling salesmen and farmers, for the reason that Marines are interested in "bullets," farmers in bulls, and salesmen in calves. The reader is left to study out this remarkable analogy for the purpose of developing further coincidences which may occur to him as a result of the above stimulus. The writer is at a loss to explain the relation of these matters to the subject of landing force boats, however.

In favor of the stock mahogany runabouts it is well to observe that there are complete facilities for emergency production and shipment of these should the necessity suddenly arise. Even the motors are standardized. In this respect, and in view of the attitude of the War Department toward private manufacturers, the expense would not be excessive where time is of the essence.

But in view of the fact that weight materially affects these Vee-bottom boats, armor plate would not be very practical. On the whole this type leaves something to be desired.

Let us examine the so-called sea-sled type boat with its surface propellor. The "sled" bottom is an inverted "Vee." All the pounding of rough seas is centered in the hollow. I have seen these boats split in two from excessive pounding. Probably the "sled" can carry more weight than the regular "Vee" boats. But the hull of course is made of wood. On one occasion a "sled" driven near Quantico sank instantly as the result of impact with a heavy log.

It is submitted that efficient propulsion depends to a greater extent upon the "bearing" made by the "wheel" or propellor in the water. Aside from the question of "pitch" a certain amount of "wheel" diameter is vital. The engine has to work to move the wheel alone; more so of course in the water. One blade of a surface propellor is always "out." Notice the spray thrown aft. Those who are familiar with eight-oared college crews will recall the oft-heard voice of the coach: "Jones, you're washing out;" If he persists in raising the blade in the water before reaching the end of the stroke, Jones will lose his position. It would seem that the third blade of the surface propellor has the same fault. It produces

a certain amount of cavitation. On orthodox boats the hull serves as a cavitation plate. You will notice that outboard motors have a cavitation plate on the shaft above the propellor. Personally, I am not impressed with the attempt of "sled" designers to avoid this difficulty which is made acute by the surface "wheel."

However, it is clear that the sled design permits higher speeds in heavy seas. For that reason, and in competition with other wooden boats, the sled more nearly approaches the "ideal" boat, which, above all, must be seaworthy. But we must not forget that while a wooden boat at slow speed can be designed to withstand the pounding of heavy seas, nevertheless at high speed the tremendous increase in the force of the blows may "open up" the hull. In that respect, at least, the sea-sled is vulnerable. In general, the sled operates on the hydroplane principle. A recent article in a Boston newspaper described a sea-sled pontoon which has been developed for seaplanes to permit them to operate in rough water with less difficulty.

We have "iron ships" in the navy, yet small boats are usually built of wood, save for the Mullins steel boat. Due to the weight of frames these Vee-bottom runabouts are not built over twenty feet, approximately.

However, the writer has used several models of the "Steelcraft" hydroplane, chiefly with outboard motors. In general the Steelcraft is a modification of the Vee-bottom and the sea-sled designs. The center keel is a Vee, flanked on each side by a concave bottom, arched to the chines. This design utilizes the principle of the "arch" for strength. It is electrically welded, and uses bulkheads in lieu of frames. The modified "Vee center" thrusts water into the hollows of the bottom, thus keeping the boat on top in rough seas. Operating on the hydroplane principle the Steelcraft is not materially affected by increased weights. Planing surface is obtained by dimensions similar to those of the Miss America series. The writer drove a fifteen-foot five-foot beam Steelcraft over thirty miles per hour with a seven-hundred pound load, powered by a twenty-five horsepower "giant-twin" outboard motor. Without the load the same boat barely exceeded thirty-three miles per hour. From the writer's experience these boats can withstand more pounding at high speed in rough seas than any other small boat described in this article. At reduced speeds these steel boats proved exceptionally seaworthy, and quite equal to any so-called sea boat. I wish to emphasize this fact because the public seem imbued with the idea that merely because a boat is fast with the power on, it therefore can-

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not compete as a "sea boat" at reduced speeds with slower boats of the "all weather" persuasion.

The writer is not free to discuss the Steelcraft in further detail at this time, except to submit the opinion that this design is more nearly ideal for landing boats than any so far produced or designed, for the reasons that (1) it is made of steel alloy and welded; (2) that it is capable of high speed in heavy seas; (3) that it "planes" and therefore, except for the propellor, does not draw any water; (4) that the arched steel hull can withstand severe pounding on beaches and rocks; (5) that it is practically non-capsizable due to its design and beam; (6) that it may be easily "nested" since it is practically flat on all sides; (7) that it is capable of stopping and accelerating rapidly, and of turning sharply at high speed; (8) that it can be easily manufactured by any automobile company, using standardized marine engines easily obtained; (9) that it can be built for any capacity from twelve to fifty feet; (10) that it can perform in rough seas with an efficiency equal or superior to any "sea skiff" type boat; (11) that its speed and efficiency are not materially impaired by increased weight, and hence may be armor-plated adequately to withstand shrapnel and small arms fire; (12) that it is easily "beached" and may then be used as a temporary shelter during the disembarking, also serving as an excellent cover for the supporting machine gun crew; (13) that it may be equipped with armored hoods for protection against "strafing" airplanes; (14) that its bulkheads form separate watertight compartments sufficient to keep the craft afloat despite leakage in parts of the hull.

It is submitted that if our landing force were equipped with boats along the above lines the operation would at least not prove a "mortal catastrophe," although a landing under fire may never be "made comfortable."

IV. MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The writer shudders at the task of trying to enumerate all the objections that have been brought to his attention in connection with suggested modifications of the existing boat system.

Of course, the navy needs "motor-sailers" in peace time as well as war. There is not room enough to put special craft aboard ship. How can you launch smaller boats in rough water alongside? How can the men climb in? The main body must use motor-sailers. The small boats will get all mixed up. "Anti-strafing hoods" are

too heavy; we must neutralize the enemy in the air before attempting to land, anyway. What about barbed wire at the water's edge, surface mines, and so on?

Again I submit that the Marines will be forced to go ashore in the face of all these difficulties. The picture is entirely different in peace-time. People are prone to forget this very obvious, historically-substantiated fact.

Assuming that the seizure of naval bases is an impending war-time problem, the next few years should be the most interesting period in Marine Corps history. There is a striking analogy between this and our present-day economic, legal, and political problems. We have, today, very little precedent. We cannot run to the books and look up the answer. Instead, we must carefully analyze all the factors bearing upon the problems, and then give each its relative weight. I have often been told that outside of the nine principles of war, you cannot depend too much on blind adherence to ancient rituals. Each war develops entirely new problems. I am therefore going to attempt briefly to analyze this problem of the landing force boat in relation to the nine principles of war.

The Offensive: We have no bases to speak of so we will of necessity assume the offensive. Therefore we must provide adequate protection for the men as they proceed shoreward.

The Objective: We must overcome positions and gain control. To gain control we must land men, not corpses. Mere destruction of the base will not suffice.

Mass: A large number of small targets are more difficult to destroy than a small number of large ones. We must employ mass in a modified extended order on a scale sufficient to permit and insure a "beach-head."

Economy of Force: We must not use more force than is necessary. The efficiency of the force must be insured by adequately protecting the landing parties as they move toward the beach, to the end that a maximum percentage reach the beach, fit to contact the enemy in his defenses.

Mobility: Time is a vital factor. The speed of the boats creates a reduction in the time necessary to land. Speed permits the transport to lie off further from the shore, and permits the long range naval guns to conduct preparation fire from a point beyond the range of average mobile light or heavy field artillery. In general, speed and operating efficiency in heavy seas fulfill this requirement.

Security: In this connection the security of the men during landing must be made certain. Of course the fleet must provide tactical security.

Simplicity: This relates more to the plan of operation, and is especially important where a number of squad or two-squad boats are used. However, when we apply this to construction, it is obvious that the design and manufacture of these boats must be simple, for the same reason that the construction of our rifles, pistols, machine guns and other arms should be simple, and easy to understand.

Surprise: Speed is vital in the development of a tactical surprise for which the enemy is unprepared.

Coöperation: This is really a matter of tactics, yet it is not straining the application of this principle to suggest

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that in the design and construction of landing force boats an opportunity to coöperate with experienced builders should be afforded. After all, the whole matter is one of team play.

In conclusion, it is submitted that this subject is most vital to the Marine Corps. "What we have done is a matter of record." What we are going to do falls within the category of procrastination. What we should do is to carry out our preparations. Line duty and landing on defended beaches are synonymous in the Marine Corps. To date our Country has never engaged single-handed in an absolutely serious, full-fledged, modern naval war. When and if we do, posterity will really know the value of the Marine Corps. If Marines are unable to get to the beach our contribution to history will not be particularly brilliant. A landing force without proper boats is like ammunition without any rifles. The writer has merely scratched the surface here. A thorough study of the types of boats is urged. Modern boats have kept the pace with modern automobiles. Some independent thinking is required. The books do not contain all the answers. As yet we have not faced the acid test. Let us go shoreward "bearing our shields" and riding in them.

GARDE d'HAITI

(Continued from page 17)

its duties, and has been able to construct four new launches. An aviation officer has been included in the Garde of Haiti.

* * *

Notwithstanding the general conditions which are slightly unfavorable to the progress and development of the organization, the Garde of Haiti has been able during the year 1934-35, in addition to its usual duties as regards customary police and defense force:

- to insure operation of telephone exchanges in distant cities;
- to repress banditry in an effective manner;
- to control arms and ammunition;
- to control thirteen weather bureau stations;
- to assure protection against fire throughout the Republic;
- to keep up the landing fields;
- to exercise patrol of ports;
- to maintain, inspect, and repair help for navigation;
- to manage the prisons, despite the fact that the cost of maintaining the present number of prisoners exceeds the sum allocated in the Budget;
- to aid in making cities and towns healthy;
- to aid the highway department in several sections;
- to control immigration and emigration;
- to look after the execution of laws and regulations covering the manufacture and sale of exportable commodities;
- to aid in spreading information regarding agriculture throughout the country by conducting an average of 500 meetings monthly for the farmers, and to make a monthly report of all waste and cultivated land;
- to protect customs agents and tax collectors; and
- to effect payment of the officials of the civil government of the towns in the interior of the country.

The plans and projects for the new year 1935-1936 are enumerated below:

- (1) replacement of wheeled vehicles;
- (2) organization of the Medical Department (Enlisted Section);
- (3) organization of an aviation section;
- (4) construction of a prison at Hinche;
- (5) installation of radio in the Garde of Haiti;
- (6) purchase of two oil burning vessels;
- (7) reorganization of inter-departmental and national rifle competition;
- (8) definitely fixing the strength of the Garde in normal times, increasing the force, creation of expeditionary companies of enlisted men from the reserve;
- (9) creation of a model prison farm;
- (10) construction of barracks at Léogane, Mirebalais, Bainet, Port-de-Paix, Bombardopolis, Bois-Laurince, Phaéton, Caracol, Bombom, L'Asile, Baie-de-Henne, Grand-Bassin, Savanne-à-Roche, Lamielle, La Chapelle, Dohoye, Miguel, Grande-Saline, Moron, etc.;
- (11) construction of prisons at Jérémie, St-Marc, and Aquin;
- (12) improvement of the barracks at Jérémie, St-Marc, Aquin, Cerca-La-Source, Jacmel, Gonaives, and Pelladère;
- (13) improvement of the prison at Jacmel.

* * *

The first eight recommendations are of prime importance. An order has already been issued with a view to completely replacing all wheeled transportation.

The staff is sure that the new year will see the realization of the seven other projects actually under consideration, as well as the completion of many of the buildings under construction and improvements contemplated.

It is, therefore, believed that the Garde of Haiti has not deviated from the plan laid out for it and that each day it approaches the ideal towards which every effort is being directed.



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ARMY OFFICERS OBSERVE FLEET MARINE FORCE MANEUVERS

In order that the Army as well as the Navy might become acquainted with the overseas problems incident to landing operations, the Navy Department invited the War Department to send official observers to Culebra with the Fleet Marine Force to witness the 1936 maneuvers. After the War Department made their selections, and the usual courtesy calls were exchanged, the observers proceeded to San Juan, some via Army transport and other via Naval craft.

The following Army officers composed the observers:

- Colonel Sherman Miles, General Staff,
- Colonel Garfield L. McKinney, Medical Corps,
- Lieut.-Colonel Harvey C. Allen, General Staff,
- Lieut.-Colonel J. R. N. Weaver, General Staff,
- Lieut.-Colonel Lloyd E. Jones, Field Artillery,
- Lieut.-Colonel Frank S. Beason, Corps of Engineers,
- Lieut.-Colonel Jesse A. Ladd, 30th Infantry,
- Lieut.-Colonel La Rhett Stuart, Coast Artillery Corps,
- Lieut.-Colonel John H. Hester, 34th Infantry,
- Major Harold P. Gibson, Infantry,
- Major Samuel I. Zeidner, Quartermaster Corps,
- Major Louis Cansler, Signal Corps,
- Major A. Franklin Kibler, Field Artillery,
- Major Paul L. Hanson, 30th Infantry,
- Major Robert W. Yates, Field Artillery,
- Major W. E. Lynd, Air Corps,
- Captain Thomas J. Ford, Chemical Warfare Service,
- Captain John E. McCannon, 30th Infantry,
- Captain William N. White, Field Artillery,
- First Lieutenant Paul de W. Adams, 30th Infantry.

A glance at the list shows that virtually every branch of the Army was represented.

The Force welcomed their distinguished shipmates on this assignment and anticipates that much mutual professional good will result in the exchange of ideas and experiences gathered from these maneuvers.

The Force Commander hopes that in the future the War Department will continue to send official observers.

—ED.

MOBILE MACHINE GUN NESTS

(Continued from page 11)

Model (CTL 1 and 2). Made in Indianapolis, Indiana.

Equipment:

.30 or .50 cal. or 37mm guns. (We ordered two .30 cal. machine guns flanking one .50 cal. machine gun). Ammunition racks provided. All

machine guns can train for 20 degrees elevation and transverse from the center and 10 degrees depression. Arranged so that either or both men can serve them. The armor is one-half to one-quarter inch steel with adequate ballistic characteristics. Plate replacement can be made in the field with emergency tools. Gas tanks 38 gallons; special protection reserve tank of 100 gallons.

Mechanics:

Motor 8 cylinder V type 85 H.P. Dry plate clutch. 4 speed transmission. 8 speeds forward and 2 reverse. High speed 33 and low speed 3 miles per hour. Hydraulic brakes. Cooling system—special—for motor and fighting compartment. Special cable type rubber belt track with front drive of Marmon-Herrington design. Steady firing platform is provided and leaping action eliminated. Six adjustable ports for vision of driver and gunner. The track mechanism is of continuous band cable type track belt, made up of rubber vulcanized over a steel belt of 22 continuous loops of steel cable. Driving dogs, forged center guide, fish scale mechanism, act as track guides. This is the type of track that is guaranteed for 4,000 miles of ordinary usage. The track suspension mechanism is of special Marmon-Herrington design.

Weights and Dimensions:

8,200 to 8,500 pounds heavy. 62.5 inches high, 132 inches long, 76 inches wide; 12 inches clearance. Track width 8 inches. 24 inches height to center of gravity. Turning radius 114 inches. The weight is cut about 1,000 pounds by eliminating the customary top heavy turret.

REMARKS

About two weeks ago the writer had lunch with one of our war-time Marines, a man of movie fame, who recently returned from Ethiopia, where he spent about six months, representing a news reel weekly. When this observer was asked for his opinion as to the "low-down" on the reports that had been carried in the press about the inadequacy and failures on the part of the tanks employed in that campaign, his reply was that the heat was so terrific and the tanks were so out of date that they were unsuitable for overland duty so near the equator, where water is at a premium most of the year. The observer also confided that the tanks were so slow and clumsy that they were incapable of semi-independent action, and that their gas consumption was beyond the capacity of the service of supply.

—ED.



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
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LEST YOU FORGET! These recent hits were all M-G-M's: CHINA SEAS—ANNA KARENINA—I LIVE MY LIFE—RENDEZVOUS—BROADWAY MELODY OF 1936—MUTINY ON THE BOUNTY—AH WILDERNESS—A NIGHT at the OPERA—A TALE OF TWO CITIES—ROSE MARIE.



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